Credit Contracts Research Articles

Foreclosures and the Labor Market: Evidence from Millions of Households across the United States, 2000-2014

We exploit the staggered and discontinuous changes in interest rates among adjustable rate mortgages to identify the effects of foreclosures independently of housing prices. First, interest rate resets predict foreclosure, accounting for up to 18% of the change in foreclosures. Second, a 10% rise in foreclosures is associated with a 1.14% and 2.57% decline in non-tradables employment and hiring, respectively, accounting for up to 10% of the decline in the hiring rate between 2006-2011. Third, we introduce a new mechanism independent of housing prices whereby foreclosures reduce local optimism and raise uncertainty, thereby leading to a contraction of credit that affects hiring, especially small businesses.

Portfolio Constraints Under Preference Heterogeneity

This paper solves for general equilibrium in a model populated by heterogeneous CRRA agents under convex portfolio constraints. Because CRRA preferences are homogeneous, the value function factors and we arrive at an ODE for the wealth consumption ratio. The paper then focuses on an application to margin constraints. This type of constraint increases the market price of risk and decreases the interest rate, producing a higher equity risk premium. In addition, the interaction of heterogeneity and margin constraints produces pro-cyclical leverage cycles. These cycles are accompanied by fire-sales in the bond market associated with a credit contraction. Finally, an economy with many types exhibits a reduction in the severity of crisis and a lower relative deviation from complete markets in all variables, but expected returns on the stock remain high to compensate risk averse agents for holding a larger share.

U.S. Monetary Policy and Emerging Markets Credit Cycles

Foreign banks’ lending to firms in emerging market economies (EMEs) is large and denominated predominantly in U.S. dollars. This creates a direct connection between U.S. monetary policy and EME credit cycles. We estimate that over a typical U.S. monetary easing cycle, EME borrowers experience a 32-percentage-point greater increase in the volume of loans issued by foreign banks than do borrowers from developed markets, followed by a fast credit contraction of a similar magnitude upon reversal of the U.S. monetary policy stance. This result is robust across different geographies and industries, and holds for U.S. and non-U.S. lenders, including those with little direct exposure to the U.S. economy. EME local lenders do not offset the foreign bank capital flows, and U.S. monetary policy affects credit conditions for EME firms, both at the extensive and intensive margin. Consistent with a risk-driven credit-supply adjustment, we show that the spillover is stronger for riskier EMEs, and, within countries, for higher-risk firms.

Joint liability in a classic microfinance contract: review of theory and empirics

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of joint liability in improving the repayment performance of a microfinance program.Design/methodology/approachThis is a systematic review of the theoretical and empirical literature.FindingsThe theoretical literature has shown, using models of peer selection, peer monitoring and peer pressure, that joint liability overcomes both the informational and enforcement failures present in credit markets for the poor. However, the empirical literature does not yield a clear answer on how much of the success of microfinance programs can be attributed to the effect of joint liability alone without considering the effect of other instruments used by microfinance programs. Further, it is seen that joint liability does not work in isolation, but its effect is dependent on social, cultural and economic environment.Research limitations/implicationsAn important future research agenda could be to study the roles of different overlapping mechanisms in group lending and to look at their interactions.Practical implicationsThe concept of joint liability works well both in the rural and urban areas, but different social, cultural and economic factors should be analyzed before initiating a microfinance program. In developed regions, focus should be on strengthening peer selection and peer monitoring, as information problems are prevalent. In underdeveloped regions, the major problem is of strategic default, so the focus should be on strengthening social sanctions.Social implicationsFindings can be used for optimal design of credit contracts for the poor.Originality/valueThe paper reviews the existing literature on – “whether and how” – joint liability lending works in inefficient credit markets and comes up with practical implications for the microfinance sector.

A Risk-Averse Newsvendor Model Under Trade Credit Contract with CVaR

A supply chain with a supplier and a risk-averse retailer is considered in the paper under trade credit contract. The retailer as newsvendor faces a non-negative random demand and the supplier provides the trade credit for the risk-averse retailer with budget constraints. Different from the existing research, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, the optimal ordering quantity and wholesale price are obtained. Analytical results are obtained for the newsvendor retailer’s optimal ordering quantity and supplier’s optimal wholesale price under CVaR measure. Sensitivity analysis is also yielded. It is found that the optimal ordering quantity decreases as the degree of risk aversion increases. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the initial budget of retailer and the wholesale price on the order quantity decision. This paper also finds that the trade credit contract could create value for a risk-averse supply chain with budget constraints. Finally, to compare with the existing results the theoretical analysis and numerical examples are illustrated.

Zastosowanie modeli zdarzeń konkurujących do badania ryzyka kredytowego

Credit risk arises from the debtor’s possible failure to meet the terms and conditions of the credit contract. As a result, the bank does not receive a particular payment stipulated by the contractual provisions. Credit risk usually equates with the credit taker’s insolvency. Hu and Cheng (2015) note the shortage of studies devoted to other kinds of credit risks competing with the risk of default and their influence on the evaluation of the probability of default. In the article, a default and an early repayment are considered to be competing risks. Two approaches were used to research the intensity of competing risks: evaluation of cause-specific hazard and sub-distribution hazard respectively. The interpretation principles within the results acquired by the use of either method have been discussed. For either of the approaches, proper regression models have been set up, alongside conducting the sensitivity analysis. The results have been duly compared. The empirical study employed a sample of 5000 sixty-months’ credits granted by one of the Polish financial institutions. Application characteristics of the credit takers have been used in regression models as covariates.

Financial development and occupational choice

In this paper we incorporate occupational choice in the style of Lucas (1978) with an additional dimension of heterogeneity in wealth into a model of banking. We use this model to better understand how development of the financial sector affects misallocation and occupational choice. Our model demonstrates three channels through which enforcement of credit contracts are tied to misallocation. Improvements in enforcement shifts the risks in variance of output from banks toward entrepreneurs; consequently, improved enforcement can serve as a form of risk sharing in the absence of state contingent loans. Second, reduction in the risk for bankers improves the appeal of banking and the general equilibrium effect shrinks the margin of intermediation, reducing the importance of initial wealth distributions. Finally, improved enforcement leads to more relaxed credit constraints, as banks are willing to lend more to entrepreneurs, further reducing the importance of initial wealth in occupational choice.

The Full Story of Runs

We examine credit supply during a repo run. Lenders initially relax lending terms upon an initial bad signal about the borrower's creditworthiness. Lenders with a greater exposure to the borrower and a closer lending relationship show a longer period of patience, followed by a less acute credit contraction; so do lenders whose loans are backed by more illiquid assets. The initial credit relaxation is consistent with a lender's incentive to prolong its borrower's life. Other loan terms (price and maturity) remain stable, which suggests active role of collateral in dynamically managing risk exposure relative to price and maturity.

Creditor protection, information sharing and credit for small and medium-sized enterprises: Cross-country evidence

Using World Business Environment Survey results for firms in 61 countries, together with country dummies that allow us to deal with observed and unobserved country-specific components, as well as with partial endogeneity, we explore the roles played by creditor protection (e.g. the enforcement of credit contracts) and by the development of credit information mechanisms, such as credit registries, in determining the availability of bank credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that better creditor protection and the development of information-sharing mechanisms narrow the financing gap between small and large firms. Countries with poor creditor protection can offset this shortcoming by implementing credit information mechanisms.

Interest free liquidity management scheme (time-weighted debt units)

PurposeThis paper aims to develop an instrument that helps in managing liquidity. Liquidity is one of the most critical issues to be considered by the financial management of the business firms to meet its financial obligations. It is more vital for banks because of the liquid nature of its assets and liabilities, along with the fact that the confidence in the bank and degree of risk depends heavily on liquidity as an indicator of its wellbeing. Islamic banks (IBs) look at the liquidity issue from the same side as the traditional banks. IBs – the most apparent Islamic financial institution – suffered from the problem of not benefiting from the lender of last resort that Central Banks (CBs) offer to traditional banks because IBs cannot borrow from the CBs at interest. The experience of Institution(s) offering Islamic Financial Services[1] (IIFS) regarding the establishment of Islamic money markets did not show a tangible success instead of the early studies done by some scholars. In spite of the rich experience of some countries in creating new money market instruments or configuration of the interest-based ones according to Islamic - Sharī’ah[2], the designs of these instruments have many limitations in terms of their tradability and flexibility, restricting their use for open-market operations by CBs.Design/methodology/approachThe purpose of calculating the time weighted debt units (TWDUs) is to find the equivalent amount of money that the supplier can borrow to the lender in the future for a maturity that differs from the first credit contract. It is a swap between an amount of credit for a particular period of time and another amount for another period. The scheme are called traditionally as reciprocal (mutual) loans, reciprocal (mutual) deposits, swapped conditional loans and “I lend you, provided you lend me” (Hammad, 2010). It is also well known in Pakistan as time multiple counter loan (TMCL), and known within some Arabic IBs as specks (Nomar = numbers) system. This contract will be called the reciprocal loans in the current paper.FindingsThe current paper represents a blue print of suggested money market instrument (scheme) that is based on the idea of Al Qardh El Hasan (interest-free loan) – called TWDUs. This instrument does not promise any revenue for the supplier and no charge for the lender.Research limitations/implicationsThe suggested model is known in traditional and contemporary writings of Islamic economists and - Sharī’ah scholars. It is accepted by many - Sharī’ah Boards in IBs (Merah, 2011) and was accepted by the Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan in 1980 through the TMCL. Despite that, it is still not discussed in depth by international - Sharī’ah boards as the International Islamic Fiqh Academy – in addition to the wide spread of opponent viewpoint that considers this contract as a kind of riba.Originality/valueTWDUs is presumed to help IBs and other IIFS to add more flexibility in liquidity management in the side of risk management[3] (represented by the potential loss to IIFS arising from their inability either to meet their obligations or to fund increases in assets as they fall due without incurring unacceptable costs or losses) in addition to avoiding the case of hoarding surplus funds in the short term. Also, the suggested instrument will not be exclusive to IBs or IIFS; it can be developed to be used at a later stage by them as a mean of overdraft between IBs and their clients. Moreover, beside its viability to help in liquidity management for other firms in business sector (non-financial) or government agencies in liquidity management, TWDUs look for Islamic financial theory as an alternative to the traditional financial theory that is based on interest. Moreover, TWDUs is expected to play an important role in monetary policy in a totally Islamic financial system or even in a mixed one (Islamic and capitalistic).

QE in the Future: The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet in a Fiscal Crisis

Analyses of quantitative easing (QE) typically focus on the recent past studying the policy’s effectiveness during a financial crisis when nominal interest rates are zero. This paper examines instead the usefulness of QE in a future fiscal crisis, modeled as a situation where the fiscal outlook is inconsistent with both stable inflation and no sovereign default. The crisis can lower welfare through two channels, the first via aggregate demand and nominal rigidities, and the second via contractions in credit and disruption in financial markets. Managing the size and composition of the central bank’s balance sheet can interfere with each of these channels, stabilizing inflation and economic activity. The power of QE comes from interest-paying reserves being a special public liability, neither substitutable by currency nor by government debt.

PERLINDUNGAN NASABAH DEBITUR TERHADAP PERJANJIAN BAKU YANG MENGANDUNG KLAUSULA EKSONERASI PADA BANK UMUM DI BANDARLAMPUNG

Legal protection for debtor as a consumer in banking becomes important which the position of the some parts of credit contract is not balanced. Bank prefer to have a strong bargaining position, so the bank based on the reason of efficiency makes standard contract contain exoneration clause that incriminating debitors. The Government’s Determination Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection has been set up the opposition to banning the use of the standard contract. Similarly, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)/ Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) carried out a function of supervising the financial institution has issued POJK No. 1/POJK.07/2013 on Consumer Protection of Financial Services Sector. The regulations issued to protect consumers especially financial services sector. The result showed that credit contract of the commercial bank in Bandar Lampung still contains exoneration clause that prohibited on The Government’s Determination Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection and OJK Regulation No.1/POJK.07/2013 on Consumer Protection of Financial Services Sector. There is a clause that requires the debtors to submit all bank’s guidance and regulations, either already exist or will be set later. The legal consequence of the implementation of exoneration clause in credit contract is the contract can be canceled by law as mentioned in Article 18 paragraph (3) The Government’s Determination Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. The legal protection of debtor as a consumer of banking service has been arranged by the regulations, but the implementation has not effective because still there are abuses by the bank. Therefore, the active role of Financial Services Authority to conduct monitoring and providing strict sanctions to banks that violate the rule. Furthermore, need education for community and have to make a format of standard contract that compatible with rules which formulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)/ Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK). Keywords: Exoneration, Clause, Customer Protection, Standard Contract

Bank loan loss accounting treatments, credit cycles and crash risk

Banks that follow conditional conservatism in their loan loss accounting treatments benefit from a reduction in crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are provisions and allowances. We show that conditional conservatism reduces crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom. Interestingly, for large banks, crash risk is not reduced by more conservative accounting even for those with higher levels of opacity. Hence regulation prompting for more conservative bank loan loss accounting does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from abrupt price declines in the stocks of large banks.

Leasing i kredyt w systemie zamówień publicznych w Polsce na tle innych krajów UE

Concluding leasing and bank credit contracts public sector entities are subject to, as all other expenditures on services and goods, the rigors of public procurement law. The aim of the paper is to compare how often these two sources of public financing are used in Poland and other European countries. As for public procurement of value less than so-called European thresholds, Poland is characterized by very high amount of bank credits in comparison with leasing services. In case of public procurement with higher values (more than the EU thresholds), the situation in the period 2010–2014 is the same, however, tendency of amount of bank credits is decreasing, while the number of leasing contracts slowly increases. The Polish public entities are leaders in the EU especially in the area of public contracts for bank credits. It could be explained by their preferences in the field of financial means by such procedures which do not require additional complicated description of public procurement subject. Bank credits fulfill such a condition.

Trade credit behavior of Korean small and medium sized enterprises during the 1997 financial crisis

This paper investigates the effect of the 1997 Korean financial crisis on the trade credit behavior of Korean small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) using a unique panel dataset for the period 1994 to 1999. I uncover new evidence supporting the substitution and redistribution hypotheses, which contradicts earlier studies. Specifically, the results show that liquid SMEs provided more trade credit to their client firms during the credit contraction, while financially constrained SMEs received more trade credit from their suppliers. Further, I find evidence that SMEs in financially distressed regions relied more on trade credit than their counterparts in financially healthier regions.

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.

Consumer Over-Indebtedness, Credit Contracts and Responsible Lending

AbstractThe paper considers the position of overindebted persons in the national and comparative perspective. A specific focus is dedicated to the interference between credit contracts and responsible lending, with reference to the role of professional creditors (banks and other financial institutions) in setting both the cost of credit and the conditions for repayment. In addition, the experience of the Arbitro Bancario Finanziario – the ADR system in force in Italy – is examined with reference to the topic.

Does Accounting Conservatism Mitigate Banks' Crash Risk?

Banks that follow conditional conservatism on average benefit from a reduction in future stock price crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are provisions and allowances. We show that conservatism reduces the crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom, but that for large banks the risk of stock price crashes is not reduced by more conservative accounting, even for those with higher levels of opacity. Hence regulation for conservative bank loan loss accounting does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from the crash risk of large banks.

The impact of the liquidity coverage ratio on money creation: A stock-flow based dynamic approach

This paper examines money creation process of the banking system when it is complying with the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). A stock-flow based dynamic model of credit creation process is developed in which the commercial bank supplies loans to the firm. The change of credit is governed by the bank lending and the repayment of the existing loans, where the equilibrium stock of credit could be attained once the lending is exactly equal to the repayment. However, the supply of bank loans is restricted by both the reserve requirement set by the central bank and the LCR prescribed by the banking authority; and, as a result, money creation must be affected by all these regulations. The bank loan supply under the constraint of the required liquidity buffer might have different prescriptions under different economic scenarios, and would eventually result in an equilibrium monetary stock correspondingly. The final formula of money multiplier is derived respectively as the rational response of the bank to the corresponding regulation. When the reserve requirement is tighter than the LCR, the money multiplier has the same expression of that in the prevailing fractional reserve regime. Yet when the situation departs from this regime, the determinants of the money multiplier are found to be associated with the parameters that characterize the behavior of banks subject to the regulation and of the private sector rather than those monetary structural factors. It is noteworthy that there may be a credit contraction and even a significant reduction in money multiplier when the bank is regulated by the LCR. This novel perspective on credit creation of the banking system also offers us an insightful understanding on the impacts of banking regulations on the stability of the banking system and suggests a new guide tool for designing them.

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