Cypriot Leader Research Articles

The role of operational code and the Cyprus negotiations: the case of Derviş Eroğlu as the Turkish Cypriot leader

ABSTRACT This study aims to contribute to the literature on the Cyprus negotiations at the individual level and to identify the political-psychological factors underlying the negotiations through operational code analysis. Moreover, it also aims to analyze the role of operational code in intercommunal negotiations at the macro-function level. Using the Verbs In Context System (VICS) method, a quantitative variant of the operational code approach, this study examines President Eroğlu’s verbs in his public statements between 2010 and 2015 when he was in office and measures his political beliefs in the context of the Cyprus negotiations. It then discusses the macro-functionality of his operational code, especially at the domestic level. The external dimension of the operational code of Eroğlu related to his beliefs about the other was identified as ‘conflicting,’ but the internal dimension related to his beliefs about himself as ‘somewhat cooperative.’ In terms of macro-functionality, it was reported that Eroğlu’s operational code was far from serving the federal vision in intercommunal talks. Besides, it was concluded that his overall operational code contributed to the reproduction of the status quo and related nationalist and ethicist dominant identities in both the north and south of Cyprus.

Revisiting the road to Cypriot independence

ABSTRACT In September 1958 Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, told Barbara Castle, the then Chair of the British Labour Party, that, after three and a half years of violence from EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών/National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis), he now supported a brief period of self-government, followed by the independence of Cyprus. He agreed to set aside enosis unless it was supported in the United Nations in the future. This led to independence, with Makarios considered ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence. But little has been said about the idea of independence before that point, about the opposition to it from EOKA, or about others who proposed independence from 1954. This article focuses on the role and proposals of Jason Loukianou, a prominent Cypriot in London, which have not been previously discussed. It proposes a revision to the idea that Makarios was ‘the father’ of Cypriot independence.

Tweet for peace: Twitter as a medium for developing a peace discourse in the hands of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders

PurposeThe article examines how the two Cypriot leaders – the Greek-Cypriot community leader Nicos Anastasiades and the Turkish-Cypriot community leader Mustafa Akinci – have used their Twitter accounts during the period leading to the intensification of the Cyprus peace process between 30 April 2015 and 31 October 2016.Design/methodology/approachThis article presents, using descriptive analysis and thematic analysis, how the two leaders have used Twitter in the negotiations' period.FindingsThe analysis shows that the leaders, during the time frame examined, developed both pro-peace discourses around the Cyprus problem and para-social and vicarious intergroup contact that contributed in what Hogg (2015) defines an intergroup relational identity that is an effective form of “bridging” leadership across communities.Originality/valueThe article argues that Twitter is a tool that, in the hands of political leaders in segregated public spheres caused by yet unresolved ethnic conflicts, can become a useful tool for constructing both a positive meaning around issues concerning the rival sides and transforming opposing social identities in the formation of an “extended sense of self that includes the collaboration partner” (Hogg, 2015, p. 191).Peer reviewThe peer-review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/OIR-03-2022-0161

Diplomatic ambiguity: Cyprus 1961–1963 – how ambivalent diplomatic attitudes, particularly those of the CRO, encouraged dangerous Greek Cypriot attempts to modify the status quo created by the London and Zurich agreements

ABSTRACT This article will focus on the international relations that the Greek Cypriot leaders sought to build up between 1960 and 1963 as part of an attempt to secure more substantial power for the Greek Cypriot majority on the internal front and a more substantial independence for the new state than the 1960 Treaties allowed. It will analyse the causes for optimism regarding this policy. It emerges that both courses were more dangerous than they may have seemed at the time. The Island’s colonial legacy of Commonwealth membership tended to give the Greek Cypriot leadership the impression that there were more possibilities for the promotion of greater substance to majority rule within the Island and more choice in the new Republic’s international status than there actually were. In this context, the lack of cooperation between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office resulted in an element of deceptive ambiguity regarding the British position on the Cyprus issue. Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Republic, maintained a positive attitude towards the Commonwealth not least because it allowed Cyprus to belong to an international organisation outside Turkish-Greek protection intended by the guarantor powers. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader closest to the Turkish government, opposed membership for diametrically opposite reasons.

Ethnic Protection Rackets: Turkish Cypriot Statebuilding before 1974

ABSTRACT For the ten years prior to the Turkish partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones, the Turkish Cypriot community lived in distinct ethnic enclaves governed by a parallel Turkish Cypriot administration. I argue that Turkish Cypriot elites formed a system of reciprocal relations with their community by acting as ethnic protection racketeers. With few material resources, but a demand for protection during intercommunal fighting, Turkish Cypriot leaders monopolised protection over and within enclaves, while also deterring co-ethnics from leaving their protection despite poor conditions. Ultimately, this influenced Turkish Cypriot preferences in UN-led talks, demanding to retain autonomy over specific territories they controlled, especially in providing security.

The Inter-Communal Talks and Political Life in Cyprus: 1974-1983

<p>This paper conducts historical research on the inter-communal talks and the political life in the two communities of Cyprus from 1974 to 1983. The period covered by the research commenced with the creation of the bi-regional structure on the island in 1974 and ceased with the declaration of Turkish Cypriot Independence in 1983. As this period constitutes an important threshold in the history of Cyprus, it might be argued that observing the political developments it covers is likely to be beneficial for the literature. The research focused on the two communities’ positions in negotiations as well as their elections and political actors. It utilized Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot newspapers (and official press releases), political leaders’ memoirs, national archives of USA (NARA) as well as official online documents. Its findings indicate that the two sides could not reach to a settlement mainly due to their disagreements on the authorities of central and regional governments. While the Turkish Cypriot side promoted broader authorities for the regional governments, the Greek Cypriot side favoured broader authorities for the central government. On the other hand, while Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş had managed to unite the majority of Turkish Cypriot right-wing voters, the Greek Cypriot right-wing was divided among supporters of Makarios and Clerides. On the other hand, while the Greek Cypriot left-wing was in cooperation with Makarios, the Turkish Cypriot left-wing opposed Denktaş’s policies. </p>

Averting institutional disasters? Drawing lessons from China to inform the Cypriot response to the COVID‐19 pandemic

AbstractUsing ‘t Hart's (2014) typology of crises, we explore the Republic of Cyprus's initial response to the COVID‐19 crisis and contend Cypriot leaders indirectly drew lessons from the Chinese experience to prevent a situational crisis from metastasizing into a much broader institutional crisis. The lessons Cyprus drew from China to secure this outcome reinforced the critical nature of transparency and timeliness in sharing epidemiological information, swift intervention efforts to minimize virus transmission, and privileging expert involvement in shaping the response plan. We conclude with implications for public leadership and lesson‐drawing under crisis.

Methodology issues of forensic excavations at coastal sites. The Cyprus (Committee on the Missing Persons in Cyprus) experience.

In 1981, the talks between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders resulted in the establishment of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), as a tripartite bi-communal committee taking decisions on the basis of consensus. It is comprised of three Members, representing the Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot community, while the Third Member is nominated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.

The Quest for a Political Settlement in Cyprus: Is a Dyadic Federation Viable?

Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders have been negotiating to create a “bi-zonal, bi-communal” federation over a span of thirty-six years, but despite support from the United Nations and other intermediaries, no agreement has yet been reached. This article examines the reasons why the many attempts to negotiate a “federal solution” have failed. Our argument is that dyadic federations have inherent flaws that make them difficult to operate successfully, and even if the two communities could somehow be persuaded to form such a union, it would not be viable as a system of government.

Contesting colonial rule: Politics of exile in the Indian Ocean

This paper examines the compulsory relocation of anti-colonial nationalists from other parts of the empire to Seychelles during British colonial rule. It explores how these colonial policies of forced expulsion that were used to contain anti-colonial political activity unintentionally enabled political exiles to create new trans-imperial networks of resistance. From the late 1800s, the British Colonial Government exiled to Seychelles over 500 anti-colonial leaders and their followers from Egypt, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Palestine and other colonies; the last political exile was Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios who arrived in Seychelles in 1956. Based on archival and empirical research this paper examines their experiences of exile and how, despite feelings of loss and isolation, they continued to challenge colonial authority by mobilising new forms of contestation. Through a colonial geographical imaginary, Seychelles was constructed as distant, remote and isolated, a place where political agitators could be safely confined and prevented from infecting others with their anti-colonial sentiments. Instead, however, these movements brought colonised people together from across the empire and created spatially extended networks of ideas that became significant in connecting these ‘remote’ islands to other places. Exiles disrupted the authority of the British Colonial Government through mundane and small acts of resistance in which they made constant, almost daily, demands for their right to return home and better living conditions. This study, on a much under-researched form of imperial mobility and confinement, contributes to debates on colonialism, space and resistance by identifying networks produced by colonised people and, through an exploration of translocal subaltern agency and resistance, confounds place-bound notions of politics.

Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic Democracy: The Failure of Nationalist Leadership from the Hague Talks to the Cyprus Referendum

Supported by the EU and the international community, the extraordinary effort of the UN to mediate a settlement of the Cyprus problem before the integration of Cyprus into the EU ended in failure. The two historical highlights that marked the failure of the peace process were the top level talks at The Hague in March 2003 and the Cyprus referendum in April 2004. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership played in derailing the peace effort during these two defining moments in the evolution of the Cyprus problem. The analysis focuses on the polarizing ethno-centric nationalism of the then Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. But it does so by contrasting the respective nationalism of the leaders to the Europeanizing and peace-enhancing trends that were emerging in Cypriot civil society and Greco-Turkish relations during the crucial period leading to the Hague talks and the Cyprus referendum. From this perspective, the role of the Cypriot leaders during the negotiation process is assessed against the backdrop of Turkey’s changed policy on Cyprus and the deepening interethnic rapprochement between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, especially following the lifting of restriction to free movement across the green line in April 2003. The investigation attempts to explore how the stubborn sustenance and strategic reactivation of the legacy of adversarial nationalism, as well as the perpetuation of the mono-ethnic concept of statehood by the Cypriot leaders rendered them practically unwilling and ideologically incapable of recognizing and seizing the greatest historical opportunity for peace in Cyprus in half a century.

Constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem

Cyprus remains a divided island 22 years after the Turkish ‘invasion’ and its partition. A set of guidelines aimed at reunification with safeguards for the Greek and Turkish communities was agreed under United Nations auspices in 1977. But the principles were not drafted sufficiently tightly, allowing for a wide degree of interpretation. Proposals advanced by Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders differed fundamentally; the Greek community sought a unified federal state with strong powers at the Greek centre while the Turkish community wanted a loose federation with the capacity to develop into a closer union as confidence grew. Changes in the Greek leadership prompted renewed diplomatic effort at the UN and the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’ but the issue of sovereignty remains unresolved. One solution might be a Swiss cantonal‐style constitution with a bicameral legislature electing a president for one year only. But the probability is the domination of the machinery of government by the Greek community. The European ...

Boutros‐Ghali's Cyprus initiative in 1992: why did it fail?

The Cyprus dispute is one of the international/intercommunal conflicts that appears to have become less solvable in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The reduced probability of a negotiated settlement is all the more surprising given the commitment of the American-led and more homogeneous-looking UN Security Council to a rapid solution in the post-1990 era. In early 1991, departing from its traditional low-profile mediation role in the Cyprus dispute, the Security Council authorized the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to use all the means necessary to compel the parties to compromise. The United States also did not hesitate to put pressure on Ankara to dissuade Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash who was perceived to be more of a problem than recent Greek Cypriot leaders George Vasiliou or Glafkos Kleridhis from resisting a settlement. Yet neither the recent high-handed American approach nor the unconventional assertiveness of Boutros-Ghali has brought the parties any nearer to a settlement. Actually, the failure of the recent intercommunal negotiations and New York summits should not have caught anybody familiar with the dispute unawares. In nearly two decades of intercommunal talks significant progress has been made in establishing the characteristics of the federal state, but serious disagreements remain over a number of issues. Nevertheless, Ghali heralded the recent developments as promising the settlement of the age-old dispute, and in 1992 the then Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis reflected the same optimism when he stated that 'only a few weeks are left before the Cyprus problem is solved'.'

Ancient Affections: Standing in the Way of Resolution in Cyprus?

ANCIENT AFFECTIONS: ____ STANDING IN THE WAY OF RESOLUTION IN CYPRUS? NicholmSambanis x. he history ofthe Mediterranean is infused with memories oftragedy. It is a history that warns against naive reflections on die region's feuds and precludes superficial solutions to ancient problems. War, partition, and die disappointing setdement process in Cyprus are cases in point Since 1977 the only officially negotiated solution to die Cyprus problem has been the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Yet under die present circumstances of ethnic hostility and resentment a workable Cypriot federation is not feasible. Radier, a Cypriot federation should be considered die ultimate—not the immediate—goal. The conflict in Cyprus is complex and has been influenced and often dominated by global and regional powers. Today, however, the problem is essentially internal, perpetuated by the animosity of rival identity groups. Increasingly, it is clear that communal initiatives to improve interedinic relations will be necessary to resolve the conflict The potential of these initiatives to improve relations is considerable, since die hostility diat divides die two ethnic groups in Cyprus is not inescapable or innate. Instead, die hostility has been primarily shaped by external factors. Furthermore, the lack of progress so fer in the negotiations is an outcome not only of the hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also of die limited scope of the different mediation efforts. Nicholas Sambanis received his M.A. in international economics and European studies from SAIS in May 1992 and was a visiting scholar at the International Economics Department of SAIS from 1993 to 1994. He is currendy a Ph.D. candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University. 125 126 SAISReview SUMMER-FALL 1994 The Cyprus problem presents us widi a great contemporary challenge: to identify a political system mat offers a compromise between the ungovernable situation thatwould ensue ifall edinic groups suddenly achieved self-determination and die also potentially explosive situation of keeping minority groups underprivileged in modern, multicultural societies. Federalism is one system that could offer such a compromise, ifit protects more than the basic freedoms ofall groups, and diese groups joindy design all federal institutions. But since a consensual basis for a Cypriot federation does not currendy exist, plans for a federal solution should be postponed until diere is improvement in interethnic relations within aie framework of a transitional government Federalism will quite likely be the optimal solution in die long run, following a process ofconfidence-building and state-building measures. For the time being, we must acceptthis pragmatic appraisal ofthe situation and develop strategies for cooperation to lay die foundation for a more positive future. A Feasible Solution to the Cyprus Problem! The protractedness of die Cyprus conflict is attributable to five main factors: Cypriot attitudes, die involvement of regional and global powers, the ineffectiveness of past mediation efforts, the complexity of protracted social conflicts, and die emphasis on establishing a federation widiout solid foundations on bodi sides. Greek and Turkish Cypriot concerns continue to be defined in mutually exclusive terms, and fear and distrust prevail. Intransigent attitudes deadlock negotiations, giving many observers die impression that the Cyprus problem is insoluble. The conflict's long history seems to disprove die old maxim diat "any solution is better than no solution." Cypriots have long waited for what they consider the optimal solution, and die majority do not wish to compromise . The lack ofconsensus among Greek Cypriots regarding die goals ofdie negotiations inhibits the formation ofa consistent position.1 The indecision of Greek Cypriots has encountered die consistendy negative attitudes of die Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (trnc). flexibility on both sides is essential for the negotiations to move forward. Establishing democratic processes in the trnc may increase its flexibility. Such processes may be promoted by holding UN-monitored elections in die Turkish Cypriot part to ensure that voices ofopposition to Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, 1 Van Coufoudakis in Norma Salem, Cyprus: a Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). ANCIENT AFFECTIONS IN CYPRUS 127 are heard. Greek Cypriots must also show greater flexibility if they wish to change the status quo partition. Greece and Turkey, two "guarantor" powers of Cypriot independence, have both...

Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958

In the second half of the 1950s, Greek foreign policy was dominated by the Cyprus question, while in the Middle East the same period was marked by a series of crises. The developments in the Middle East were important to the Greek government partly because Cyprus’s fate depended primarily on British decisions — and these decisions were connected to Britain’s position in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the turbulence in the region endangered the Greek communities in it, mainly the large community in Egypt. Yet, it may be said that Athens was rather slow in making an approach to the Arabs, on whose votes the United Nations debates on Cyprus largely depended: such approach took place only in Spring 1956, after the British had deported the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, and after the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis had scored its first electoral victory.

Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958

AbstractIn the second half of the 1950s, Greek foreign policy was dominated by the Cyprus question, while in the Middle East the same period was marked by a series of crises. The developments in the Middle East were important to the Greek government partly because Cyprus's fate depended primarily on British decisions – and these decisions were connected to Britain's position in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the turbulence in the region endangered the Greek communities in it, mainly the large community in Egypt. Yet, it may be said that Athens was rather slow in making an approach to the Arabs, on whose votes the United Nations debates on Cyprus largely depended: such approach took place only in Spring 1956, after the British had deported the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, and after the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis had scored its first electoral victory.

The First Republic of Cyprus: a Review of an Unworkable Constitution

I HE FIRST Republic of Cyprus fell in the onslaught of ethnic warfare which erupted in the island three days before Christmas 1963. At that moment, a wobbly constitution was symbolically consumed by the internecine flames and one thing was made certain: the Greco-Turkish conflict could never be resolved anew by turning back four years to the better days when delicate international give-and-take made Cypriot independence possible. The story of the first constitution of Cyprus which has been likened to a masterfully jeweled watch is one of finely drawn compromise, a fascinating account of sincere though unrealistic legalism or how not to bring an anxious colony into statehood. Independent Cyprus came into being as a result of the Zurich-London Agreements in 1959 between Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Cypriot leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities. The Agreements were basically a series of concessions which actually satisfied none of the parties. Nevertheless, these provisions formed the basis of three treaties and the Republic's constitution. The Treaty of Establishment defined the territory of the Republic, excluding two enclaves on the south shore of the island which were to be retained as British Sover-