Missile Crisis Research Articles

At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

Recent studies in nuclear deterrence show that nuclear punishment is infeasible in most cases due to the opponent’s second-strike capability, tactical redundancy, and the logic of self-deterrence. However, if the challenge against nuclear deterrence is expected to go unpunished, the deterrent policy is not credible and will likely fail. Can the defender violently punish the challenger possessing nuclear weapons? If it can, under what conditions? Thanks to President Kennedy’s tape recordings, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various theories on the defender’s policy choices after deterrence failure. This article derives a research hypothesis and its competing counterpart and examines their respective explanatory power via a process-tracing analysis of key members within the Executive Committee during the crisis. The study finds that the challenger’s feasibility of retaliating with atomic weapons is a crucial predictor for the defender’s policy choices.

Penkovsky, the Spy Who Tried to Destroy the World

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lore and popular culture tout Col. Oleg Penkovsky as “the spy who saved the world” during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In fact, his contribution to U.S. intelligence and policymaking is exaggerated, distorted, and in several instances falsified. More disturbing, Penkovsky harbored a murderous rage against the Soviet system and repeatedly tried to inveigle the West in a quixotic quest to destroy it. He devised a plan to blow up Moscow, advocated preventive war against the Soviet Union, fanned the flames of the Berlin crisis with false reports of Kremlin mobilization for war, and recommended assassinating Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Penkovsky allegedly provided critical information that bought time for President John F. Kennedy to devise a diplomatic solution to the Cuban crisis before Soviet missiles were ready to fire. Not true, according to the president’s advisers. New information reveals that some Soviet missiles were combat-ready two days before U.S. intelligence discovered the first incomplete launch site. The State Committee for Security (KGB) allowed Penkovsky to continue spying for at least ten months after he came under suspicion, perhaps to protect a mole in American or British intelligence. A senior CIA officer claimed that, meanwhile, the Soviets controlled and manipulated Penkovsky without his knowledge. Even after his arrest, Penkovsky may have attempted to instigate a nuclear war by tricking the KGB into sending a false alert of an impending Soviet surprise attack on the United States.

The strength of weak bonds: Substituting bodily copresence in diplomatic social bonding

One of the central puzzles in the study of diplomacy is why some interactions between leaders result in positive social bonds, while others are mired in distrust and hostility. Recent research in the field of microsociology, the study of everyday interactions, most notably the pioneering research of American sociologist Randall Collins, suggests several critical ingredients for a successful interaction, including bodily copresence. In this article we interrogate this claim and provide theoretical reasons why textual communication may serve as a proxy for copresence in leader interactions. We demonstrate that while copresence, in the form of face-to-face interaction, is required for strong bond formation, mediated interaction in the form of letters can serve to create weak social bonds. The strength of weak bonds is in the reduction of distrust and the gradual development of trust that can be critical to the de-escalation of crises. Empirically, we explore our argument in two hard cases for social bond formation: the letters exchanged between Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the interactions, both textual and face-to-face, between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan at the end of the Cold War. We conclude by pointing toward an interdisciplinary research agenda on the determinants of social bond formation in diplomacy.

Revisiting the Role of Nuclear Weapons in India-Pakistan Conflict: A Case Study of the Kargil Conflict

The Kargil conflict is categorised as a “staircase nuclear conflict.” According to the literature, in such conflicts, the incentives for the first use of nuclear weapons are present. The Kargil conflict, along with the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and the USSR and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash, are taken as the only incidents when two nuclear states fought each other since the advent of nuclear weapons. Contrary to the generally held belief, this paper argues that Kargil was not a nuclear conflict. This paper will raise some questions about the categorisation of Kargil as a nuclear conflict. Prime amongst them: what was the level of readiness and operationalisation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons at the time of the Kargil operation? The paper argues that Kargil occurred too soon after the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and that because it occurred one-year post-Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests should not elevate it to be a nuclear conflict. The paper further argues that there is a need for more rigorous analysis to work out criteria for how, when and why a conflict should be categorised and analysed as a nuclear conflict.

A. A. Gromyko: diplomacy of a new world order

The author writes about the outstanding Soviet diplomat, politician and statesman A. A. Gromyko. On the priority directions of A. A. Gromyko. The fact that Soviet diplomacy, expressed by A. A. Gromyko, contributed to the victory of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition in World War II. About the United Nations — a new international organization of the nuclear era, with universal competence and a broad representative composition, in the creation of which A. A. Gromyko made a significant contribution. On the main provisions of the UN Charter, which is signed by A. A. Gromyko. On controversial issues on the formation of the foundations of the UN, in the solution of which A. A. Gromyko was directly involved: initial membership; the problem of "small countries"; “veto” rule; the composition and powers of the UN Security Council, etc. On agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons, in the development of which A. A. Gromyko, who ensured the effectiveness of the "nuclear deterrent" strategy. On the principled position of A. A. Gromyko in the negotiations on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which contributed to its settlement. About the professional qualities of A. A. Gromyko, about his mastery of the art of diplomacy, about his state thinking as a person, which ultimately led to the recognition of the USSR as a Great Power. The fact that the strategy of "nuclear deterrence", at the origins of the political and diplomatic development of which was A. A. Gromyko, still guarantees universal security. The fact that the "nuclear parity" of the opposing sides was achieved and legally formalized thanks to, among other things, the diplomatic efforts of A. A. Gromyko, which did not allow the Cold War to develop into an open nuclear confrontation. The author has convincingly shown that A. A. Gromyko was not just an ordinary government official, he really made a decisive personal contribution to the construction of a new post-war world order, which for more than 75 years has been ensuring the sustainable development of mankind without global wars.

Intelligence analysis as cryptic hermeneutics

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to show the extent to which scholars have not fully explored the hermeneutical dimension of Sherman Kent’s methodology and its practical implications for intelligence analysis. However, a critical analysis of Kent’s ‘positivist’ epistemology is necessary to understand some major intelligence failures made by the CIA during the Cold War. Drawing on the historic examples of Guatemala (1953–1954) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), this article advocates introducing a critical discourse analysis approach along with an evidence-based reasoning methodology for the study and practice of intelligence analysis.

Voices of Nagasaki after 75 Years

ABSTRACT Soon after the second atomic bombing in 1945, hibakusha in Nagasaki saw the dawn of the Cold War, along with the Soviet Union’s possession of atomic bombs. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 created a real fear of nuclear war capable of destroying all of humanity. The Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 were a good sign of hope. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987, also succeeded in reducing nuclear warheads in the 1990s. However, we have also seen nuclear deterrence strategies of the nuclear powers firmly established. The Cold War ended in 1989, but its nuclear deterrence policies have persisted. Unfortunately, the NPT regime has gradually begun to weaken since 2010. Hibakusha and nongovernmental organizations such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons have stood firmly in strong solidarity and in 2017, succeeded in establishing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on 22 January 2021. Even now, hibakusha continue to suffer lifelong radiation-induced cancers and leukemia. Hibakusha must face a new stage in the abolition of nuclear weapons under a dangerous divide between NPT supporters and TPNW promoters. To overcome this divide, we need to increase the power of civil society around the world.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process on the Example of Psychological Characters of U.S. Presidents

Formation of the internal politics is a difficult process. Its key element consists of the formulation and adoption of foreign policy decisions, and their character depends on many factors. These include geographical position of the country, existence of military and economic power, cultural, historical traditions, as well as the type of the political system, social structure of the society, and individual features of political leaders.Acceptation of foreign policy decisions may reflect critically not only on the country where it was accepted, but on the fate of humanity as well. It became more evident after the Cuban crisis in the year of 1962, when Soviet strategic missiles were placed in Cuba, and USA replied by blockading the island. At the time, decisions of both American or Soviet leaders on the nuclear attack could lead to an irreparable mistake. Along with increased awareness about the process, the acceptation of foreign policy decisions, especially in the situation of conflict and crisis, became one of the most important topics of scientific research.At present, several scientific directions and schools have been created, which are working on the problems of decision-making and findings the ways for the process optimization. These types of schools and directions are “overlapping,” thus it is difficult to classify those one by one. In such situation, consideration of the directions, which would be more interesting for researchers, looks as more justified.Keywods: Political Psychology, Decision-making, Psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitivism, US Presidents

1962: Baseball and America in the Time of JFK by David Krell

Reviewed by: 1962: Baseball and America in the Time of JFK by David Krell Mark McGee David Krell. 1962: Baseball and America in the Time of JFK. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2021. 384 pp. Cloth, $34.95. The old jingle for Certs mints ads used to tout they were "two, two, two mints in one." Well, 1962: Baseball and America in the Time of JFK is three, three, three books in one. Somehow managing to have it all make sense, David Krell takes readers through an exhaustively researched mix of baseball, history, and pop culture. There is plenty of baseball here, enough for any fan. Nineteen sixty-two saw the expansion of the National League with the addition of the Houston Colt .45s and what would be legendarily known as the hapless New York Mets. The year before, the American League had brought in the Los Angeles Angels and a second incarnation of the Washington Senators. As evidence of his extensive research, Krell provides detailed and often colorful profiles on the players who would make up the first rosters of these expansion teams. Drama on the field was heavy on the West Coast with the Los Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco Giants needing a playoff game to determine the NL pennant winner. The Giants prevailed and went on to the World Series where they lost 4–3 to the New York Yankees. The Dodgers may have lost the pennant, but 1962 found the team playing in Dodger Stadium. Dodgers owner Walter O'Malley made sure his new stadium in Chavez Ravine had every amenity a player or fan might want. As Krell discusses, the road to building Dodger Stadium was filled with obstacles ranging from negotiations for mineral rights with the city, the construction of an oil well, and disgruntled residents having to move from the area. Krell reveals how Houston and New York used the leverage of the Continental League, which never got off the ground, in order to land their teams. Just like the Colt .45s and the Mets, the Dodgers and Giants rosters of 1962 [End Page 269] are colorfully and extensively profiled, from Don Drysdale and Sandy Koufax of the Dodgers through Giants stars Willie Mays and Willie McCovey along with lesser players. The New York Yankees, winners of the 1962 World Series against the Giants, also are given similar treatment along with a game-by-game review of the Fall Classic. Krell's grasps of history and popular culture are equally as researched. There are thirty-three pages of notes as evidence of his hard work, including telephone interviews dating back several years from publication. There are surprise nuggets all throughout the book. How many times are you going to find the rise and fall of "Romper Room's" original host Sherri Chessen and the sad life of Marilyn Monroe chronicled in the same volume along with the debuts of The Beatles and The Beach Boys and the complexities of pitcher Bo Belinsky? Readers are taken on trips through the opening days of the space race with President Kennedy making what then seemed an impossible goal of reaching the moon by the end of the decade. They are there as Kennedy deals with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which put Russia and the United States on the path to nuclear war for thirteen tension filled days. On a lighter note, Krell provides insight into what people were watching on television, what movies they were buying tickets for, what plays were shining on Broadway marquees, and what books were at the top of the bestseller lists. In addition to the usual digging into newspaper and magazine articles and videos, Krell tracked down many personal interviews, including some of those involved in the times like actress Stephanie Powers. When those who were making a name for themselves in 1962 were no longer alive, Krell uses previously published interviews as well as one-on-one interviews with their children such as Chris Lemmon's remembrances of his father, Academy Award winning actor Jack Lemmon and Katherine Quinn, widow of Anthony Quinn, about his movies screened in 1962. As an exclamation point on the depth of Krell's research...

The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969

At the height of the Cold War a dispute between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union nearly escalated into an all-out war that could have enveloped the entire globe. A border conflict between the two nations over disputed territories served as a flash point in the Cold War similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Amid growing tensions between the two nations, the border conflict severed ties and shifted the bipolar power paradigm. After severing ties with the Soviet Union, China looked towards rapprochement with United States. The significance of the conflict during the Cold War is far reaching considering the ideological shift that has led China to becoming the global power it is today. Examining what led to the conflict and the conflict itself, various international relations theories can be applied. A theoretical analysis of the conflict supports the successful use of deterrence by each nation and provides evidence to the clash of civilizations theory as causation for the conflict.

The Caribbean Crisis in the Memory Politics of the USSR (Russia) and the United States: Comparative Characteristics

This paper discusses and compares two national versions of memory politics (Soviet/Russian and American versions) in the context of the Caribbean crisis, one of the most resonant events of the Cold war. The paper describes how each country interprets the Caribbean crisis in the context of the changes that took place in the international arena and in domestic political life. The main methods of memory politics implementation that are typical for each of the parties to the conflict are analyzed. An attempt is made to identify common approaches to memory politics implementation and distinctive features specific to each of the parties. The authors pay special attention to the coverage of the Caribbean crisis in schoolbook, in declassified archival documents, in museum exhibitions and memorials dedicated to the history of geopolitical and ideological confrontation between the two superpowers. The paper describes the areas where the policy in question is most often applied. The issue of how the memory politics was related to the evolution of the identities of the two states during the Cold war and after its end is also touched upon.

‘I would rather go on being underdeveloped.’ Rereading and recontextualising Edmundo Desnoes's 1965 novel Memorias del subdesarrollo

This article follows two lines of inquiry. First, it provides a rereading of the novel Memorias del subdesarrollo (Desnoes 1965), suggesting that the protagonist, Sergio, is affected by the threat of nuclear war throughout the novel and that this fear dominates the text from the outset, and not just the novel's ending during the Missile Crisis of October 1962. It argues that Sergio's state of anxiety and inertia derive as much from this fear as from his intellectual detachment and problematic relationship with the Cuban Revolution, where critical attention has tended to focus. This rereading gives texture to Sergio's inaction and nihilism, revealing a coherent response of an individual to the threat of catastrophe. Secondly, this article sets this rereading against a new context of catastrophe: that of climate change, ecosystem collapse and species extinction. In this context an overlooked revolutionary fervour is detected in Sergio that provides a reading of hope in the narrative that, when read analogously against the present, may reflect a sense of hope against calamity.

Hungary: A Short History

Hungary: A Short History

Razvitie torgovyh otnoshenij mezhdu Respublikoj Kipr i Sovetskim Soyuzom (1960—1963 gg.)

This article studies the development of Soviet-Cypriot trade relations in 1960-63, based on research at the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Concurrently, a historical analysis follows the events after the creation of the new Cypriot state and the two major Cold War crises (the building of the Berlin wall and the Cuban missile crisis). The efforts made by both governments to develop bilateral trade, the aftermath of the two major international crises and the results of the two governments’ policies have been identified and analyzed.

Armageddon and the Stock Market: US, Canadian and Mexican Market Responses to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

The threat of nuclear annihilation has never been higher than in 1962, when US President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khruschev engaged in brinkmanship over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba during October 16-28. Although the resolution of the crisis was followed by a sustained recovery in the US, Canadian and Mexican stock markets, the stock market impact of the crisis itself, at first glance, seems relatively limited. Notwithstanding the fact that empirical analysis of 1962 US market data reveal a significant break on October 23, 1962, which is the day after President Kennedy’s television address about the Cuban missile crisis, the drop on this day was smaller than prior one day declines seen in the earlier part of the year. When we focus on the 1% left tail of the distribution, that is, just the very largest negative returns, a different story emerges, however. US uncertainty is now seen to have a significant negative impact on returns across each of the US, Canadian and Mexican markets. Moreover, the size of the negative response to the rise in uncertainty is comparable in all three cases notwithstanding the fact the pre-crisis Mexican stock market trajectory had been very different from that seen in the United States and Canada.

The Missile Crisis from a Cuban Perspective: Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Reflections, by Håkan Karlsson & Tomás Diez Acosta

The Missile Crisis from a Cuban Perspective: Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Reflections, by Håkan Karlsson & Tomás Diez Acosta

El verdadero anticomunismo: Política, género y Guerra Fría en Costa Rica (1948–1973)

El verdadero anticomunismo: Política, género y Guerra Fría en Costa Rica (1948–1973)

De-Escalation of International Incidents Prone to Escalate Into Conflicts With the Use of WMD

Even small military and political incidents between states have a potential of escalation towards inter-stat war with the use of conventional armed forces and further towards the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). To avoid such an escalation, a pre-planned windows of cooling down like pre-organized mechanisms for negotiations and talks between conflict sides are to be in-built in military strategies and war scenarios of the states. Nuclear weapons leave prohibitively short time-frame to decision-making on times of crises (sometime dozens of minutes only after receiving true or false signal on missile attack of the other side). Strategy of co called launch-on-warning are still applied practically by the two major nuclear superpowers, and that increase the risk of sliding quickly towards use of nuclear weapons in a moment of crises. It is time to stop to base nuclear options on such a risk-prone strategies. Historic cases of Suez crisis (1956), Berlin crisis (1961), Caribbean Missile Crisis (1962), periods within Arab-Israeli Doomsday War(1976), North Korean-American crisis of 2018, Iranian-American exchange of strikes and coercive actions in 2019-2020 allow to collect methods of stepping back from the dangerous thresholds, and create the arsenal of de-escalation measures. De-escalation measures must become a critically important component of national security strategies of major nuclear-weapons states.

Premonitions of a Korean War: Will Russia Be a Peacemaker or a Party to the Conflict?

By 2017, the situation that has developed around the Korean peninsula has come to be called a new Cuban missile crisis. “I’ve been working in this country for a long time,” said the Russian ambassa...

'No Holds Barred' and the New Vulnerability: Are We in for a Re-Run of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Cyberspace?

International information security – or cybersecurity, to use the more popular but grossly oversimplified term – is now high on the agenda of global challenges. But back at the time, things were different. It wasn’t an obscure issue by any means, but discussions were mostly confined to the expert community, and they were usually overshadowed by more pressing concerns. And then 9/11 happened, whereupon international terrorism eclipsed all other threats for years to come.