Crisis Proneness Research Articles

The Effects of Corporate Elitism and Groupthink on Organizational Empathy in Crisis Situations

This study is to empirically testify that corporate elitism is an antecedent to groupthink, which prevents organizational empathy from working effectively in crises. The current study is expected to expand the boundary of crisis management literature into a company’s crisis-preparedness before a crisis occurs. The findings offer the useful guidance to organizations on how to better manage their crisis proneness through identifying the early signs of corporate elitism and groupthink.

COVID-19 Could Cause Bigger Cracks in Turkey’s Fragile Crisis Prone Economy

The cash strapped Turkey's gloomy economy was already ailing before the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic. The August rout of 2018 caused serious cracks as lira tumbled against the dollar (25% in three days and 41% in just two weeks); consequently, core inflation peaked at 26% and key interest rate shot up to 24% in October 2018. Currency crisis (the worst since 2001 Turkish economic crisis) along with coronavirus health crisis and the resultant Great Lockdown jolted the Turkish economy from its roots sending chills to the bones of financial markets, which could cost $50 billion or more. If the Turkish government (President Erdogan in particular) is not able to come up with at least $50 billion to support its economy during this extraordinary tough time, coronavirus as a heavy puncture will send the ailing Turkish economy right to the burial ground, this was reflected in ineffectiveness of policy interventions by the Turkish central bank (i.e. abbreviated as TCMB). According to Fitch’s latest forecast, Turkish economy is expected to contract 3% in 2020 (i.e. forecast of 3.9% growth).

From the Crisis of Corporatism to the Crisis of Governance

In the first half of the twentieth century, and, in particular, in the interwar period, corporatism, in its populist, progressive, reactionary and totalitarian variants, became a central feature of European societies. Many observers have regarded this development as a central driving force of the profound societal crises which characterised this period. In contrast, other observers have mainly interpreted the corporatist surge as both a reaction and a possible solution to societal crises caused by the nature of capitalist re-production. In a similar vein, the emergence and expansion of new types of governance institutions since the 1970s has been understood as both the cause and as a reaction to the protracted series of crises which have characterised Western Europe and the rest of the Western world from the 1970s to the recent financial crisis. In more general terms, societal crises can be said to be intrinsic to a modern society that is characterised by constant transformations of its basic structure. This is also reflected in the constitutive distinction of modern society, the distinction between the factual unfolding of social processes and contra-factual normative articulations concerning how these processes ought to unfold. Against this background, this chapter examines the close link between societal crises and the evolution of intermediary institutions in their corporatist, neo-corporatist and governance variants in the European context. Intermediary institutions fulfil a dual role in so far as they are simultaneously oriented towards the internal stabilisation of social processes and the establishment of compatibility between the social process in question and the rest of society. This gives them a strategic location in society in so far as they can be understood as central sites of societal integration as also reflected in the particular way in which they seek to combine factuality and normative articulations. But this location also implies that they are sites where tendencies of societal dis-integration tend to emerge and become most visible. This was particular clear in relation to interwar corporatism, but it has also re-emerged as a central issue within contemporary governance. A central reason for the crisis proneness of both interwar corporatism and contemporary governance can be found in their advancement of a fundamental anti-legalist stance which, both in the interwar period and in the present time, paved the way for an erosion of the legal infrastructure of society.

Are sensation seekers in control? A study in crisis preparedness

As a key phase of crisis management (CM), crisis preparedness (CP) constitutes an indispensable process, without which organisations become acutely prone to adverse eventualities. Predicated on a sample of 210 Israeli managers, and the use of hierarchical regression, we explored how locus of control (LoC), impulsive sensation-seeking (ImpSS), leadership styles and femininity affect perceived CP. We found impulsive sensation seekers, typified by external LoC, to be crisis prone and so are transactional leaders as opposed to transformational leaders, who were found to be associated with CP. Contrary to previous research, we found feminine traits to be associated with crisis proneness. Our study contributes to the extant CM research chiefly by highlighting the effect of LoC and ImpSS on perceived CP.

情報のハブを利用した危機対応についての一考察 : D社の事例をもとに( リスクと情報経営)

情報のハブを利用した危機対応についての一考察 : D社の事例をもとに( リスクと情報経営)

Leadership attributes, masculinity and risk taking as predictors of crisis proneness

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which leadership attributes, masculinity, risk taking and decision making affect perceived crisis proneness.Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws mainly on the literature about gender, leadership and organizational crisis to explore whether masculinity predicts crisis proneness, and the extent to which leadership attributes as well as risk‐taking and decision‐making style are efficient predictors of perceived crisis preparedness (CP). Utilizing pertinent literature and concepts, the paper evaluates a database of 231 female and male managers.Findings – As hypothesized, masculinity is positively associated, whereas transformational leadership is inversely associated with perceived crisis proneness. Both participative decision making and passive management predict higher degree of perceived crisis proneness and so does risk taking.Research limitations/implications – More in‐depth research as well as larger and more diverse sample is requ...

The Crisis-Prone Organization as a Factor in Workplace Aggression

Although workplace aggression has been linked in theory to characteristics of the worker as well as to characteristics of the organization, there have been few supporting data. This research examines the relationship between organizational climate and workplace aggression. A diverse sample of 57 subjects, representing a wide variety of occupations and worksites, responded to a questionnaire measuring the perceived crisis proneness of their organizations. Subjects also rated the amount of aggression at their worksites. The crisis proneness scale, developed for this research, had an alpha of .87 and correlated +.56 with the amount of aggression reported by subjects. This relationship held up with job satisfaction, social desirability, and various demographic variables controlled for. Crisis proneness also correlated very highly with a measure of perceived fairness of the organization, and these two variables were not practically distinguishable in this research. It is suggested that security managers need to be very aware of the organizational climate, and do all that they can to minimize perceptions that the organization is ‘crisis-prone’ or that it is treating workers unfairly.

Executives’ Orientations as Indicators of Crisis Management Policies and Practices*

ABSTRACT The paper examines effects of executives’ orientations on crisis management awareness and practices, drawing on the simplicity and paradox management theories. It is suggested that a focus on single‐sided management constitutes an antecedent of crisis proneness. Employing a set of key corporate domains and based on a holistic organizational approach, the study aims at assessing the extent to which companies are crisis prone or prepared. In a sample of 82 Istaeli business and not‐for‐profit organizations it was found that human resource management, strategy, structure, and unlearning factors significantly predicted crisis preparedness. These results suggest that unlearning, despite a mere allusion to this correlate in the simplicity and paradox management theories, correlates better with crisis preparedness. By contrast, traditional strategy‐related and structural effects were marginally related to crisis management policies. Implications and suggestions for further research are proposed.

Are Pegged and Intermediate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimes-a view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimesa view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.

From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared

Published in Oil & Gas Executive, Volume 1, Number 2, 1998, pages 52-56. Managers tend to race headlong into the future while looking in the rearview mirror (how it was done in the past) and out the side windows (how the competition is doing it). Needless to say, this type of management is counterproductive. If managers spend their time solving problems and resolving crises, little time remains for innovation and competitive leaps. Foresight and anticipation are needed for managers to be more productive with the resources and assets they have at their disposal. Change and uncertainty are inevitable, but they need not be terminal. Success, and in some cases survival, will require more sophisticated intelligence systems. We will need greater collaboration between the communicators (public affairs, public relations), the operators (senior managers), and the planners (strategic planning).Additionally, the managerial mindset must refocus from looking at the organization as first and foremost a profit-maximizing, economic entity to an awareness of the strategic significance of staying tuned in to what is happening outside the organization, in the dynamic social, political, environmental, and technological arenas. "For knowing afar off the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But, when for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow until everyone can recognize them, there is no longer any remedy to be found."—Machiavelli, The Prince (1513) As Machiavelli counseled long ago, being proactive is wise and affords great advantage. Machiavelli did not, however, provide the strategic and tactical skills necessary for an organization to become more proactive and to gain strategic advantage and avoid crises. In our complex and rapidly changing world, becoming anticipatory and gaining strategic advantage requires sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques, new decision-process models, and practical accountabilities. These tools allow an organization to capitalize on strategic outside intelligence, to avoid being blind-sided by external forces, to profit from new opportunities, and to turn emerging threats into opportunities. Failure to anticipate and to be proactive, on the other hand, can have destructive consequences. Motorola watched its stock drop 30% when a stakeholder group broke its story about neurological damage from cell phones. Audi (Volkswagen) watched the U.S. sales of its highly profitable Audi 5000plummet 84% after being associated in the media with "sudden acceleration incidents." Like Motorola, Audi stood by as if paralyzed by a media attack of its vehicle, which had 10 years of successful technology to support its safety. IBM, General Motors, Westinghouse, Sears, and the Columbia Broadcasting System also failed to anticipate dramatic external shifts in their respective industries and to avoid the crises they signaled.

Crisis Prone Versus Crisis Avoiding Organizations Is your company's culture its own worst enemy in creating crises?

Organizations are often unaware of some of the most important forces influ encing their actions. This article expands on that general observation for the subject of man-made, organizationally induced crises or disasters. Interviews with 30 executives in 23 organizations revealed that 19 companies saw them selves as being more vulnerable to crises than they were in the past. However, only 10 of them had a relatively integrated crisis management plan; 13 had no or only fragmented efforts in crisis management. The authors identify key cul tural characteristics that explain the discrepancy between the two groups. The 'concept of self' or 'orghanizational identity' appears to be paramount in influ encing strategic actions in crisis management. Many organizations need to be encouraged to examine their basic sense of identity. (Ed.)

Der Begriff der Krise

An analysis of the concept of crisis cannot ignore that it is often used in a highly suggestive way, nor should it neglect to look at its historical roots. The psychosocial crisis concept as it is used in psychiatry, psychotherapy, social work, etc. has two historic roots: one root lies in the medical-natural-sciences tradition; the other in the dramaturgical Le. healing tradition, and they both flow together in the concept as commonly used. At present, there are numerous crisis definitions each of which emphasizes a different aspect. Greater precision, models and operational definitions are indispensable for exact research. Crisis precipitation, disposition (crisis proneness) of the system, environment and reaction of the system are discussed as separate aspects of a crisis. Finally, the innovative and constructive role is stressed which the crisis concept plays in research and practice.