Humean Research Articles

Humean Chance: Five Questions for David Lewis

Critique de l'approche du hasard objectif developpee par D. Lewis a partir du principe epistemique de la survenance et a partir d'une reconciliation entre le realisme et la metaphysique reductionniste de Hume. Defendant l'idee selon laquelle l'approche des meilleurs-systemes chez Lewis manque son propre critere pour une metaphysique du hasard, l'A. souleve cinq questions concernant la survenance du hasard et du non-hasard chez Lewis, et montre que celui-ci ne peut repondre qu'aux quatre premieres. L'A. conclut a la faillite du humeanisme reductionniste et a un conflit interne dans la position de Lewis

A Humean Definition of Horror

A Humean Definition of Horror

Humean motivation and Humean rationality

L'A. defend la these selon laquelle M. Smith ne parvient pas a defendre la theorie de la motivation de Hume en introduisant l'idee d'une explication teleologique des desirs qui motivent l'action intentionnelle. L'A. conclut a l'ineliminabilite de la rationalite normative malgre le caractere rationnel des explications de la raison motivante

728-3 Contrast-enhanced Electron Beam Tomography for 3-D Reconstruction of Coronary Arteries: Detection of Stenoses and Documentation of Angioplasty Success

Non-invasive imaging of coronary arteries is complicated by their very fast movements. We evaluated the potential of contrast-enhanced Electron Beam Tomography (EBT, Ultrafast-CT) for the visualization of coronary artery stenoses. 24 patients with angiographically documented coronary artery disease were investigated. In 5 patients, EBT was repeated after angioplasty, Contrast agent was administered via a peripheral vein and ECG-triggered axial EBT scans were obtained during breathhold (acquisition time 100 ms/slice, table movement 2 mm/slice, slice thickness 3 mm). 3-D reconstruction of the coronary arteries was performed as shaded surface display with a density threshold chosen to consider only the vessels’ contrast enhanced inner lumen. By administration of contrast agent, the mean density within the coronary artery lumen was significantly increased from 18 ± 9.7 HU (mean value of native vessels) to 212 ± 78.3 HU (p < 0.001). 3-D reconstruction with a threshold of 80 HU permitted selective visualization of the coronary arteries’ inner lumen in all cases. 9/11 hi9h grade stenoses and 5/5 occlusions of the proximal and mid LAD were clearly identified, as well as 3/4 high grade stenoses of the proximal and mid RCA (with decreased image quality due to rapid vessel movement). 2 high grade lesions of the LCX could not be identified. A followup investigation after angioplasty in 5 patients (4 pts. LAD, 1 pt. RCA) clearly visualized the increase in vessel lumen in all cases. Electron Beam Tomography with intravenous application of contrast agent permits the non-invasive imaging of high grade LAD stenoses. RCA and LCX stenoses can be visualized with limited success. The outcome of angioplasty can be documented.

Hegel and the Humean problem of induction

Hegel and the Humean problem of induction

Contrast Enhancement of Liver Parenchyma and Biliary Tract Related to Liver Function at Delayed Computed Tomography

Computed tomography (CT) of the liver was performed in 53 patients before, during and 4 to 6 hours after intravenous administration of approximately 60 g of iodine in metrizoate. At delayed CT, contrast medium was observed in the extrabiliary ducts in 20 patients (38%) and in the gallbladder in 28 (68%) of the 41 patients with no previous cholecystectomy. The increase in attenuation of liver parenchyma at delayed CT compared with the non-enhanced baseline CT ranged between 2 and 26 HU (mean 13.9). The material was divided into three groups with regard to liver function: normal, intermediate and pathologic. In the normal group contrast medium was observed in the gallbladder in 81 per cent and in the bile ducts in 57 per cent and the mean increase in attenuation of the liver parenchyma was 14.5 HU. In the pathologic group the same parameters were 40 per cent, 7 per cent and 10.6 HU, respectively. Contrast medium in the gallbladder and biliary ducts improved the information about anatomy. Pathology of the gallbladder and tumour growth along the hepatoduodenal ligament were better demonstrated. Delayed CT is a simple and non-invasive technique that may improve planning of liver surgery.

THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME

Philosophical BooksVolume 27, Issue 4 p. 256-256 THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME First published: October 1986 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1986.tb01218.xCitations: 2Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume27, Issue4October 1986Pages 256-256 RelatedInformation

Humean Fictions

Humean Fictions

Polemical Aspects of Hume's Natural History of Religion

DAVID HUME'S Natural History of Religion aroused controversy even before its publication in 1757. Bishop Warburton wrote the publisher of the work, Millar, asking that it be suppressed on the assumption that its purpose was to establish naturalism, a species of atheism, instead of religion. Reverend Caleb Fleming defended Hume's work on the grounds that Hume had finely exposed superstition and popery: professeth himself an advocate of pure theism, and as far as he a theist, he cannot be an enemy pure Christianity.1 Hume's avowed purpose, in his introduction the work, purely scholarly and apparently disinterested: What those principles are, which give rise the original belief [in religion], and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation, the subject of our present enquiry.2 Modern commentators have accepted Hume's claim at face value. H. E. Root, though he points out the one-sidedness of Hume's presentation, says There no question here of Hume's philosophical sincerity and honesty.3 J. 0. Higgins views the work similarly: the Natural History of Religion (NHR) is what its title suggests, not anti-religious propaganda, although it contained a good deal that was critical of religion or, as Hume termed it, 'popular religion,' but a natural history in the eighteenth-century style, intended

David Hume's Invisible Hand in The Wealth of Nations : The Public Choice of Moral Information

110 DAVID HUME'S INVISIBLE HAND IN THE WEALTH OF NATIONS THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF MORAL INFORMATION Introduction The thesis I shall defend is that there are systematic aspects of Adam Smith's economics which make little sense when read in isolation from a literature in which David Hume provides the signal contributions. Consequently, parts of Hume's own work are stripped of meaning, isolated as they are from later developments. The puzzles about Smith's analysis which I find illuminated by Hume's are the following: 1. Why does Smith both defend the importance of economic growth for the material of well-being of the working class and claim that property originates as spoil, impoverishing the working class? After all, in the classical system the existence of property is one requisite for economic growth. 2. Why does Smith exalt the assumption of self-interested behavior in private activity but claim that irrationality dominates the political process? 3. Why does Smith deny the importance of benevolence in Wealth of Nations and insist on the importance of morality Sentiment morality in Theory of Moral its?3 The three questions have a common feature: they are related to the question of how public goods are provided. The particular public good in question is the institution of private property. As with all true I am obligated to the Center for Study of Public Choice for generous support of my research. Suzanne Levy gets the credit for the extent to which this approaches English. I have benefited from acute comments from Charles Rowley and Charles Griswold. The errors and obscurities which remain are solely my responsibility. Ill public goods, society considered as a whole benefits from having such an institution, but each individual considered separately can gain by anti-social behavior.4 Public goods provide a considerable difficulty for any social institution; neither competition in the market nor government requests that individuals reveal how much they wish to be taxed are certain to be efficient. There are aspects of the classical economic analysis which stress the importance of moral information as a partial solution to the public goods problem. By "moral information" I only require that the theory is employed as a guide and that if an individual acts contrary to the theory, this choice is not cited as "falsifying" the theory. Rather, something is said to be "wrong" or "wicked" about the choice.6 Much of modern economic analysis assumes that individuals have perfect information; this postulate rules out any significant role for moral information in the provision of the public goods. To avoid assuming away such a role for morality, we will drop the perfect information assumption and then examine if we can make sense of the classics' attack on the public goods problem. Of course, the specification that individuals see their own interests very poorly is consistent with Smith's general approach. The technique employed below is to look at the issue which Hume and Smith addressed as a problem in modern economics. The key difficulty is to determine under what conditions moral information could guide individuals with very imperfect perceptions to maximize their utility. In particular, suppose we find that moral guidance tells an individual how efficiently to produce. Is this morality self-enforcing or are resources required to persuade people to act in accord with these teachings? If resources are required, we will not pay much attention to just how this persuasion 112 is provided, e.g., whether we tell people that theft is "evil" or whether we hang a few thieves. General production theory tells us we probably will do both, but this is a separate issue. The argument to be advanced is that moral information has self-enforcement properties in private activities but these properties are missing in public activities. In this account, then, real resources will be required for implementing the morality. This consideration in turn raises an interesting issue. If the government expends these resources, what reason is there to believe that they will be provided to serve the public interest and not the interest of the government? Is it possible that the government can prosper by keeping people ignorant or by giving them advice...

David Hume on Reason, Passions and Morals

26. DAVID HUME ON REASON, PASSIONS AND MORALS Perhaps the most notorious passage in Hume's Treatise is the one that concerns the relative roles of reason and passions, where he says: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions (T 415). This psychology of action is the foundation of Hume's moral theory, wherein we find his two other notorious dicta, one being !.¡oral distinctions cannot be derived from reason, and the other, Ought cannot be derived from is. Many commentators have interpreted Hume as saying that reason plays no role in the making of moral judgments, and, while not taking the rationalistic line, criticized him for not giving reason its proper due. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's primary concern is to argue against the rationalist position which takes reason to be sufficient (always or sometimes) to move one to act, and to give rise to moral judgments. I wish to show that Hume is only concerned with dismissing the claim that reason could be a sufficient condition, not that it is a necessary one. Indeed, Hume could be interpreted as saying that reason is no less important than passions in shaping human conduct, anc in the area of inorai conduct, there can be no moral judgments without the work of reason. At the same time, however, passions remain the prime mover; reason does not move us to act (generally, hence morally). 1 shall try to show that the dictum '¿¡oral distinctions cannot be derived from reason' is essentially correct, but its being correct in no way shows that reason is not a necessary element of moral distinctions. 27. Before discussing the views of some critics of Hume's moral theory, it is important to clear up one source of misunderstanding that lies in Hume's discussion of the psychology of action. When Hume says that reason is the slave of passions, he does not say thereby that reason is unimportant. He is saying merely that reason alone does not move one to act. The force that propels one to action is the passion, whether it be love, or anger, or pride, or envy, or fear, or desire. Reason alone does not provide the motive. However, it is reason that does the groundwork, analyzing facts, perceiving relations, and drawing conclusions, all of which go to determine which action to perform, but the action will not be performed unless one of the passions is also present. Just because reason is the slave does not indicate that its work is not relevant. To extend the slavery metaphor, we may observe that slave owners supported slavery for the very reason that the slave's work was found indispensable; analogously, it must be observed that Hume is most unlikely to hole that reason plays no part in human action. To complete the analogy, we should say that while much could be achieved with slaves, it was the masters who conceived the plan, and the masters must rank higher in the causal order. We may observe further that greater achievement could be had by treating slaves properly, not overworking them, and not ill-treating them. If reason is the slave, it will be in our interest to cultivate it, sharpen it, and use it always and to the full. This could be inferred from HuTr.e's discussion of the understanding in Book 1 of the Treatise. indeed, in the conclusion of Book I, Hume points out forcefully that we contradict ourselves if we hold that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be 28. receiv'd (T 268). For it is only through reasoning that we arrive at any such conclusion. He goes on to say: Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction (T268). There cannot be a clearer demonstration that it is not the case that Hume fails to give reason its proper due. Later, I shall cite further evidence for this in relation specifically to the role of reason in...

ANOTHER LETTER OF DAVID HUME

ANOTHER LETTER OF DAVID HUME RICHARD H. POPKIN RICHARD H. POPKIN Washington University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Notes and Queries, Volume 31, Issue 1, March 1984, Pages 6–7, https://doi.org/10.1093/nq/31-1-6 Published: 01 March 1984

A Humean Pattern of Justification

A Humean Pattern of Justification

Actions, reasons, and Humean causes

Actions, reasons, and Humean causes

Actions, Reasons, and Humean Causes

Actions, Reasons, and Humean Causes

Some Unorthodox (But Decidedly Humean) Reflections on the Ramifications of the Fact/Value Disjunction

Some Unorthodox (But Decidedly Humean) Reflections on the Ramifications of the Fact/Value Disjunction

Faith in Other People: Three Views

FAITH IN OTHER PEOPLE: THREE VIEWS THE " CREDIBILITY GAP" which was once considered the affiiction of a political administration has now become a general feature of our society. Economic and ethnic groups now meet one another in principle with skepticism. A deep-seated mistrust governs relationships among nations and between individuals. In view of this, the question concerning the conditions necessary for people to trust each other seems to be an urgent one. The problem seems acute enough to warrant an essay which has as its concern precisely the question of what it means to have faith in another person, and this article will endeavor to explore this issue by analyzing and evaluating three contrasting notions of what is involved in believing other people. The division of the essay is threefold : Part One will consider the contribution of the empiricism of David Hume, while the emphasis on reason of some scholastic writers will provide the framework for discussion in Part Two. Lastly, Part Three will propose the personalist approach of the nineteenth-century neo-scholastic thinker Matthias Joseph Scheeben. I DAviD HuME Perhaps the most influential philosopher in the Englishspeaking world at the present time is still David Hume. Certainly, the general principles which he laid down concerning human knowledge are in many ways the outstanding expression of the empirical outlook which has in general characterized the Anglo-Saxon mentality, and these principles also form the foundations of the analytic philosophy which prevails in much of the English-speaking world. For Hume, a wise man will proportion his expectation of 438 FAITH IN OTHER PEOPLE: THREE VIEWS 439 future events in general to the degree o£ regularity with which he has experienced them in the past. For example, I have had a certain experience o£ this particular individual, and I have found that his statements proved perhaps rarely true, or perhaps frequently so, or perhaps almost always so. I£ I am sensible, I will proportion my confidence in his future statements to my past experience o£ his reliability. Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am surrounded by my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leave it in order to rob me of my silver standish.But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy.So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears.1 The more extensive my experience of a person, the better position I am in to know how to expect him to act. H I know him very well, not even the irregularities in his manner of acting will surprise me. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. A person of obliging disposition gives a peevish answer: but he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: but he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others, we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. However, for me to form a judgment as to a person's reliability , it is not essential that I have had personal experience of him. There is, in general, a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages. . . . The same motives always produce the same 1 Enquiry, Section 8, Part I, source of the subsequent passages cited. 440 PATRICK BURKE actions: the same events follow from the same causes. Ambition , avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning...

STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME

Philosophical BooksVolume 6, Issue 1 p. 12-12 STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME DAVID R. BELL, DAVID R. BELLSearch for more papers by this author DAVID R. BELL, DAVID R. BELLSearch for more papers by this author First published: January 1965 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1965.tb01358.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume6, Issue1January 1965Pages 12-12 RelatedInformation

THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME

Philosophical BooksVolume 5, Issue 3 p. 25-27 THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME CHRISTOPHER CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER CHERRYSearch for more papers by this author CHRISTOPHER CHERRY, CHRISTOPHER CHERRYSearch for more papers by this author First published: October 1964 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1964.tb00884.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume5, Issue3October 1964Pages 25-27 RelatedInformation

Hume’s Approach to Causation

DAVID HUME has described his theory of causation as the 'chief argument' of his Treatise of Human Nature. The broad lines of that argument are well known, and need not be detailed here. Hume's conclusion is that causation is not a ' power ' in the cause but a ' felt compulsion ' in the mind- an expectation that a certain event will be followed by a certain other event of the type habitually associated with the first in our experience. Both events are perceptions; the first is an impression, the second a believed idea: and causation is the association of the two. Furthermore, Hume not only expresses his notion of causation in terms of the theory of impressions and ideas; he also argues to it by means of this theory. I take the liberty of making these assertions without argument in the belief that they will be generally accepted: but I should like to argue the following propositions: I. that the theory of impressions and ideas, which Hume utilises in his later discussion of causation, is based on that precise theory of causation which the later discussion is designed to refute. II. that Hume's discussion of association makes appeal to a variety of causal theories. We shall consider these in turn.