Cross-strait Policy Research Articles

Analysis of the influence of Cross-Strait policy on pineapple trade

To prevent the risk of plant epidemic at the source, the General Administration of Customs of mainland China decided to prohibit the import of pineapples from Taiwan starting from March 1, 2021. Leveraging data from the 2020 mainland China and Taiwan Agricultural Statistical Report, we constructed a model to analyze the impact of mainland China's trade policy changes on the pineapple market in Taiwan. The results of the analysis indicate that the policy change will have a severe impact on Taiwan's pineapple market and will significantly affect producers' investment confidence. Achieving market equilibrium and overall efficiency in the pineapple market would be challenging, given the targeted nature of this policy change. Comparatively, the fruit industry, including pineapples, exhibits the weakest durability in risk management against such targeted policy changes, when compared to other agricultural products. Import policies from large unified market economies have a decisive impact on small exporting regions.

Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea

Abstract Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite Beijing's aggression toward Taiwan since 2016, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party remain at odds over cross-strait policy. In contrast, South Korean conservatives and progressives united in response to Chinese economic sanctions over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. I argue that a country is less likely to unite against a foreign threat when a “formative rift” in its history divides political groups over national identity issues and causes them to perceive the threat differently, as in Taiwan but not South Korea. This study is based on a multilingual analysis of Taiwanese and South Korean political parties’ statements on China policy. Its findings contribute to scholarship on how international factors affect domestic politics and our understanding of China's rise.

Taiwan in 2020

Taiwan saw a series of crucial developments at home and abroad in 2020. Externally, the massive confrontations in Hong Kong were taken as justifying the ruling DPP’s anti-China cross-Strait policy. The impacts of the intense US–China trade war reshaped relations in the US–China–Taiwan triangle. Internally, the results of the 2020 general election strengthened the DPP’s political dominance. Likewise, the successful fight against COVID-19 buttressed the government’s popular support. Still, there are old and new socio-economic issues that will continue to challenge the governing capability of the DPP in 2021.

Balancing, bandwagoning or hedging: Taiwan’s strategic choices in the era of a rising China

ABSTRACT Small states have three strategic options when they are confronted by a rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. With an increasingly powerful and assertive China as its neighbour, Taiwan, as a small state, is in such a conundrum. Employing survey data collected during the past two decades, this study examines how Taipei’s cross-Strait policy has been closely associated with the public’s preferences. Because Taiwan citizens reject a unification under Beijing’s terms, the bandwagoning policy has never been considered as an acceptable strategy. A ‘pure’ balancing policy is also unpalatable due to the enormous costs and associated risks. Instead, the island citizens are generally supportive of setting aside the sovereignty dispute with a rapprochement approach towards China. Hedging has thus become a preferred strategic option for most Taiwan citizens. The public’s support for a hedging policy has shifted recently due to China’s aggressive conduct and America’s supportive policy towards Taiwan. Because Beijing’s assertive behaviour is expected to persist and the Biden administration will remain supportive of Taiwan, Taipei’s strategic choice is likely to have a stronger balancing component. The cold and tense cross-Strait relationship since 2016 is expected to continue beyond the tenure of Taiwan’s pro-independence incumbent government.

Economic Implications Under Cross-Strait Exchanges -Take Taiwanese College Students as an Example

In the current development of cross-strait relations, Taiwanese college students are undoubtedly the most important ethnic group. In October 2015, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the CPC proposed to deepen Cross-Strait economic cooperation in a mutually beneficial and win-win way and benefit more ordinary Taiwanese young people as well as the small and medium-sized enterprises. In 2017, Yu Zheng Sheng, chairman of the Mainland Political Consultative Conference, mentioned at the CPPCC National Committee meeting: we will strengthen exchanges with Taiwan's grassroots people and young generations and build a solid foundation for the peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations. We can see that the fight for the goodwill and recognition of young people toward Mainland will remain the top priority of Mainland China s work on Taiwan. To win the recognition of Taiwanese youth for the Mainland has actually been implemented for years. In the past, Taiwanese students were invited to visit and explore Mainland China in summer and winter vocations, expected to enhance their feelings towards Chinese people and promote their recognition of the Mainland China. With the gradual opening up of Cross-Strait policies and the wide-and-deep exchange of views, the concrete result has become the focus of common concern across the Taiwan Strait. The empirical results from the questionnaire survey in this study explain the specific impact of Cross-Strait exchange on Taiwanese students. In particular, the study has indeed demonstrated its significant impact on many aspects of the college students' career and entrepreneurial awareness and willingness propositions.

Taishang in China and Southeast Asia : Culture and Politics of Taiwanese Transnational Capital

This paper first traces the historical origin of Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople) with its transnational character and offers a profile of the two major Taishang groups in both China and Southeast Asia.BR Then, Taishang’s mode of business culture and the ways to deal with business risks are discussed in China and Southeast Asia. Due to Taiwan’s unique and vulnerable diplomatic situations, Taishang’s internal culture of management, business networking and labor control are rather personalized and guanxi connection in nature. For the same reason, Taishang’s external business – state relations are also much dependent and weak, especially so under the authoritarian rule in China. In China, Taishang associations are in no position to voice their demands autonomously. Some Taishnag have turned themselves into China’s hostages and even become “instrument” of China’s “unified front work” to extend reverse political pressure on Taiwanese government on related cross-Strait policies. Finally, this paper points to the possibility that under Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s new Southbound Policy since 2016, Taishang in Southeast Asia might receive more positive attention and policy boost to further their production and investment activities and even social and political involvements.

Asymmetric Risk Impacts of Chinese Tourists to Taiwan

Since 2008, when Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-Jeou relaxed the Cross-Strait policy, China has become Taiwan’s largest source of international tourism. In order to understand the risk persistence of Chinese tourists, the paper investigates the short-run and long-run persistence of shocks to the change rate of Chinese tourists to Taiwan. The daily data used for the empirical analysis is from 1 January 2013 to 28 February 2018. McAleer’s (2015) fundamental equation in tourism finance is used to link the change rate of tourist arrivals and the change in tourist revenues. Three widely-used univariate conditional volatility models, namely GARCH(1,1), GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1), are used to measure the short-run and long-run persistence of shocks, as well as symmetric, asymmetric and leverage effects. Three different Heterogeneous AutoRegressive (HAR) models, HAR(1), HAR(1,7) HAR(1,7,28), are considered as alternative mean equations for capturing a variety of long memory effects. The mean equations associated with GARCH(1,1), GJR(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) are used to analyse the risk persistence of the change in Chinese tourists. The exponential smoothing process is used to adjust the seasonality around the trend in Chinese tourists. The empirical results show asymmetric impacts of positive and negative shocks on the volatility of the change in the number of Group-type and Medical-type tourists, while Individual-type tourists display a symmetric volatility pattern. Somewhat unusually, leverage effects are observed in EGARCH for Medical-type tourists, which shows a negative correlation between shocks in tourist numbers and the subsequent shocks to volatility. For both Group-type and Medical-type tourists, the asymmetric impacts on volatility show that negative shocks have larger effects than do positive shocks. The leverage effect in EGARCH for Medical-type tourists implies that larger shocks would decrease volatility in the change in the numbers of Medical-type tourists. These results suggest that Taiwan tourism authorities should act to prevent the negative shocks for the Group-type and Medical-type Chinese tourists to dampen the shocks that arise from having fewer Chinese tourists to Taiwan.

Taishang Studies

The study of Taiwanese entrepreneurs who live and invest on the Chinese mainland (Taishang) has only recently started to attract attention. Taishang have been referred to as a “linkage community” that connects Taiwan and the Chinese mainland through its economic undertakings, political influence, and social experiences as a migrant community. Against this background, this article clarifies the extent to which Taishang have contributed to and shaped the ongoing process of cross-strait interaction and the development of cross-strait policies. It revisits the field of Taishang studies, takes stock of the knowledge that this field has generated so far, and explores future directions for meaningful research.

Taiwan's Politics: Fraying at the Dawn of a New Era

Taiwanese politics in 2015 was overshadowed by party infighting within the ruling Kuomintang, restive social atmosphere due to the Sunflower Movement in 2014 and the uncertainties of a Democrative Progressive Party (DPP) government in May 2016. Cross-strait relations experienced a downturn after China pushed for the 92 consensus to frame future cross-strait policies. The Ma government leaves behind thorny issues in political, economic and legal fields, creating huge challenges for the coming DPP government.

Two-level games, issue politicization and the disarray of Taiwan’s cross-strait policy after the 2000 presidential election

This study aims to illuminate the interactive relationship between domestic politics and external policy in Taiwan’s mainland China policy after the 2000 presidential election. Following the logic of Putnam's two-level games, this paper demonstrates how the newly elected President Chen Shui-bian adopted an ambiguous and evasive approach as well as frequently shifted positions in his dealings with the mainland China issue due to the constraints of his pro-independence constituents and a vigilant, anti-independence Beijing. Employing Knopf's three-to-three games as well as Puchala’s issue politicization, it further shows how Taiwan's opposition parties—the KMT, the PFP, and the NP—as well as Chen's political rivals, took advantage of Chen’s inability to break the Strait impasse by initiating active engagement with Beijing in order to gain political advantages.

The Sixteenth Party Congress and Cross-Strait Policy: Old Wine in Old Bottles?

The Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party marked the start of the transition from Jiang Zemin, representing the third generation of Chinese leaders, to Hu Jintao of the fourth generation. This paper begins with an assessment of the major changes in cross-strait relations that took place over the course of Jiang’s tenure; mainland policy that evolved in response to these changes; and the elements of that policy that were affirmed and established as the basis for future policy at the Sixteenth Congress. This is followed by an examination of the post-Congress policy implementation as well as a discussion of the possible future directions of mainland policy toward Taiwan. It argues that although developments in both cross-strait and Sino-American relations have resulted in some indications of greater flexibility, the fundamental elements of Beijing’s policy have not changed dramatically.

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.

Chen Shui‑bian and Cross‑Strait Relations

This article discusses Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's China policy and the impact this has on the cross-strait relationship. Chen is unlikely to deviate from the pro-independence stand of the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). For the short-term, Beijing has good reason not to use force, but resorts to both well-calculated pressure (on the DPP) and concessions (to the opposition), in the hope that this may eventually weaken the DPP. This neiwai jiaokun (internal trouble and external pressure) may emasculate Chen's will and ability to push for independence. Even a declaration of independence by Taiwan, if without U.S. support, will be manageable to Beijing, which has been psychologically, politically, and militarily prepared for such a contingency. The declaration can only pose a threat if it is used by a major foreign power for other objectives. Therefore, the Chinese reading of U.S. strategic intentions is crucial in deciding what action China will take on Taiwan. Introduction In Taiwan's 18 March 2000 presidential election, the Kuomintang (KMT) government was defeated, for the first time after 55 years in power, by the pro-independence Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). Chen Shui-bian's election as President has shocked many people in Beijing into questioning the feasibility of its existing Taiwan policy. The following issues have been raised: * Whether China's peaceful reunification strategy still works. * Whether the United States merely wants to maintain cross-strait stability or promote Taiwan's independence; or use Taiwan not only to slow China's rise but also to eventually dismember China. * Whether China should continue to follow Deng Xiaoping's policy of keeping a low profile and avoiding conflict when this policy cannot stop the determined push from both Taiwan and the United States. * Whether China's modernization will be better served by solving the Taiwan problem now or later. * Whether force can be avoided in solving the Taiwan problem. If not, will it cost more to use it now or later? Beijing has thus been plunged into a process of policy discussion and reformulation. While Beijing is watching and pondering, Chen Shuibian's various gestures have so far not made things better. This article discusses Chen's election as well as his inauguration speech and China policy and the impact these will have on the cross-strait relationship. Taiwan's Presidential Election of 2000 There were five candidates for President in the 18 March 2000 elections: the KMT's Lien Chan; the DPP's Chen Shui-bian; independent candidate Soong Chu-yu; the New Party's Li Ao; and independent candidate Hsu Hsin-liang. Though not as dominant as it was in the 1996 presidential election, cross-strait policy remained a very prominent issue in the election. Debates on this issue had attracted greater attention after President Lee Teng-hui announced his two states theory in July 1999. [1] On Reunification/Independence The three presidential campaign front-runners, Lien, Soong, and Chen, had de-emphasized the unification/independence issue, as many voters were afraid of armed conflict with China. Though once a vocal advocate of Taiwanese independence, Chen Shui-bian was far less fervent in public about independence. He vowed that he would not declare Taiwan independent (assuming Beijing did not move to retake Taiwan by force) nor abandon the government's title of the Republic of China (ROC). But his Long live Taiwan independence! chant heard during the campaign made many suspect that his new stance stemmed merely from political expedience. His remarks often appeared ambiguous, evasive, and contradictory. While vowing not to promote a referendum on Taiwan's independence, he also supported the concept of having the Taiwanese people determine their own destiny. While promising not to write Lee's two states theory into the Constitution on one occasion, on other occasions he advocated amending the Constitution to give legal effect to the theory. …

"One China, One Taiwan": An Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party's China Policy

At the largest opposition party in the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) influence on Taipei's future approach to cross-Strait relations can not be ignored. This study aims to systematically examine the DPP's China policy and its implications for future cross-Strait relations. It concludes that, without altering the fundamental principle of China, one Taiwan, the DPP has moderated its outright calling for Taiwan's de jure, when the governing Nationalist (KMT) has been more articulate in claiming a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from China. The apparent consensual understanding reached between the KMT and the DPP on the issue of Taiwan's status in essence denies both the option of immediate reunification with China and the option of immediate (de jure) independence for Taiwan. It implies that in the near future Taiwan's current cross-Strait policy is unlikely to change without a dramatic reshuffling in the domestic political landscape.

The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Strait , and: Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan (review)

Reviews 175 Tse-Kang Leng. The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Strait. Transitions—Asia and Asian America. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. xiv, 157 pp. Hardcover $59.00, ISBN 0-8133-2982-5. Paperback $16.95, isbn 0-8133-9006-0. Brian Hook, editor. Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan. Regional Development in China, vol. 2. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996. xvii, 161 pp. Hardcover $69.00, isbn 0-19-586180-9. Paperback, isbn 0-19-586181-7. Erratum: The title, but not the review, ofthefirst book above appeared in the Table ofContents and on page 140 ofthe CRI 4:2 issue. We arepublishing the complete review in this issue. The Editors apologizefor any confusion or inconvenience this mistake may have caused. In the scholarship ofdevelopment, die statist approach, focusing on both a strong state autonomy and strong state capacity in explaining the economic miracle in East Asia, has recendy been challenged. This approach argues that in some countries the state indeed plays a leading role in development by facilitating rapid economic growth, whereas in other countries the state behaves like a predator, consuming the fruit of the burgeoning economy. Leng Tse-Kang's The TaiwanChina Connection, based on his doctoral dissertation, represents an effort to challenge the statist view. Leng focuses his analysis on the making of economic policy across the Taiwan Strait in the period of democratic transition on the island , arguing against the applicability of the "strong state paradigm" to post-authoritarian Taiwan. Leng begins with Taiwan's democratization process, arguing that the changed relationship between state and society in democratic Taiwan has weakened both the autonomy and capacity ofthe state, the strength ofwhich had been responsible for Taiwan's economic take-off in the authoritarian era. As Taiwan underwent democratization in the 1990s, the factional politics within the top hierarchy of the KMT regime and its alliance with business groups in pursuit ofmarket opportunities in China forced the regime to make concessions in the making ofits cross-Strait economic policy. Instead of the strong-state policy that had existed in the authoritarian decades, the KMT regime found itself now driven, on the one hand, by the pro-unification faction within the KMT and the pro-independence drive ofthe opposition party and, on the other, by strong pressure from the busi-© 1998 by Universityvvr 7 > ' _ íu ... „ ness sector, which demanded relaxed policies that would permit profit-seeking on ofHawai ? Press' r r r o the mainland. Since the top leaders ofthe KMT regime have always stood in the gray area between unification and independence, the regime has suffered from a 176 China Review International: Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1998 severe conflict of interest among the different departments within the state bureaucracy , and there has been a lack ofpolicy coordination. According to Leng, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the predominant agent responsible for Taiwan's cross-Strait policy, always gives national security first priority, and this often negates the business interests promoted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the other hand, the MAC has often been in open conflict with the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), as it tries to put pressure on the SEF and suppress its autonomy, since the SEF, a nongovernment agency, engages in direct dialogue and negotiation with China on behalf of the MAC. Moreover, despite the official prohibition of direct investment and trade across the Strait, many Taiwanese business enterprises, botìi large and small, have joined the rush to the mainland without sanction from the state. The Taiwanese state has found itself crippled, unable to stop the wave of profit-seeking in China. According to Leng, as Taiwan's export-led economy is increasingly dependent on the Chinese market, this gives China the leverage to manipulate Taiwan's domestic economy and increase Taiwan's political vulnerability rather than leading to the mutual benefits promoted by liberal economists. Despite his illuminating analysis ofTaiwan's recent political developments and its economic relationship widi China, Leng's polemic against the "strong state paradigm" suffers from two difficulties. First, even though he refutes the "strong state paradigm" in post-authoritarian Taiwan, Leng seems almost unscrupulously to embrace its existence in the...

The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order. Legal and Political Considerations

Part 1 The international legal status of Taiwan: The international legal status of Taiwan, Hungdah Chiu Is Taiwan a part of China? H. Kuijper Toward modern concepts of sovereignty and statehood, M.C. Davis. Part 2 Responses to diplomatic isolation - informal diplomacy: Limitations and prospects of Taiwan's informal diplomacy, Linjun Wu Does flexible diplomacy improve Taiwan's international status? K. Moller. Part 3 Responses to diplomatic isolation - participation in international organizations: Taiwan's return to international organizations - policies, problems and prospects, D. Van Vranken Hickey Taiwan's 'return' to international organizations, Ko Swan Sik All dressed up but not invited to the party - can Taiwan join the United Nations now the Cold War is over? V. Wei-Cheng Wang The Republic of China's right to participate in the United Nations, Sheng-Tsung Yang Taiwan's right to be heard before the security council, J.E. Lord Taiwan's option of becoming a permanent observer, L.B. Sohn The United Nations framework for the participation of observers, N. Sybesma-Knol Taiwan, China and the United Nations, Lung-Chu Chen. Part 4 relations across the Taiwan Strait: The paradox of Taiwan-mainland China relations, J.C. Hsiung The development of Cross-Strait policies in China and Taiwan, Cheng-Wen Tsai. Part 5 Concluding observations: Self-determination in action for the People of Taiwan, J.M. Henckaerts. Appendices: legal aspects of the problem of representation in the United Nations general assembly resolution on the representation of China in the United Nations the Chinese White Paper on Cross-Strait relations the Taiwanese White Paper on Cross-Strait relations request to consider the exceptional situation of Taiwan in the international context.