Crimea Crisis Research Articles

The Crisis in Crimea and the Principle of Non-Intervention

During the civil unrest in Ukraine in early 2014 Russia began supplying rebel groups in Crimea with military equipment, deployed military forces into Crimea and encouraged and supported Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. This article claims that Russia’s conduct between February and March 2014 constitutes unlawful intervention and not a use of force. It reaches this conclusion by, first, exploring the meaning and content of the principles of non-intervention and the non-use of force and then, second, by examining Russia’s justifications namely, that it intervened at the request of Ukraine’s competent authorities, to protect endangered Russian citizens and to support Crimea’s claim to self-determination. The overall aim of this article is to highlight the content and meaning as well as the legal boundaries of the principle of non-intervention as an international legal norm distinct from the prohibition against the use of force.

The end of a military-industrial triangle: arms-industrial co-operation between China, Russia and Ukraine after the Crimea crisis

Abstract:Due to a U.S./EU arms embargo that was imposed on China in 1989, China remains excluded from trading with any of the leading arms producers except for Russia and Ukraine. The previously existing military-industrial symbiosis between Ukraine and Russia, however, came to an abrupt end in 2014 with Russia‘s invasion and resulting occupation of Crimea. The sudden breaking off of defense-industrial ties between these two closely interwoven military-industrial complexes offers analysts the unusual chance to study the nature of transnational arms production arrangements and their strategic implications under crisis conditions. China is poised to benefit from this, while Western sanctions create incentives for China and Russia to enhance their mutual strategic co-operation.

Perceived Conflict and Leader Dominance: Individual and Contextual Factors Behind Preferences for Dominant Leaders

Recent research finds that political candidates and leaders with dominant, masculine physical features are more preferred under conditions of conflict than of cooperation. Importantly, however, methodological limitations of past research have hindered the identification of whether this effect reflects that voters intuitively view (1) dominant leaders as more competent in solving problems of conflict, (2) nondominant leaders as more competent in solving problems of cooperation, or (3) both. In this article, we utilize recent advances in evolutionary psychology to form precise predictions on the nature of the underlying psychology and employ an unprecedented array of data types—including highly controlled experiments, natural experiments, and behavioral measures—to investigate the validity of these predictions. Using large approximately nationally representative surveys of 2,009 Poles and Ukrainians fielded during the Crimea crisis in 2014, we find that preferences for leader dominance are exclusively driven by the intuition that dominant leaders are better able to facilitate aggressive responses during social conflict and that these preferences are regulated by contextual conditions and individual predispositions related to such responses.

Policy of George W. Bush administration and Barak Obama first administration towards the Russian Federation and other states of the CIS (2001-2012): a comparative analysis

The article is devoted to the analysis of policies of the two latest American presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (his fi rst administration, 2009-2012) towards Russian Federation and its neighbors – states of the CIS. The author in detail considers main milestones of this policy, its aims, ways, methods and results. The author highlights and analyzes main reasons of degradation of bilateral relations during George W. Bush presidency and considers positive results of “Reset” policy of fi rst Barack Obama’s administration, at the same time noting their limitation and maintenance of disagreements in a few important problems. Policy of the USA towards Russia and other states of the CIS is considered in broader context of fundamental attitudes in foreign policy of neoconservative Republican George W. Bush’ administration and Democratic Barack Obama’s administration. The author makes the main conclusion that as a whole policy of the Democrats towards the Russian Federation and its neighbors was more reasonable, fl exible and effective and let the United States because of softening of rhetoric and a few small compromises return relations with Russia to constructive cooperation and get from this country assistance in all key areas. But by the end of the fi rst Barack Obama’s term a few negative trends became obvious, and these trends developed during the second term of Obama’s presidency. Post-Soviet area has remained potential “battlefi eld” in relations between the two countries, and later this fact has led to the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, which continues nowadays.

The Crimea Crisis from an International Law Perspective

In February and March 2014, Ukraine was literally overrun by a chain of events that eventually led to Crimea’s incorporation into Russian territory. Crimean and Russian authorities jointly used the internal conflict in Ukraine to deprive the Ukrainian government of its control over Crimea, to hold a so-called referendum, and to declare Crimea’s independence. On the day after independence was declared, Russia formally recognized Crimea as an independent state, [1] and the Crimean parliament requested Russia to admit Crimea to the Russian Federation. [2] Soon after that, the accession treaty was signed, and, within a few more days, all Russian constitutional requirements for Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation were fulfilled. [3] All parties to the conflict refer to international law to justify their positions. The Crimean authorities and Russia claim that Russia had a legal basis for intervening and that Crimea had the right to secede from Ukraine. Most states, however, reject these claims. Thus, three questions are presented: Was Crimea’s secession lawful under international law? To what extent has Russia violated international law? And what is Crimea’s status? This article addresses these questions. Part 1 briefly describes the relevant circumstances and events leading to Crimea’s secession. Part 2 reviews the legal obligations between Ukraine and Russia concerning territorial integrity and the prohibition against the use and threat of force. Parts 3 and 4 discuss the legality of Russia’s intervention in Crimea and the legality of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, respectively. Part 5 concludes this article by answering the questions it raises. [1] See “Executive Order on Recognizing Republic of Crimea,” President’s web-site, March 17, 2014, accessed June 1, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20596. [2] Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, “Crimea Applies to be Part of Russian Federation After Vote to Leave Ukraine,” The Guardian , March 17, 2014, accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result. [3] See in regard to the Russian constitutional process Otto Luchterhandt, who argues that during that process Russian constitutional law was violated (Otto Luchterhandt, “Annexion der Krim – Putin verstost gegen russische Verfassung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , April 18, 2014).

Comeback of the transatlantic security community? Comparative securitisation in the Crimea crisis

ABSTRACTAs previous crises such as Libya and Iraq have shown, the transatlantic community is suffering from a deficient common security identity. Comparing the US, French, German, and British reactions to the Russian annexation of Crimea discloses whether the value-based foundations of the transatlantic security community are eroding. The securitisation model seems well-suited to complement the theory of security communities by offering analytical criteria for the comparison. Who securitised what, when, and how in early 2014? The analysis proposes securitisation as a promising research tool for foreign policy comparisons and reveals to what extent the transatlantic security community still exists.

Horror Vacui: Or Why Investment Treaties Should Apply to Illegally Annexed Territories

The 2014 Crimea crisis, in addition to issues of general international law, triggered questions relating to international investment law and arbitration. One of these is to what extent a state’s investment treaties bind that state on another state’s territory which it has put under its control by means of annexation. Starting from the assumption that annexation must not be recognized as legal, it seems necessary to adjust the application of this principle of non-recognition in the case that it ultimately benefits an aggressor. Such a situation might arise with respect to investment claims. Having impaired investments in an annexed territory, investors might want to hold the annexing state liable. However, as a jurisdictional hurdle, they need to satisfy a common criterion of investment treaties, which require investments in the territory of the contracting parties. A strict application of this territorial nexus by a tribunal would deprive investors of protection under international investment law. The interest of the international community to sanction illegal acquisition of territory thus clashes with the individual’s interest to have the investment protected under international law. The result might leave the investors in a legal vacuum. Addressing the issue on an abstract level, this article argues that an extension of a state’s investment treaties to annexed territories can well be founded in the law of treaties and is supported by custom and general principles.

A CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: THE CASE OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN UKRAINE

This study attempts to evaluate European Neighbourhood Policy by analysing the European Union’s foreign policy during the international crisis in Crimea. With respect to the basic neo-realist premises, this paper argues that the activities of EU within the neighbourhood of Russia have negatively contributed to the process of annexation of Crimea. Based upon the parallel structure of NATO and EU enlargements, this study contends that the EU has failed to differentiate its approach to Russia from that of the US. It could be argued a more inclusive approach by the EU, particularly in its Eastern neighbourhood, could lead Moscow to follow a more moderate foreign policy in the region. Starting with the US policies shaping NATO’s expansion in Europe, this paper outlines EU’s active regional policies under the European Neighbourhood Policy, which have been perceived by Russia as a security threat.

English

This article examines the power distribution on the world stage and emphasizes the Russia-US relationship as its essential element. The article approaches the crisis in Crimea from the system level perspective and seeks to answer the question of its impact on the distribution of power in the world order. Furthermore, the paper examines the interpretation of the uni/multipolarity as expressed by the US and Russia. The article concludes that the crisis did not change the distribution of power on the global stage and became a concentrated expression of the dispute about the multipolar world.

The Eurasian Customs Union: An Alternative to the EU's Association Agreements?

The choice for Eastern Partnership countries between the Eurasian Customs Union (CU) and the EU with its Association Agreements (AA) (including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements) is a political decision: the CU will never go as deep into the structure of the economy as the EU-oriented AAs. To a large extent the CU has followed the set-up of the EU, albeit under the institutionalised dominance of Russia. However, many potential CU member states are reluctant to join, especially now, in view of the Crimea crisis. One may ask whether countries are free to join or not join the CU, such freedom being a condition for regional integration.

Security Assurances to Ukraine and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum: from the 1990s to the Crimea Crisis

Twenty years ago the issue of nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory, and of security assurances to be given to Ukraine in return for becoming a non-nuclear-weapon state, was at the center of atten...

"Ukrayna-Kırım Krizi" Ya da "İkinci Yalta Süreci"

The regional crisis began in 2013 in Ukraine has turned into an inter-national one with Russia's annexation of Crimea. Ukraine-Crimea based recent events happened in the context of Black Sea geopolitics continue to show strong signals of a coming period of change. In the sense of Colorful Revolution period, revolution/coup or counter revolution/counter coup processes, broke out firstly in Georgia in 2003, and then continued in Ukraine in 2004 have led a serious a state of failure between Russia and the West. Expectations that a new Cold War may start alongside the breakup are quite high. Russia based statements that claim referendum in Crimea as the end of the unipolar displays we'll talk about a different world after March 2014. Therefore, in this work, firstly background of Ukraine- Crimea crisis, roles of the sides, and expectations from the crisis will be dealt, then possible effects of the crisis on regional politics and inter¬national system which is under construction will be analyzed. Moreover, a comparison with 1853-1856 Crimean War will take place and suggestions about Turkey's place and its possible policies to¬wards the crisis will be presented.

Британо-российские отношения при правительстве Д. Кэмерона–Н. Клегга

The article is devoted to the problem of relationship improvement between UK and Russia under David Cameron’s – Nick Clegg's coalitional government, before the Crimea crisis of 2014. The author scrutinizes history and peculiarities of bilateral political and economic relations, which include the Britain's accusations of human rights violation against Russia, on one side, and the contracts between BP and Russian oil corporations, on the other side. Also the positions of the two states on such issues as the beginning of international intervention in Libya, the adjustment of matters with the civil war in Syria, and the settlement of situation in Afghanistan are highlighted in the paper. The article answers two main questions: what contributed to improvement of bilateral relationship, and what could help to make it better again in the nearest future?