In all jurisdictions in Canada, individuals have the right to non-discrimination when receiving services available to the public. While some of these statutes expressly exempt specific government activities from their scope of application, these laws otherwise prohibit discriminatory practices in the context of service provision, without drawing a distinction of whether these services are public or private in nature. Despite this, most notably in the past decade, respondents in government services cases have sought to advance various arguments based on the purported claim that they ought to be treated differently and more leniently than other respondents who face human rights complaints. There are three primary examples of this. Firstly, government respondents have increasingly attempted to argue that some of their activities do not constitute “services” under human rights legislation in order to prevent human rights tribunals from hearing complaints relating to their programs, policies, activities, and laws. In my view, there is a deliberate and calculated objective behind such arguments. It is to push groups and individuals alleging discrimination outside of human rights systems, which are generally more affordable and faster than courts, and leave them with no other option than to bring constitutional challenges under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) with little odds of success. Second, when government respondents are unsuccessful at forcing discrimination complaints out of the human rights system using what I will refer to as the “services argument”, they have implored tribunals to allow them to play by different rules than other respondents. In particular, they argue that the appropriate test in human rights cases involving government services ought to be the more onerous inquiry developed under section 15 of the Charter, rather than the prevailing prima facie discrimination standard normally applied. Finally, government respondents found to be engaging in discriminatory conduct in the context of service provision have also begun to claim that human rights tribunals ought to refrain from making certain remedial orders against them. They have most vigorously attempted to fend off orders of systemic remedies by invoking arguments relating to Crown immunity and deference. Many of these arguments have, to a certain extent, born fruit as we are now witnessing the emergence of a new trend in human rights jurisprudence. In my view, this trend is increasingly and unjustifiably letting government respondents off the hook. This paper examines this trend.