Cross-border Spillovers Research Articles

Are global spillovers complementary or competitive? Need for international policy coordination

Abstract Advanced and emerging economies are becoming more interdependent with rapid pace of globalization of capital markets and technological innovations in recent years. We examine whether technology and monetary policy shocks get transmitted between advanced and emerging market economies and to what extent they generate complementary or competitive effects. Given the globally integrated nature of capital markets, we uncover a transmission mechanism by which technology and policy shocks in advanced and emerging countries spill over between them through the capital flow channel. We mainly investigate whether analysis from a SVAR model by econometricians provides empirically similar conclusions to those from a macroeconomic theory-based DSGE model in measuring the impact of demand-side policy and technology shocks. We fit our VAR models to the same time series data used to calibrate and estimate the DSGE model. We conclude that monetary and fiscal policy shocks are competitive between the US (advanced economy) and India (emerging market), while domestic and global technology shocks or the exchange rate shocks have complementary effects. Intuitively, technology enhances productivity in both countries, while policy shocks tend to drive capital to a country with higher rate of return. Thus policy shocks in advanced countries could have unintended effects in terms of capital inflows to emerging economies and hence greater coordination of policies can help limit adverse cross-border spillovers.

Cross-border spillovers of macroprudential policy in the Euro area

Financial flows between heterogeneous member states were crucial drivers of the imbalances that culminated in the Euro crisis. Macroprudential instruments, by affecting the behavior of international banks, can have secondary effects on the financial cycles of other member states. However, countercyclical tools like the Basel III capital buffer are mostly set by independent authorities with national stabilization mandates. Should regulators coordinate macroprudential policy, and if so how? Using a small two-country NK model with financial frictions, we show that macroprudential responses in core economies can have destabilizing spillover effects on a financially dependent periphery through interbank lending. We subsequently evaluate a policy rule in which the core regulator internalizes these spillovers and compare it to prevailing national stabilization rule. While national rules deliver a good performance in general, under certain conditions internalization becomes preferable.

Putting Global Governance in Its Place

Abstract Greater interdependence is often taken to require more global governance, but the logic requires scrutiny. Cross-border spillovers do not always call for international rules. The canonical cases for global governance are based on two sets of circumstances: global commons and “beggar-thy-neighbor” (BTN) policies. The world economy is not a global commons (outside of climate change), and much of our current discussions deal with policies that are not true BTNs. Some of these are beggar-thyself policies; others may produce domestic benefits, addressing real market distortions or legitimate social objectives. The case for global governance in such policies, I will argue, is very weak, and possibly outweighed by the risk that global oversight or regulation would backfire. While these policy domains are certainly rife with failures, such failures arise not from weaknesses of global governance, but from failures of national governance and cannot be fixed through international agreements or multilateral cooperation. I advocate a mode of global governance that I call “democracy-enhancing global governance,” to be distinguished from “globalization-enhancing global governance.”

The Global Dimensions of Macroprudential Policy

This report elucidates the risk channels for EU economies associated with international financial integration and provides an overview of the macroprudential policy options that are available to address these risks.1 It builds on the main insights from the rich academic literature developed recently to create a narrative of the role of global variables for the conduct of macroprudential policy at a national level. The report reviews the evidence on the cross-border spillovers of domestic macroprudential policies (MPPs). It also highlights key policy areas for making macroprudential policy as effective as possible. Annex 1 presents findings from several new research papers across the European System of Central Banks.

Cross-Border Spillover Effects of Macroprudential Policies: A Conceptual Framework

Due to the international dimension of the financial sector within the EU and beyond, domestically oriented macroprudential policies have the potential to create material cross-border spillover effects. This occasional paper provides a detailed overview of the academic and empirical literature on cross-border effects of macroprudential policies. It also summarises a stocktaking exercise, conducted by a task force of the ESCB’s Financial Stability Committee (FSC), on existing national approaches within the EU for assessing and monitoring such cross-border spillover effects. The paper accompanies an FSC report presenting a framework to be used by macroprudential authorities when assessing cross-border spillover effects induced by enacted or planned policy measures.

How Do Banking Groups React to Macroprudential Policies? Cross-Border Spillover Effects of Higher Capital Buffers on Lending, Risk-Taking and Internal Markets

We study the impact of macroprudential capital buffers on banking groups' lending and risk-taking decisions, also investigating implications for internal capital markets. For identification, we exploit heterogeneity in buffers applied to other systemically important institutions, using information from three unique confidential datasets, including information on the EBA scoring process. This policy design induces a randomized experiment in the neighborhood of the threshold, which we use to identify the effect of higher capital requirements by comparing the change in the outcome for banks just above and below the cut-off, before and after the introduction of the buffer. The analysis is implemented relying on a fuzzy regression discontinuity and on a difference-in-differences matching design. We find that, when parent banks are constrained with higher buffers, subsidiaries deleverage lending and risk-taking towards non-financial corporations and marginally expanded lending towards households, with negative effects on protability. Also, we find that parents cut down on holdings of debt and equity issued by their subsidiaries. Our findings support the hypothesis that higher capital buffers have a positive disciplinary effect by reducing banks' risk-taking while having a (temporary) adverse impact on the real economy through a decrease in affiliated banks' lending activity. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, it is essential that policymakers assess their potential cross-border effects. JEL Classification: E44, E51, E58, G21, G28

Identity Conflict with Cross-Border Spillovers

ABSTRACT We model simultaneous inter and within identity-group conflict in two territories connected by cross-territorial spillovers. Within each territory, two groups contest the division of a group-specific public good, and all members contest the division of group income. Each group has a cross-border affiliate. Greater success (share) of its affiliate ‘spills over’ into higher efficiency of a group in inter-group conflict. We find that inter-group and total conflict move together within a territory, while within-group conflict and output move in the opposite direction. A unilateral increase in cross-border spillover reduces inter-group conflict in the source territory but increases it in the destination; an equi-proportionate bilateral increase affects conflict in a non-monotone manner. Population increase in a territory, a larger minority, weaker property rights, higher relative labour productivity of the majority, may all increase inter-group conflict in the other territory. Community-neutral growth in labour productivity within a territory reduces inter-group conflict therein.

Cross-Border Effects of Prudential Regulation: Evidence from the Euro Area

We analyse the cross-border propagation of prudential regulation in the euro area. Using the Prudential Instruments Database (Cerutti et al., 2017b) and a unique confidential database on balance sheets items of euro-area financial institutions we estimate panel models for 248 banks from 16 euro-area countries. We find that domestic banks reduce lending after the tightening of capital requirements in other countries, while they increase lending when loan-to-value (LTV) limits or reserve requirements are tightened abroad. We also find that foreign affiliates increase lending following the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers in the countries where their parent banks reside and that bank size and liquidity play a role in determining the magnitude of cross-border spillovers. JEL Classification: G21, F34, F36

Macroprudential Policy Spillovers and International Banking - Taking the Gravity Approach

In this paper I study how the effects of nationally implemented macroprudential policy spill across borders via international lending. For a set of 157 countries, I estimate a gravity model applied to international banking where the use of different macroprudential policy measures enter as friction variables. My findings support the existence of cross-border spillovers from macroprudential policy. Moreover, I find that the overall effect from more macroprudential regulation is highly dependent on the income group of the countries in which banks operate: The effect is of opposite sign for advanced and for emerging economies. I argue that the difference may tell of banks having more opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in emerging market economies.

Cross-border spillovers of monetary policy: What changes during a financial crisis?

This paper analyses cross-border spillovers of monetary policy by examining two countries that were in the eye of the storm during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, namely Ireland and Portugal. The research provides insight as to how banking and sovereign stress affect the inward transmission of foreign monetary policy to two economies that share many characteristics, but that also have many distinct features. In particular, our research addresses the question of whether a banking system in distress reacts more or less to monetary policy changes in other major economies. The empirical analysis indicates that international spillovers are present for US and UK monetary policy for both Ireland and Portugal, but there is heterogeneity in the transmission mechanisms by which they affect credit growth in the two economies.

Cross-Border Spillovers of Monetary Policy: What Changes During a Financial Crisis?

This paper analyses cross-border spillovers of monetary policy by examining two countries that were in the eye of the storm during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, namely Ireland and Portugal. The research provides insight as to how banking and sovereign stress affect the inward transmission of foreign monetary policy to two economies that share many characteristics, but that also have many distinct features. In particular, our research addresses the question of whether a banking system in distress reacts more or less to monetary policy changes in other major economies. The empirical analysis indicates that international spillovers are present for US and UK monetary policy for both Ireland and Portugal, but there is heterogeneity in the transmission mechanisms by which they affect credit growth in the two economies.

The implications of China’s slowdown for international trade

We study cross-border spillovers from China’s recent growth slowdown onto partner-country exports. Our analysis uses a panel vector autoregressive model and novel measures of export-intensity adjusted final demand in China’s secondary and tertiary sectors. Impulse-response analysis suggests that spillovers are largest for shocks to China’s secondary sector: a one percentage point decline in demand growth from China’s secondary sector reduces average partner country export growth by almost 0.3% points on impact, and about half this amount on average over the first year; the same size shock to China’s tertiary sector has a much smaller effect. This suggests that spillovers to different trading partners will depend on their sectoral linkages with the Chinese economy. At the regional level, the analysis indicates that countries whose trade linkages with China are strongest—such as those in Asia—would be most affected.

Entrepreneurship and State Taxation

Entrepreneurship plays a vital role in the economy, yet there exists little well-identified research into the effects of taxes on startup activity. Using recently developed county-level data on startups, we examine the effect of states' corporate, personal and sales tax rates on new firm activity and test for cross-border spillovers in response to these policies. We find that new firm employment is negatively—and disproportionately—affected by corporate tax rates. We find little evidence of an effect of personal and sales taxes on entrepreneurial outcomes. Our results are robust to changes in the tax base and other state-level policies.

Cross-Border Banking and the Circumvention of Macroprudential and Capital Control Measures

We analyze the joint impact of macroprudential and capital control measures on cross-border banking flows, while controlling for multidimensional aspects in lender-and-borrower-relationships(e.g., distance, cultural proximity, microprudential regulations). We uncover interesting spillover effects from both types of measures when applied either by lender or borrowing countries, with many of them most likely associated with circumvention or arbitrage incentives. While lender countries' macroprudential policies reduce direct cross-border banking outflows, they are associated with larger outflows through local affiliates. Direct cross-border inflows are higher in borrower countries with more usage of macroprudential policies, and are linked to circumvention motives. In the case of capital controls, most spillovers seem to be present through local affiliates.We do not find evidence to support the idea that additional capital inflow controls could interact with macroprudential policies to mitigate cross-border spillovers.

Cross-border Banking and the Circumvention of Macroprudential and Capital Control Measures

We analyze the joint impact of macroprudential and capital control measures on cross-border banking flows, while controlling for multidimensional aspects in lender-and-borrower-relationships (e.g., distance, cultural proximity, microprudential regulations). We uncover interesting spillover effects from both types of measures when applied either by lender or borrowing countries, with many of them most likely associated with circumvention or arbitrage incentives. While lender countries’ macroprudential policies reduce direct cross-border banking outflows, they are associated with larger outflows through local affiliates. Direct cross-border inflows are higher in borrower countries with more usage of macroprudential policies, and are linked to circumvention motives. In the case of capital controls, most spillovers seem to be present through local affiliates. We do not find evidence to support the idea that additional capital inflow controls could interact with macro-prudential policies to mitigate cross-border spillovers.

Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union at the Zero Lower Bound

Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, Euro Area governments faced adverse economic environments: high ratios of public debt to GDP, depressed outputs and the prospect of monetary policy hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB). This article assesses to what extent the conduct of fiscal policy differs within a monetary union at the ZLB. Using a fiscal DSGE model with two regions (North and South) calibrated to replicate the conditions where, absent any additional shock, the Euro Area economy would have been stuck at the ZLB for three years starting in 2013, we show that cross-border spillovers from fiscal policy are substantially higher without monetary offset and increase with the extent of fiscal consolidation measures. Spillovers can amount up to half (resp. one sixth) of the domestic impact in the case of VAT-based (resp. spending-based) consolidations. Outside the ZLB, fiscal expansion in one region triggers monetary tightening which has negative effect in the whole union, and gives rise to gains from fiscal cooperation. At the ZLB however, national objectives tend to be closer and the coordinated policy is less consolidating. Moreover, cooperation encourages symmetric rather than asymmetric policies.

On a tight leash: Does bank organizational structure matter for macroprudential spillovers?

This paper examines whether the organizational form of multinational banks' foreign affiliates affects cross-border spillovers of macroprudential regulation. We compare changes in the growth of lending provided by foreign banks' branches versus subsidiaries in the United Kingdom in response to changes in capital requirements, lending standards and reserve requirements in foreign banks' home countries. Our results suggest that a tightening of capital requirements at home reduces UK branches' interbank lending growth by 5.7pp more relative to subsidiaries. We link this effect to the higher degree of control which parent banks hold over operations of their foreign branches compared to subsidiaries. Supporting this hypothesis, a set of further tests illustrates that the response of foreign affiliates operating under a branch structure is stronger where parent banks are more likely to delegate more decision making authority to the board of directors of their subsidiaries.

Civil Wars & Transnational Threats: Mapping the Terrain, Assessing the Links

Among the primary strategic rationales for U.S. policy engagement in war-torn states has been the assumption that internal violence generates cross-border spillovers with negative consequences for U.S. and global security, among these transnational terrorism, organized crime, and infectious disease. Closer examination suggests that the connection between internal disorder and transnational threats is situation-specific, contingent on an array of intervening factors and contextual conditions. Taken as a cohort, war-torn states are not the primary drivers of cross-border terrorism, crime, and epidemics, nor do they pose a first-tier, much less existential, threat to the United States. Of greater concern are relatively functional states that maintain certain trappings of sovereignty but are institutionally anemic, thanks to endemic corruption and winner-take-all politics. Ultimately, the most important U.S. stakes in war-torn countries are moral and humanitarian: namely, the imperative of reducing suffering among fellow members of our species.

Resisting behind the border talks in TTIP: The cases of GMOs and data privacy

AbstractDespite initial intentions to better align transatlantic regulation and associated practices in the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this was not possible for rules concerning genetically modified organisms and data privacy. By 2016 both matters effectively fell off the TTIP negotiating agenda. This paper identifies the factors responsible, specifically the critical role played by independent regulatory agencies and associated bureaucratic politics, transnational coalitions of private sector organizations, and non-government organizations and contingency. These factors are not exclusive to the two salient regulations considered here, with the implication that the identification of cross-border spillovers is at best a necessary condition for the successful negotiation of binding trade rules on behind-the-border government policies.

A Treatise on the TARGET2 Imbalances & Stagnation in Europe

Since the Global Financial Crisis, there have been two parallel issues faced by the Eurozone, Stagnation and TARGET2 imbalances. This study analyses the aspect of settling TARGET2 in an equitable and fair manner that could also resolve the issues of sluggish growth, deflation and high unemployment in Europe. It is proposed that the TARGET2 balances are settled by an adjustment to the monetary base in the EMU. Specifically, it implies that the Eurozone members are granted a right to settle their imbalances against Euro-system in proportion to their capital key weights. The proposed approach will have four order/tier effects which include, a) adjustment of monetary base at the EMU level, b) creation of additional liquidity in the Euros -system member states, c) creation of much needed fiscal space and d) cross-border spillovers among the EMU members. While keeping the bleak economic outlook of Eurozone in context, we analysed the implication of proposed mechanism at first tier using a Factor-Augmented VAR model on data from 2000Q1 to 2017Q1. Our key results suggest that such an approach would lead to a considerable increase in the real output growth, investment, consumption, gross fixed capital formation, stock markets as well as exports and imports of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The magnitude of the proposed mechanism is comparable to the stimulative stance taken by authorities since the GFC and qualitative easing of “whatever it takes”. Comparatively, there are substantial gains for the TARGET2 surplus countries like Germany than the deficit countries as the former can address its public expenditure needs as well as settle large external surplus without breaching balanced budget act (Schuldenbremse). Given that, the adjustment will be based on the capital key weights and existing arrangements, the proposed approach is equitable, fair, and can be used as an unconventional tool by the ECB.