Critical Philosophy Research Articles

The Brilliant, Monochromatic Red of Climate Leviathan

Climate Leviathan argues that to address the climate crisis we must extend the critique of capitalism and that to imagine a just world we need radically open democracy. This reviewer shares the book’s deep anticapitalist politics and Gramscian critique of climate science, but its lack of engagement with feminist, anticolonial, and other critical theories and philosophies of difference undermines its theoretical and political possibilities. Yet the book must be widely and critically read, and its shortcomings must be supplemented to make a world with space for both the diversity of humankind and also for companion and other species.

The Philosophy of Black Lives Matter

The Philosophy of Black Lives Matter

Artificial Intelligence, LLC: Corporate Personhood for AI

Our legal system has long tried to fit the square peg of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into the round hole of the current tort regime, overlooking the inability of traditional liability schemes to address the nuances of how AI technology creates harms. The current tort regime deals out rough justice—using strict liability for some AI products and using the negligence rule for other AI services—both of which are insufficiently tailored to achieve public policy objectives. Under a strict liability regime where manufacturers are always held liable for the faults of their technology regardless of knowledge or precautionary measures, firms are incentivized to play it safe and stifle innovation. But even with this cautionary stance, the goals of strict liability cannot be met due to the unique nature of AI technology: its mistakes are merely “efficient errors”—they appropriately surpass the human baseline, they are game theory problems intended for a jury, they are necessary to train a robust system, or they are harmless but misclassified. Under a negligence liability regime where the onus falls entirely on consumers to prove the element of causation, victimized consumers must surmount the difficult hurdle of tracing the vectors of causation through the “black box” of algorithms. Unable to do so, many are left without sufficient recourse or compensation. This Article proposes a new framework to regulate AI technologies: bestowing corporate personhood to AI systems. First, the corporate personality trait of “limited liability” strikes an optimal balance in determining liability—it would both compensate victims (for instance, through obligations to carry insurance and a straightforward burden of causation) while holding manufacturers responsible only when the infraction is egregious (for instance, through veil-piercing). Second, corporate personhood is “divisible”—meaning not all corporate personality traits need to be granted—which circumvents many of the philosophical criticisms of giving AI the complete set of rights of full legal personhood. Third, innovation incentives weigh heavily in favor of shifting to a tort regime better tailored to the potential promises and unique harms of AI.

Instrumentalism: A worthwhile critical concept for philosophy of education?

The aim of the article is to posit the question whether, or under what conditions ‘instrumentalism’ can be seen as a viable target of the philosophical critique of education. Firstly, I will briefly review and compare three critical conceptions in modern philosophy that interpreted Western civilization as a form of instrumentalism, yet, at the same time, used the concept perhaps too sweepingly: Adorno and Horkheimer (instrumental reason), Heidegger (calculative thinking) and Arendt (means-ends logic in politics). Secondly, I will discuss the exact sweeping moment in those thinkers’ ways of pursuing their critiques of instrumentalism and the way it can, in fact, weaken the pedagogical impact of their analyses. We face a paradox here: if we consistently follow Heidegger and Adorno (Arendt as well, but the situation looks much better with her, as usual), we are prone to ignore the actual perils for freedom in, for example, subsuming education to the global market economy, because it appears to be only a contingent or occasional (ontic) phenomenon that has its ontological roots as early as Homer or Plato. Conversely, if we ignore their analyses, we endanger our critique with inevitable shallowness, i.e. with a tendency to moan about the obvious circumstances without a real understanding of their ontological, historical and cultural backgrounds. This paradox can be translated as a general paradox of the relationship between philosophy and education. To conclude, I will illustrate this by referring to the leading question of this volume: ‘what (is education) for?’, or, to put it differently, to the problem of the purpose of education. If we assume that within the problem itself instrumentalism is inscribed (as all the three philosophers would), we still face the pedagogical and concrete problem of discerning different types of instrumentality. This problem corresponds with the various ways we describe our educational aims and goals.

The gift as philosophical critique of the social grant system in South Africa

The gift as philosophical critique of the social grant system in South Africa

A Philosophical Critique of Homosexuality: Prevailing of Reason over Emotions

A Philosophical Critique of Homosexuality: Prevailing of Reason over Emotions

Law in the Snares of the Political. Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication

The paper aims at reconstruction and critical discussion with the main tenets of political theory of adjudication, as presented by Rafal Manko in his book, 'W strone krytycznej filozofii orzekania. Politycznośc, etyka, legitymizacja' ['Towards a Critical Philosophy of Adjudication. The Political, Ethics, Legitimacy']. In the paper, I demonstrate: that the interpretation of the concept crucial for the entire theory – which is the concept of political – has been chosen by Manko in an ideological and a priori manner; that the choice above effectively prevents the realisation of the main objective of the book, which is to legitimise adjudication; that the adoption of the ethics of adjudication advocated in the book is – in the light of the basic assumptions of that very publication – both improbable and hardly acceptable. Finally, I claim that Manko’s theory, due to its totality, can distinguish neither between legitimate law and violence nor between justified and unjustified adjudication. As a result, it loses its critical force. All these problems are not peculiar to Manko’s theory, but they are general weaknesses of various versions of critical jurisprudence.

Note 57: Hospitable approaches to community music scholarship1

The purpose of this article is to evoke an approach to scholarship that is resonant with community music’s ethos and practice. After contextualizing questions that have driven my work, I engage with a ‘philosophical critique’ of community music, published in 2016, through one of its endnotes and, in so doing, reveal why the text is problematic and ‘out of step’ with contemporary thinking concerning understandings of community music. Following this, I develop some ideas associated with community music as an act of hospitality and, in so doing, provide a potential lens for critique rather than a criticism. In conclusion, I advocate for future scholars and researchers to have a sensitivity and understanding of the practices and the issues that face those who are engaged in community music in order to generate a conducive environment through which powerful critique might be made.

Cultural Exchange as an Expanded Field of Architecture : The Decentering Architectural Criticism of the Yugoslav Praxis Group

By exploring a context of networks, critiques, debates, dialogues, and collaborative practices, this article challenges common understandings of the ideological dimension of architectural discourses of the period of the 1960s and 1970s in Yugoslavia. It also considers the potential for rethinking theoretical issues involved in the critical dialogue with other currents of utopian urbanism and prospective thought that were influential at the time. The article investigates the reception of ideas and ideologies, from Lefebvre’s theoretical studies and Habermas’s thesis of modernity as an incomplete, i.e., unfinished project, to Fredric Jameson’s arguments in a historical context of cultural modernity simultaneous with these texts, but in different conditions. The concepts of architectural criticism are analysed through representative practices of the period, from the first attempts to write and rewrite the history of architecture, which coincided with architecture in the expanded field of experimental and conceptual practices, to postmodernist narratives redefining the questions of identity by appropriating the strategies of performing arts in the public space throughout the early 1980s. The thematic framework is constituted by case studies on cultural transfer in the fields of philosophy, theory, sociology, spatial research, and architectural discourse, which played a key role in the strengthening of border-crossing networks. The theoretical and methodological point of departure is the analysis of the Praxis circle, a group of critical Marxist philosophers and intellectuals who gathered around the journal Praxis (1964–1974) and the philosophical-political Summer School of Philosophy held on the Adriatic island of Korcula (1964–1974). The aim is to document and contextualize the role of these activities in disseminating the intense intellectual exchanges of “creative criticism” between East and West. Although recent scientific historiography has expressed greater interest in the inter disciplinary area of cultural transfer, there has never been a thorough critical perspective of the politically charged debates on the history of Eastern European intellectual critical engagement, or systematic study of the theoretical achievements in the architecture of late socialism.

Metafisika Mediasi Teknologis: Kritik Atas Filsafat Teknologi Klasik

This paper aims to propose philosophical criticism toward 'classical' thinking on philosophy of technology. This set of thinking tends to be trapped in the distinction between subject-object and romantic-pessimisms on the existence of technological dominance. The authors objective is to provide comprehensive understanding through contemporary approaches in philosophy concerning technological mediation. The study employs factual historical analysis and philosophical reflection to understand technological mediation patterns. The result maps point of view that develops a metaphysical orientation of technological mediation in terms of several approaches. Postphenomenological approaches technological mediation in a relational and intentional context rather than providing a subject-object distinction. Actor-network theory improves the asymmetrical relation of humans and non-humans. Simondon and Harman provide for ontological analysis of tools and technology in human relationships. Critical theory of technology opens the chance that technological relations are not only neutral-instrumental but have transformative and emancipatory power. Therefore, the technological mediation approach can become a new subject in the metaphysics of technology discourse in overcoming the limitations of the classical philosophy of technology.

Kant’s Conception of Theodicy and his Argument from Metaphysical Evil against it

Abstract A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant’s exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant’s critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood; and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant‘s new conception of theodicy, I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant’s second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of ‘metaphysical evil’, and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant’s claim in this regard.

¿Qué es ser cosmopolita? Pequeña contribución a la historia del concepto

Partiendo de la lectura de Pierre Hadot, este breve ensayo busca ayudar a entender la idea de cosmopolitismo desde sus fuentes antiguas hasta su reanudación en la modernidad. En él se tentará mostrar cómo Shaftesbury integró la figura del sabio cosmopolita estoico en su filosofía y cómo ella fue importante para la constitución de otras figuras como el extranjero exótico (Montesquieu), el hombre natural (Rousseau) y el critico en Kant – todas ellos resultantes de una misma conceptualización. De la perspectiva del estoicismo shatesburiano se puede entender mejor también el sentido de Bildung en la antropología alemana del siglo XVIII e de crítica en Kant, y como esta está relacionada con el cosmopolitismo de su antropología y de su filosofía de la historia.

Putting educational gerontology principles to the test: a quantitative confirmation of the empowering benefits of liberal arts courses

ABSTRACT The humanist and critical principles of educational gerontology attribute different goals to education in later life. Self-Actualization is the goal of humanist educational gerontology, while empowerment, emancipation, and social change are the goals of critical educational gerontology. Liberal arts education is dominant in later-life learning. Both the humanist and the critical philosophies of learning in older age claim that this type of education is not empowering. Empowerment is a contested concept that has been defined through a set of constructs ranging from psychological capacities to attitudes and behaviors. In terms of capital, empowerment translates into gains in identity and social capital, operationalized in the variables agency and social and civic participation, respectively. The present study investigated the empowering potential of liberal arts courses using the BeLL survey data of 7,338 adult learners. Through a series of ANOVAs and a regression model, we found that age, gender, educational attainment, the number of courses, and changes in agency are significantly associated with changes in social and civic participation. We concluded that liberal arts education does empower adult learners, especially older adults, women, and individuals with lower educational attainment. Given that goal-related claims in the principles of educational gerontology have been empirically challenged, we recommend a new statement of principles that takes into account the latest developments in the field, as well as learners’ agential capacities and the structural inequalities they face.

Projekt wieczystego pokoju. Polityczne marzenie wielkiego filozofa

CEL BADAWCZY: Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie projektu wiecznego pokoju Immanuela Kanta pod kątem jego filozoficznych i politycznych założeń.
 PROBLEM I METODY BADAWCZE: Głównym problemem analizowa‑ nym w tym tekście jest ukazanie roli myślenia teoretycznego i jego politycznych implikacji. Filozofia krytyczna Kanta wyznaczyła nową drogę refleksji filozoficz‑ nej. Zasadniczo filozofowanie po Kancie okazało się niemożliwe bez odniesienia do jego myśli (czy to w sensie pozytywnym, czy też negatywnym). W ramach myśli filozofa pojawiła się także refleksja polityczna. Ważnym miejscem w tej refleksji wydaje się określenie ogólnego celu ludzkości, którym, według Kanta, jest dążenie do wiecznego pokoju.
 PROCES ARGUMENTACJI: Artykuł próbuje opisać projekt wiecznego pokoju Kanta z punktu widzenia problemu jego wykonalności. Ta kwestia ujawnia podstawowy problem refleksji nad polityką, czyli powiązania teorii z praktyką.
 WYNIKI BADAŃ: Filozofia jest czysto intelektualną spekulacją, której idee odnoszą się jednak do praktyki politycznej. W tym kontekście można zastano‑ wić się, czy „sny” filozofów­-teoretyków mają zastosowanie w praktycznym (realnym) świecie.
 WNIOSKI, INNOWACJE I ZALECENIA: We wnioskach próbuje się wy‑ kazać pierwszeństwo namysłu teoretycznego nad praktycznym wdrażaniem koncepcji politycznych w życiu społecznym. Kant – jako filozof – pokazuje, że idee i różne teoretycznie ustalone cele, które stanowią wyzwanie dla człowieka i społeczeństwa, mają sens jedynie jako postulaty a priori, a te dopiero wdrażane w praktyce stają się właściwymi celami do osiągnięcia.

Philosophy of law as social-humanity discipline

It is reasonable to develop the philosophy of law as a single socio-humanitarian discipline, and there is no epistemological need to divide it into “philosophical philosophy of law” and “legal philosophy of law”. The interpenetration of philosophy and law is possible, because love of wisdom has a lawgenetical potential, and jurisprudence contains a socio-philosophical potential. For the first time, the proposed explication of philosophicallawgenetical structures serves as a theoretical defense against belittling the role of philosophy in the formation of law and in the performance of its functions. Legal progress is guided by the values of humanistic philosophy.

Philosophy and its History: An Essay in the Philosophy of Philosophy

Philosophy and its History: An Essay in the Philosophy of Philosophy

Cosmopolitan Wisdom and the Enactment of Moral Intelligibility

Abstract Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy pays little explicit attention to the concept of ‘wisdom’ in its taxonomy of the functions of human reason in its work of rendering intelligible the world and the human place in the world. On the basis of some crucial texts in Kant’s writings, this essay argues that wisdom has a role to play in the task Kant assigns to practical reason; this task is to make the world in which humans dwell intelligible morally, i.e., to make sense of the world as locus in which good and evil take form in function of the exercise of human freedom. In such a world, the function of wisdom is ‘cosmopolitan’ in that it provides a horizon of a social hope that recognizes human solidarity, vulnerability, and otherness, as signal instances of the inclusive moral relationality necessary for sustaining both an ‘outer’ world order for peace and the ‘inner’ dynamic of full moral relationality that Kant terms ‘the ethical commonwealth’.

父母元情绪理念与青少年问题行为:迷走神经的调节作用

父母元情绪理念与青少年问题行为:迷走神经的调节作用

Philosophy of law as social-humanity discipline

It is reasonable to develop the philosophy of law as a single socio-humanitarian discipline, and there is no epistemological need to divide it into “philosophical philosophy of law” and “legal philosophy of law”. The interpenetration of philosophy and law is possible, because love of wisdom has a lawgenetical potential, and jurisprudence contains a socio-philosophical potential. For the first time, the proposed explication of philosophical lawgenetical structures serves as a theoretical defense against belittling the role of philosophy in the formation of law and in the performance of its functions. Legal progress is guided by the values of humanistic philosophy.

Hannah Arendt: Socratic Citizenship and Philosophical Critique

Abstract In this essay I trace the relationship between philosophy and politics in Hannah Arendt’s work, with specific reference to the tension between her Socratic commitments and her appeal to “common sense” or sensus communis. I argue Arendt’s idea of a “common sense of the world” gives rise to a conception of the public realm that has too much shape and integrity to fit the often misty and particulate nature of contemporary reality. This is not the familiar critique of Arendt as a nostalgic Grecophile. Rather, it is a critique aimed at the phenomenological concept of “world” underlying her analysis. This concept—derived, but notably different, from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions—relies on background practices and understandings that are thick enough to sustain both a common public culture and a shared “sense of the world.” I suggest that Arendt’s appeal to a sensus communis runs aground of the moral and value pluralism that both Weber and Berlin have suggested are constitutive features of modernity. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between Arendt’s critique of modernity and Socratic philosophical critique (on the one hand) and Frankfurt School Critical Theory (on the other).