Existing crime policies are focused on raising the costs of crime for those committing the crime. For example, our drug policy attempts to deter drug crimes by increasing penalties or probabilities of capture. Eck and Eck (2012, this issue) argue that this approach ignores the growing body of evidence that suggests the majority of crime is placespecific. Dark alleys, decrepit buildings, and other places create opportunities for crime that otherwise may not have taken place. In other words, it is not just people that cause crimes, but places literally can cause crimes too. Under this framework, there may be substantial efficiency gains by tailoring crime policies in ways that provide incentives for building, motel, bar, and other proprietors to reduce crime. In this essay, we examine the merits of place-based crime policy. The fundamental idea driving place-based policy is that a causal link exists between locations and crime. This idea seems plausible. Crimes occur when offenders and their potential targets interact in situations in which there are no means to control their behavior. For instance, two antagonists will be more likely to fight at a bar without a bouncer than one that employs a bouncer. The bar with the bouncer includes a credible punishment mechanism that forces actors to control their behavior. Extending this idea, if proprietors would change their location-specific environments in ways that generally discourage crime, this could reduce the number of uncontrolled interactions, which in turn, could reduce crime overall. To make this case, however, two arguments must be true. First, proprietors do not fully internalize the externalities associated with criminal behavior that they facilitate by