A large literature on institutions has developed that claims that institutions influence long-run growth and development; thus, it becomes critical to carefully examine what institutions influence which outcomes to better understand factors that influence long-run economic growth across countries. Douglass North terms institutions as the rules of the game and this paper will work to further examine these rules by looking at private property rights institutions, which are the rules and regulation protecting citizens against the power of the government and elites , and contracting institutions, which are the rules and regulations governing contracts between ordinary citizens. The paper Unbundling Institutions , published in the Journal of Political Economy by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson in 2005, seeks to conceptualize the different factors within the institutional framework and provide some semblance of which of these factors provide the most relevant analysis. The paper finds that property rights institutions have a strong influence on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development, while contracting institutions have a more limited impact on those same factors. My presentation will give a concise background on the development of the new institutional approach and explain the reasoning for the conceptual divide between property rights and contracting institutions. Using a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) approach and the instrumental variable approach, the presentation will address issues of causality and correlation. Identifying the link to the policy arena will provide context as to why this area is of particular importance.