Criminal Code Reform Research Articles

Toward a more just criminal code in pre-revolutionary France: J.-P. Brissot (1754–1793)

Jacques-Pierre Brissot, a controversial and often ignored journalist and politician of the French Revolution, began his career as a serious publicist by concentrating on criminal code reform. Among his early efforts is a lengthy pamphlet investigating the problem of the innocent falsely accused, Le Sang innocent vengé, ou Discours sur les réparations dues aux accusés innocens (1781), awarded a prize by the Academy of Châlons-sur-Marne. The Criminal Ordinance of 1670, still in effect at that time, was the object of Brissot's attack. Although a number of scholars of the Ancien Régime have indicated that the police force of the period was totally inadequate and that a severe penal code may have been one of the only ways to deter crime, these were not Brissot's main concerns. He, like his mentors the philosophes, and particularly Voltaire, chose legal institutions as an indication and illustration of problems and abuses in the existing system. Brissot's insight, however, was his perception of harsh and unnecessarily cruel punishments as a threat to the life and liberty of the individual. His concern was the damage done by legal proceedings to the individual rather than swift retribution for the damage done by the individual to society. He contended that reforms were needed to create a criminal justice system more responsive to individual rights. This article examines Brissot's pamphlet and demonstrates that he should be granted a prominent place among the advocates of reform.

Report to the attorney general on federal criminal code reform

Report to the attorney general on federal criminal code reform

Civil Liberties and Criminal Code Reform

Civil Liberties and Criminal Code Reform

The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review

The United States Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, in its Report to Accompany S. 1, came to the opposite conclusion regarding the constitutionality of an appellate court's increase of a sentence on appeal. It stated that, Provided due process considerations are observed, increasing the sentence should be entirely permissible.3 Section 3725 of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 (S. 1437)4 would empower federal appellate courts to increase c iminal sentences on appeal in certain cases.5 This article will discuss whether it is a violation

Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience

Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience

Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience

Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience

Felony Trials in Michigan Counties

In 1927 the Legislature of the State of Michigan revised its code, permitting, among other changes, an option, in the discretion of the defendant, of trial by jury or by the Court without a jury. Incidentally this permissive provision is one plank of the socalled criminal code reform movement which gave birth, in Michigan and elsewhere, to curious progeny, such as are embodied in the Baumes Laws (of increased penalties for repeaters) and the like. Data relative to the employment, proportionate selection of jury and juryless trials, comparative sentences and time consumed, in the specific instance of the Recorder's Court of Detroit, Michigan, have been published in an abstract' and in a more comprehensive article.2 Oppenheim,3 in an excellent exposition of the legal precedents and authority for the provision, propounds the thesis that of Jury trial may not be denied a defendant yet, similar to the waiving of an examination, is also inherent, not to the State, but to the safeguards of personal liberties. He further points out the loosely used, oft-quoted constitutional guarantee of right of trial by a jury of peers to the contrary notwithstanding, that permissive waiver may legally be provided either by constitutional amendment or judicial interpretation. In the former instance the United States Supreme Court ruling4 and the decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court (as the result of a test case)5 lend authoritative opinion to these views. All of which is of greatest import to those interested in equitable administration of justice and most certainly to the advocates of speedy justice. The present discussion is an extension of the Recorder's Court study and concerns itself with the usage of the optional method of trial in several rural Michigan jurisdictions. Collaterally, the question had been raised of the use of the plea of guilty as a mode of