Just as Durkheim saw crime as a normal element in societal life, so did Gluckman treat opposition and conflict as a normal part of ongoing social order. Instead of interpreting difference of interest as socially destructive, Gluckman argued that means of accommodating these inevitable divisions often actually strengthened social cohesion. He carried this view to point of interpreting tribai society as being in a state of relative political stasis, even when it was repeatedly torn by rebellion (1963:10). It was not difficult to integrate such an approach with structural-functionalism. The political type at each evolutionary stage was interpreted as an internally consistent system. The work of anthropology was seen as study of interdependence of custom and interlocking of relationships (1965:283). For Gluckman, most convincing evidence of those connections could be found in those very events which seemed on surface to show contrary: events of dispute, and of social division, of opposition and confrontation. Gluckman concentrated on the constant process of what he called disturbance and readjustment in tribal society (ibid:282). Moral crises generated social solutions. In tribal society these were magical, in modern society, secular (ibid :Chs. 5, 6; also 1972:1 50). His approach stressed that in both there were solutions. For Gluckman, concept of a disturbed and then restored equilibrium was a central paradigm (1968:219-237). Thus, like obsessively clean individual described by Freud, who through constant washing legitimised a preoccupation with unclean, so Gluckman's surface obsession with legal rules, moral obligation, and forces of order, legitimated an equal, or perhaps even greater, fascination with breach, conflict, contradiction, rebellion, dispute, competition, and like. Since he worked in a period of British social anthropological thought dominated by a vision of organic cohesion and social structural consistency in tribal society, more disorderly themes in which he was most interested could come to surface only in terms of then dominant form. Thus, Gluckman's written schema frequently depend on exploiting an in-built paradox for effect. The ritual representation of rebellion became a statement of loyalty (1963). Dispute became occasion for reinforcing norms (1955). Divided personal loyalties became cross-cutting ties that linked separate and competing groups (1965:110). Illustrated'with lively examples garnered from ethnographies of his contemporaries, these juxtapositions clearly were intended to startle, and binding together of opposites operated as an effective stylistic device. Yet, as Kapferer has pointed out, though Gluckman's ideas extended and expanded our understanding of conflict, his emphasis was on its reflection of structure, not on its transformational properties (Kapferer 1976:78). In analysing conflict, Gluckman usually used modern cases only to highlight theoretical points about tribal societies. The 'modern' was his contrasting case, or his illustration of universality of basic principles. In his own work, he occasionally, but not often, took up events in industrial societies for their own interest, but he encouraged students and others to do so and was always fascinated by field material they brought back. He was, however, not always happy with transactional, choice-making, game theory, exchange theory approach that dominated work of his younger colleagues in late sixties, because he thought it too much preoccupied with explaining behavior in terms of narrow self-interest, and neglected larger cultural and societal contexts in which interests and social positions were defined. Yet he was obviously attracted by many aspects of these and other processual approaches.