As the EU’s intervention and crisis management capabilities have been ripening and surviving their first tests in the Balkans or Congo, there is a growing interest in spreading this experience and introducing some “pilot projects” of intervention in other parts of the world. In this respect, the areas that attract most of the EU attention are situated in its near neighborhood. Stability in Moldova and in the South and the North Caucasus are especially important for the EU as it expands. In methodological terms, there are considerable differences in the situations of these three areas. Firstly, there is a difference in the intensity of the conflict: it has nearly died down in Transdniestria, while in Abkhazia the confrontation is more intense, and in Chechnya the fighting is on-going. Secondly, Russia’s interest also varies. Moscow takes close to its heart the developments in Chechnya, and keeps its finger on the pulse in Abkhazia, but Moldova is hardly a top priority, even within the CIS policy of the Kremlin. The EU, on the contrary, is very much concerned about the Transdniestrian problem, and has a general interest in Abkhazia (as part of the South Caucasus). The European view on Chechnya has not substantially changed, even in light of the war on terror, although the statements on this issue have become milder. Nevertheless, Europe continues to exploit the Chechen issue as a lever to influence Russia’s policy. However, the methods of settlement of the various conflicts are similar, though the pace of conflict resolution differs. While Chechnya is already a part of the Russian Federation, and the task is to make it a ‘normal’ constituent member, Moldova is only moving toward a federal constitution, and Abkhazia is thus far unwilling to set up any federal structure with Georgia. Even the rhetoric of the parties is the same: Transdniestria is flooded with “criminal gangs” and “illicit arms dealers,” Abkhazia is full of “terrorists” and “armed separatists mediating the drug trafficking,” and Chechnya is the nest of “international terrorism” and “banditry.” The slightest difference is that in Moldova and Georgia, despite official demonization of the enemy, there is some dialogue with the non-recognized entities, while Moscow does not want to conduct any negotiations with the Chechen rebels at the current stage, noting (fairly) that there is no unified command of warlords, and thus no representative to talk to. Finally, the prospects for the intervention in the Moldovan case are more favorable, while Abkhazia is unlikely to fall under the patronage of a European or joint RussianEuropean force. As far as Chechnya is concerned, there is practically no chance that Moscow would allow any kind of international involvement in this region. There is seemingly a direct link between Russia’s interest in an area and its openness to the pos-