Crisis Management Operations Research Articles

C4ISR: A Comprehensive Approach

In this keynote speech the NC3A General Manager identifies several key lessons from current operations and ways of developing capabilities, including the lack of agility, coherence and upfront interoperability. In dealing with current operational and capability development challenges, NATO and the member nations need to identify overlaps and redundancies and apply effectively the concept of ‘smart defence’ under growing financial pressures, while at the same time providing for close interaction with various international organizations, civilian security players, e.g. police forces, and private actors in complex crisis management operations. Among the specific recommendations are the establishment the position of a Chief Technology Officer and the transition from project to programme management.

Turkey's Accession to the European Union in terms of impact on the EU's security and defense policies: potential and drawbacks

This study explores the impact of Turkey's likely entry in the European Union (EU) in terms of the EU's foreign, security and defense policies. It reviews Turkish capabilities, namely its military capabilities, which could provide the EU with valuable defense assets. There are differences related to Turkey's relations with the EU, which have increasingly spilled over into the NATO, hindering the development of cooperation over crisis management operations. The article then delves in the implications of Turkey's strategic geographical location to EU policies. It reviews how far the EU and Turkey may have convergent interests in some of the neighboring regions, especially in the Middle East.

Chapter Two: Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-led Crisis-Management Operations

In the twenty-first century, the European Union is confronted by myriad security problems that demand concerted action and cooperation. As a negotiating power, it seeks to persuade Iran to forswear a nuclear weapons programme. As a crisis manager it seeks to contribute to global peace and stability through civilian and military operations. Closer to home, it is wrestling with questions about membership enlargement, large-scale migration and terrorist threats to the security of its populations and infrastructure. European governments, already under financial strain from ageing workforces and welfare systems, face ever more difficult choices about budget cuts in security and defence after the near-collapse of the global banking system. Will it be possible to enhance cooperation between member states? How can the EU complete its transition from a security actor with great potential to a player that credibly aligns available policy instruments and resources? These and other issues about the very nature and identity of the Union are explored in this Adelphi. From the need to establish its hard-power credentials, overcome its reluctance to demonstrate them against non-compliant states, and leverage its relationships with other great powers, to attempts to break its dependence on Russian energy, it is clear the EU has its work cut out. But, by affirming its commitment to multilateralism and defining a careful balance between closer cooperation and the national security concerns of EU member states, this book suggests, the European Union can build on its status as a global security power in the making.

A Responsibility to Assist. Human Rights Policy and Practice in European Union Crisis Management Operations. A COST Report

A Responsibility to Assist. Human Rights Policy and Practice in European Union Crisis Management Operations. A COST Report

EU and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Reluctant Involvement in Conflict Resolution

Abstract. The article deals with the European Union (EU) policy toward the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-arabakh. The article argues that, in order to understand the EU as a crisis management actor, one has to study not just the patterns of EU intervention in conflict resolution and the impact of its actions but also EU decision not to intervene. These have a huge explanatory potential for the understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Thus the article analyses in detail not just what the EU does vis-à-vis the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts but also what it failed to do. It analyses EU decisions to appoint special envoys, send civilian crisis management operations and offer assistance to the conflict zones, but also draws lessons from EU’s refusal to consider the deployment of peacekeepers or the avoidance of conflict resolution strategies, which might upset Russia. The article concludes that EU intervention in conflict resolution is primarily driven by external constraints or opportunities rather than strategic design. When faced with a choice for possible intervention in conflict settlement, the EU tends to opt for the easier, rather than the necessary, foreign policy measures and tends to work around the hard issues of conflict resolution.

Recovery time of a complex system in risk and crisis management operations

It is generally recognised that a random sum of discrete random variables and a maximum of a random number of non-negative random variables are very powerful analytical concepts for formulating effective stochastic models with significant applications in many practical disciplines. The paper combines these concepts in order to formulate a stochastic model. Properties and applications in risk and crisis management operations of the formulated stochastic model are also established.

The System of EU Crisis Management – From Bringing Peace to Establishing Democracy?

I. Overview of EU Crisis Management Operations and Missions 1. Differentiation 2. Operations and Missions in Particular II. General Legal Framework 1. Mixture of Civilian and Military Crisis Management and its Problems 2. Legal Basis in European and International Law III. Transfer of Democracy? 1. Rule of Law Concept of the EU 2. Result of the EU Crisis Management Missions and Operations: Practical Output Annex

Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU's Evolving Practice

The conduct of EU military and civilian crisis management operations in third states within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy has presented the EU with new administrative and operational challenges in recent years, including the need to defi ne the international legal position of such operations and their personnel during their presence abroad. In some cases, the EU has entered into agreements with host states to determine the legal status of EU crisis management operations, while in other cases the application of already existing arrangements has been extended to them. The status agreements negoti- ated directly by the EU confer more extensive privileges and immunities on EU operations and their personnel than current international practice in this area would warrant. Despite opposition to this policy within the EU, it has remained in place under the two model status agreements adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2005 to serve as a basis for negotiations with prospective host states in all future EU operations. Even though no norm of international law compels the EU to request only such privileges and immunities as are absolutely necessary for the purposes of an operation, its practice of negotiating extensive privileges and immunities does not sit well with the growing emphasis on the accountabil- ity of peace support operations. This article offers an overview of the evolution of the EU's practice of concluding status agreements in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy and examines the key provisions of the two model status agreements.

The European Union and Developments in Crisis Management Operations and Peacekeeping

Thirty years ago, Henry Kissinger posed the question, “Whom do I call when I want to speak to Europe?” Now, the former U.S. Secretary of State is reported to have said: “I think one knows whom to call; I don’t think Europe has yet decided how to give answers to all the questions.” Europe’s foreign policy is said to be fragmented and weak. A common defense and foreign policy still eludes the European Union (EU), and it is by no means clear that the deficiencies identified during the course of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia have been rectified. Part of the problem today may also be that there are now too many candidates willing to answer for Europe. Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. Ambassador to the UN and also to NATO, recalled the Bosnian peace conference at Dayton, Ohio, in 1995, which had three co-chairmen, one of whom was Karl Bildt, the then EU special representative. But Germany, Britain, and France also sent envoys, and each indicated that Bildt did not speak for them. Externally, the growing prominence of the European Union and its gradual assumption of some of the functions of the state had meant that its place in international relations has become more rather than less ambiguous over time. Many of the formal legal agreements between the EU and the outside world are so-called “mixed” arrangements. Furthermore, most of its informal foreign policy also operates within a somewhat unclear and evolving framework of cooperation and competition with the foreign relations of its member states. The overall situation has been complicated by the accession of new states to the EU. Prior to the formation of the EU, European history was characterized by instability and armed conflict, and it was in the aftermath of one of Europe’s bloodiest wars that a number of individual member states came together to lay the foundation for today’s

The promotion of security sector reform strategies: Comparing the roles of the European Union and Canada

This article analyzes the role of the European Union (EU) and Canada in the promotion of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) activities in two regional organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The concept of SSR seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. Recent debates within the EU have led to the adoption of an SSR concept from the Council and a new strategy from the European Commission on the SSR activities. Within the framework of the ESDP, the EU has positioned itself as a leading actor, in this domain, including in its crisis management operations. On the other hand, Canada, through its whole-of government and human security programs has also been an important actor in the promotion of SSR activities. Yet, even though several international organizations (including the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO) are effectively doing SSR activities on the ground, there does not exist a common framework within any of these organizations despite the role of the EU and Canada. As such, it is surprising to found no global common policy for SSR while this approach is precisely holistic in its foundations. Taking these elements into consideration, this paper analyzes two specific aspects : a) the absence of a common policy framework within international organizations and b) the major differences between the approaches of the OSCE and NATO in the domain of SSR and the implications for the EU and Canada’ roles.

The promotion of security sector reform strategies: Comparing the roles of the European Union and Canada

This article analyzes the role of the European Union (EU) and Canada in the promotion of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) activities in two regional organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The concept of SSR seeks to address the effective governance of security in post-conflict environment by transforming the security institutions within a country in order for them to have more efficient, legitimate and democratic role in implementing security. Recent debates within the EU have led to the adoption of an SSR concept from the Council and a new strategy from the European Commission on the SSR activities. Within the framework of the ESDP, the EU has positioned itself as a leading actor, in this domain, including in its crisis management operations. On the other hand, Canada, through its whole-of government and human security programs has also been an important actor in the promotion of SSR activities. Yet, even though several international organizations (including the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO) are effectively doing SSR activities on the ground, there does not exist a common framework within any of these organizations despite the role of the EU and Canada. As such, it is surprising to found no global common policy for SSR while this approach is precisely holistic in its foundations. Taking these elements into consideration, this paper analyzes two specific aspects : a) the absence of a common policy framework within international organizations and b) the major differences between the approaches of the OSCE and NATO in the domain of SSR and the implications for the EU and Canada’ roles.
 
 Full extt available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v3i2.186

Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis Management Operations: From Nuisance to Necessity

How do we explain under which conditions the EU is likely intervene in one crisis situation and not in another? To what extent have human rights considerations been factored into these operations thus far? This article seeks to answers these questions and describes the decision-making process with respect to EU involvement in crisis management operations and the instruments at the disposal of the EU, with a particular focus on human rights policy. An overview and analysis of current and past civilian and military crisis management operations points to three factors that help to explain EU involvement in crisis situations, namely: norms, interests and institutions. It concludes with suggestions to better integrate human rights into future operations. This article is written in a personal capacity and does not reflect EU positions.

Why Europe needs space as part of its security and defence policy

Abstract While Europe is edging towards the creation of a coherent space policy and is also trying to create an EU-wide common security policy, the need to use space assets to support security and defence has been only partially acknowledged. The background to Europe's progress towards its goals in space and security is reviewed and the diverse and vital roles that space technology plays in military operations are elaborated. The author argues that top political-level support for integrating space into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) must be forthcoming; a good start would be the creation of an official document detailing the full range of space missions and functions required for the conduct of crisis management operations, to be used as a thematic guide.

The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies

Since the beginning of the European Community, there have been ambitions to develop 'Europe' into a significant foreign policy actor with its own security and defence policy. The development of an independent European defence is a key to fulfilling this goal. The European rapid reaction force declared operational at the EU summit in Laeken in December 2001 may contribute to the EU's role as an international actor. A number of preconditions have to be fulfilled before the EU decides to deploy the force in, for example, sub-Saharan Africa. The article establishes that a number of conditions have already been fulfilled. It concludes that it is likely that the European military force will be used in crisis-management operations in sub-Saharan Africa. However, a decision to do so will only be taken if the deployment can serve the wider purpose of showing the European Union in its role as an international actor.

European Defence and Nato

THE ASPIRATION AMONG WEST EUROPEAN governments to co-operate not just on economic and trade policies but also on security and defence goes back to the years immediately after World War II.(f.1) The Brussels Treaty Organization (1948) and the subsequent Western European Union (1954) were essentially defensive alliances, while the European Defence Community (established in 1952 and abandoned in 1954) included the notion of a common defence policy and a pooled military capacity governed by a European defence and foreign policy council. Although none of these initiatives provided Europe with the concrete military protection it needed to navigate through the cold war, they are evidence of the fact that European governments have consistently sought channels of co-operation among themselves in addition to participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).European Political Co-operation allowed European Community members to formulate common foreign policy objectives in the 1970s and 1980s. Its successor when the cold war ended, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), added to the policy pronouncements a capacity for modest joint actions. The Balkan wars of the early 1990s underscored for many Europeans the need to develop both political and military capacity in the only European military organization they had - the Western European Union (WEU) - to manage crises that did not really threaten the territorial security of any member of NATO.(f.2) Of course, the same crises also reinvigorated the Atlantic Alliance, ultimately modernizing its command structure and broadening its mission. As a result, the EU and NATO have begun to look like competitors in the crisis management area on the EU's borders.By mid-1996, NATO and the EU appeared to agree on a formula that would allow European initiatives within NATO. The EU would even be able to borrow expensive NATO assets, such as command and control, to undertake European-led, low intensity crisis management operations - the Petersberg tasks - through the WEU.(f.3) In 1997, at its summit in Amsterdam, the EU took over from the WEU both the responsibility for and the management of the Petersberg tasks.This model of constructive co-operation between the aspirations of the European Union and the military capacity of the Atlantic Alliance came to be known as the European Security and Defence Identity or ESDI-in-NATO. There was agreement in principle that NATO and the WEU would prepare for Combined Joint Task Force operations. Yet, the details of this arrangement were never satisfactorily worked out because the aspiration for European independence proved just as strong as the determination of NATO (and especially the Americans) to maintain control over the Alliance's mandate, operations, and assets.(f.4)In an historical meeting at St Malo in December 1998, the French and British governments agreed that the EU should create a 'capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces.'(f.5) Building on this bilateral accord and fuelled by the Kosovo crisis, in December 1999 the EU announced a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which includes the so-called Headline Goal, that is, the capacity to maintain a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops with all the military requirements to launch sustainable crisis operations in the European area by 2003.(f.6)The surprising pace with which the EU developed new decision-making structures for ESDP and its apparent progress in assembling military forces for the rapid reaction force, all amidst the controversy over NATO's role in the air war against Serbia, has led to many defensive and 'turf-protecting' debates on both sides of the north Atlantic. The debate is about who decides - NATO or the European Union - when or where to intervene. Moreover, who will do the military planning and operational preparations for such potential interventions? Who can participate if the EU undertakes the action alone? …

The Zeebrugge ferry disaster

On Friday 6 March, 1987, at approximately 19:30 the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry boat capsized just outside the Belgian harbour of Zeebrugge. Almost 200 people died as the ship sank very quickly. This article examines the emergency operations that followed the disaster from the perspective of information and communication dynamics. Five specific aspects are thus analyzed in greater detail and elements of an alternative scenario are suggested for each of them: the initial alert and the subsequent mobilization of the emergency services; the information- handling performance of the crisis center; interorganizational communication between disaster- relief agencies; external communication to survivors, families and next of kin, the management of the mass media. It is concluded that, when examining the crisis management operations more closely, the alleged success of Belgian disaster relief operations at Zeebrugge appears in many respects something of a myth. The paper is commented on by John P. Heck, Head of Civil Defense at the Dutch Ministry of the Interior.