(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)I. IntroductionThe precipitous fall of stock market indexes of the major South and East Asian economies which happened in late 1997 inspired researchers to investigate the 'interdependence' and 'contagion' debacle across the region. Controversial arguments that emphasize strong market linkage between markets do so simply for the fact that there are co-movement of markets and risks are generally country-specific (Daly, 2003). The reinforcement of the notion of international diversification that defines the primary motivation for risk-averse investors, drawn by 'portfolio rebalancing', is a critical tenet of the much studied 'Efficient market hypothesis. In contrast to the investor's desire for a relatively low correlation, contagion effect causes the crisis spill over to markets with relatively little or no 'economic linkage'. The presence of the 'contagion' undermines much of the rationale of 'portfolio rebalancing' (Islam et al., 2013). To understand the state of interdependence between markets, it is crucial to understand individual behavior contributing to shock transmission. While much of the state of contagion can best be assessed with dynamic conditional mean and variance, the essential long term association may call for unique marginal reconstructions.The major Southeast Asian economies prior to the Asian crisis have attracted half of the total capital inflows in Asia. High interest rates for seekers of higher returns primarily found Asian markets to be much more attractive than European markets. The increased capital investment eventually resulted in higher-leveraged economies, creating an asset bubble. As some critics suggested, accelerated growth such as that of the Southeast Asian region would only bring prosperity if improvement of total factor productivity surpassed immediate capital expansion (Krugman, 1994). The situation was made worse in the face of capital outflows, as many Asian economies shifted from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes, and faced immense depreciative pressure.The first degree markets are the crisis markets (Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand) from which shock is believed to have spilled over to the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore (Secondary crisis markets) and into many other Asian economies. Thailand, as the ground zero market, had to rely on Structural Adjustment Package (Khan, 2004). This compelled the Hong Kong government, which previously allowed short selling by speculators, to impose strict capital controls and direct capital market intrusion (Corbett and Vines, 1999). In contrast, Malaysia shifted from a floating to a fixed exchange regime, and profound restrictions were imposed. South Korean currency devaluation then quickly doubled. However, South Korea, with proper policy in place, tripled its per capita GDP in the eventually. China and Singapore allowed capital outflow, but successfully recovered due to their improved total factor productivity.It did not take very long before the Asian economies in crisis regained their previous form. Nonetheless, they were initially throttled by hasty liberalization, lack of corporate governance and proper financial controls (Daly, 2003). Among others, there were things such as the abrupt lifting of the credit ceiling, and restrictions on the rate of return as emphasized by Montes and Popov (1998). During the periods following this turmoil, developing economies quickly responded with foreign currency reserves, and 'Pan Asian currency swaps' were introduced as insurance against individual and country specific risks. Interestingly, nations such as Japan, China and India restricted their economies from building up extensive 'foreign exchange reserves', shifting funds to US treasury bonds, mortgage markets and securities, leading to the development of an asset bubble in the US.The most significant economic crisis in recent history, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008, warrants much investigation. …