Prior to a firm’s earnings announcement, the capital market receives earnings-relevant information from a wide array of sources. While prior research isolates specific incentives that influence the timeliness of particular disclosures, our understanding of how these forces combine to influence the aggregate timeliness of earnings information to the market is limited. In this study, I use daily analyst forecasts to examine the arrival of earnings information to the market and assess how its timeliness varies with the direction and magnitude of the earnings news. Despite managers’ career-driven incentives to leak good news and withhold bad news, I document that the flow of earnings information to the market is significantly more timely for bad news than for good news. This asymmetry, however, is reduced for more extreme earnings news. That is, as the magnitude of the earnings news increases, good news becomes more timely whereas bad news becomes less timely. Collectively, my results are most consistent with a scenario where managers face a tradeoff between current stock price implications and future reporting reputation benefits.