Based on resource dependence theory, agency theory, and institutional theory, we develop an integrated conceptual framework for motivations, moderators, and performance of Chinese cross-border acquisitions. We then use a unique dataset, which covers the 2003–2016 period, to examine how market-seeking, resource-seeking, and managerial self-interest motivations of cross-border acquisitions influence the performance of China’s manufacturing sector publicly listed companies (PLCs). Analysis of the aggregated data shows strong support for market-seeking motivation for cross-border acquisitions. But we only find weak support for resource-seeking motivation. Our analysis also reveals the underlying agency problem thus supporting the managerial self-interest motivation for cross-border acquisitions. Disaggregated data analysis shows that all cross-border acquisitions are driven by market-seeking motivation, whereas resource-seeking is the main driver of acquisitions by state-owned and low-tech PLCs. Acquisitions by China’s private-owned PLCs and medium/high-tech PLCs are also motivated by managerial self-interest in free cash flow, which leads to the principal-agent conflict.