The European Union (EU) Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive) was enacted in December 2014 after nearly a decade of consultations—its implementation was due by 27 December 2016.1 The Directive entails a number of requirements reforming the Member States’ substantive and procedural law, thereby specifying the European damages regime. It seeks to boost private enforcement and, in particular, to enable each purchaser that suffers damage due to infringements of competition law to claim compensation. The main objective of the Directive is the attainment of ‘full compensation’, with ‘deterrence’ being stipulated as an important secondary goal.2 ... This paper brings into focus the harm borne by final consumers. Any infringement which raises prices to final consumers, either directly or indirectly through the supply chain, may harm such consumers in two different ways. First, final consumers who made some purchases during the infringement period (e.g. at the time a cartel was in place) may have done so at inflated prices. We refer to this as the ‘overcharge effect’. Second, final consumers who refrained from purchasing (or reduced their purchase volume) during the infringement period only because of the inflated prices, but who would have purchased (more) absent the infringement, suffered from a so-called ‘lost consumption effect’. This damage component, equivalent, in economic terms, to the deadweight loss generated by the infringement, captures the benefits (the utility) that consumers would have derived from all the purchases which did not effectively take place because of the infringement. No matter how straightforward the existence of the ‘lost consumption effect’ may be from an economic point of view, it is very difficult, from a legal perspective, for individual consumers to prove that they would have made a purchase if the prices were lower but refrained from doing so due to the infringement. Hence, we argue that all necessary actions—in particular enabling consumer collective redress mechanisms—should be taken to facilitate compensation for the harm resulting from the ‘overcharge effect’ in order to guarantee that the final consumers benefit, at least, from viable enforcement mechanisms related to that share of their overall harm. In this paper, we present the economic and legal arguments supporting our views.