CPSU Central Committee Research Articles

ФЕНОМЕН ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ СОВЕТНИКОВ И КОНСУЛЬТАНТОВ В ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ Ф.М. БУРЛАЦКОГО

The article presents an analysis of the phenomenon of political advisor, consultant in the creative heritage of one of the founders of the Soviet political science Fyodor Burlatsky (1927-2014). The historical-political and political-textual analysis of Burlatsky’s works is done. Among them are the following: “Political science and real politics”, “Reforms and reformers: Hopes and illusions”. It is concluded that Burlatsky formulated the original typology of political advisers based on historical material and his personal experience as an advisor, consultant of the CPSU Central Committee. The following types of advisers were singled out: 1) adviser-thinker, 2) adviser-prophet and 3) adviser-intriguer. Besides, Burlatsky divided advisers and consultants into two groups: obedient and independent.

Dinamika razvitiya materialno-tekhnicheskoy bazy selskogo khozyaystva v Krasnodarskom krae v 1960–1980 godakh

Currently the development of agriculture in Russia is prioritized due to the need to ensure food security. The Krasnodar region has considerable experience in agriculture in the preceding period. The article discusses the process of creating the material and technical base in the Kuban, and the reasons for insufficiently effective use of technology in 1960-1980. The main attention is paid to changes in the logistics that have influenced the production and processing of agricultural products. In this period covering four five-year plans, there had been a significant transformation in strengthening the material-technical base of agriculture, as well as observed changes in social conditions, created for mechanics and their families. Measures developed by the March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1965, contributed to the strengthening of material and technical base of collective and state farms. Comprehensive mechanization of grain production of cereal crops was completed in the eighth plan period. As a result, the cost of labour in the production of a hundredweight of grain in the kolkhozes was reduced. In the ninth five-year on Kuban the growth of equipment of the collective farms and state farms caused the increase of expenses on its maintenance. Therefore, the issues of radical improvement of machinery and equipment utilization occupied an important place in the decision of problems of agriculture efficiency increase. Significant increases in the cost of one tractor, the grain combine harvester and other agricultural machinery, and the cost of repair led to the fact that farms in the region raise steadily the cost of one conventional hectare of completed work. Various reasons for insufficiently effective use of technology in the country received coverage in a number of scientific publications, however, the organization of MTB use, maintenance and repair and storage of machinery in agriculture and the supply of collective and state farms in the Kuban region in 1960-1980 have not been studied. Therefore, the aim of this article is to explore them.

Considerations about the nature of the figure of Jesus Christ for Magazine "Worldview" with an analysis of the article by Academician Biletskyi OI "Some Notes on the Atheistic Literature of the Last Days (1960) "

These "Remarks" by a well-known academician were written somewhere in 1960 on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Why did he write them exactly (because not in his specialty as a philologist and even in Russian), that is unknown to me. Proceeding from O. Biletsky's conclusion that the authors of the atheistic editions common in Ukraine until 1960 are non-Ukrainian scholars, that is, in their masses, there are translated atheistic works (even the brochure by E. Duluman "Was Jesus Christ" originally printed in Moscow after leaving him from the Orthodoxy), in the party's Central Committee came to the conclusion that in Ukraine, somehow, in the ideological sphere, the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee of 1954 and 1960 on the task of atheistic and the early work, including in the field of study and study of individual religions, were ignored here. their phenomena. In Ukraine, only from 1961-1962, the opening of the universities of the chairs of scientific atheism began, and writing and editing of somewhat primitive in the content of atheistic works was established. Thus, the "Remarks" of the academician worked on the contrary from the fact that he (or the Central Committee) was definitely hoping.

Nomenklatuurisüsteemi funktsioneerimisest aastatel 1944–1953 Eesti NSV valitsusliikmete näitel [Abstract: The functioning of the nomenklatura system in 1944–1953: the example of the members of the Estonian SSR government

The research of the nomenklatura as the central instrument of the Soviet Union’s cadre policy is primarily channelled towards lists of nomenklatura positions and the people who filled those positions, yet the functioning of the nomenklatura as a bureaucratic system for approving and harmonizing cadres has gone almost entirely unnoticed on both the USSR-wide and the local Union republic levels. This article examines the appointment and dismissal of members of the Government of the Estonian SSR – the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR – during the late Stalinist years of 1944–53 in order to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamics of relations between the central authority and the Union republic in implementing the nomenklatura system and the relationship between the Party and state organs in making cadre decisions. In the nomenklatura hierarchy, the members of the Union republic’s government belonged to the higher level CPSU Central Committee nomenklatura as well as the Party Central Committee nomenklatura of the Union republic. This meant that the conclusive approval of their appointment to their post and their dismissal could take place on the basis of decisions made by the CPSU CC. Yet formally, the constitution legally prescribed the procedure for appointing members of the government to office and for dismissing them. According to this procedure, the formation of the Union republic’s government belonged to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of state authority in the Union republic. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet functioned in its name during the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet in dismissing individual members of the government from their posts and in appointing them to office. Thus the peculiarities of processing cadre decisions derived from the fact that members of the government belonged to the CPSU CC nomenklatura and from the constitution, for which reason Party rights, in other words mechanisms based on nomenklatura had to be tied in with constitutional mechanisms in appointing and dismissing members of the government. It appears from this study that the processing and approval of cadre decisions concerning members of the Union republic’s government took place first of all in the Party organs in accordance with Party rights pursuant to nomenklatura regulations, and thereafter in state organs, where the requisite legislative acts were drawn up. This study arrives at the conclusion that nomenklatura and constitutional regulation made it possible to process and adopt cadre decisions as a routine bureaucratic procedure. Procedural cases of cadre decisions concerning members of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, however, allude to frequent distortions and violations that manifested themselves as deviations in the sequence of the adoption of decisions and less frequently in cases where even the decision of the Party or of the state organs was not adopted at all. In summary, there were admittedly disruptions in the implementation of the nomenklatura system, yet the existence of nomenklatura mechanisms nevertheless enabled Party organs to effectively control and direct the placement of cadres in state organs, and the CPSU CC, in turn, to control the placement of leading cadres in the Union republics. Keywords: Soviet government, Council of Ministers, administration of a Union Republic, cadre policy

Nomenklatuurisüsteemi funktsioneerimisest aastatel 1944–1953 Eesti NSV valitsusliikmete näitel [Abstract: The functioning of the nomenklatura system in 1944–1953: the example of the members of the Estonian SSR government

The research of the nomenklatura as the central instrument of the Soviet Union’s cadre policy is primarily channelled towards lists of nomenklatura positions and the people who filled those positions, yet the functioning of the nomenklatura as a bureaucratic system for approving and harmonizing cadres has gone almost entirely unnoticed on both the USSR-wide and the local Union republic levels. This article examines the appointment and dismissal of members of the Government of the Estonian SSR – the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR – during the late Stalinist years of 1944–53 in order to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamics of relations between the central authority and the Union republic in implementing the nomenklatura system and the relationship between the Party and state organs in making cadre decisions. In the nomenklatura hierarchy, the members of the Union republic’s government belonged to the higher level CPSU Central Committee nomenklatura as well as the Party Central Committee nomenklatura of the Union republic. This meant that the conclusive approval of their appointment to their post and their dismissal could take place on the basis of decisions made by the CPSU CC. Yet formally, the constitution legally prescribed the procedure for appointing members of the government to office and for dismissing them. According to this procedure, the formation of the Union republic’s government belonged to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet as the highest organ of state authority in the Union republic. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet functioned in its name during the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet in dismissing individual members of the government from their posts and in appointing them to office. Thus the peculiarities of processing cadre decisions derived from the fact that members of the government belonged to the CPSU CC nomenklatura and from the constitution, for which reason Party rights, in other words mechanisms based on nomenklatura had to be tied in with constitutional mechanisms in appointing and dismissing members of the government. It appears from this study that the processing and approval of cadre decisions concerning members of the Union republic’s government took place first of all in the Party organs in accordance with Party rights pursuant to nomenklatura regulations, and thereafter in state organs, where the requisite legislative acts were drawn up. This study arrives at the conclusion that nomenklatura and constitutional regulation made it possible to process and adopt cadre decisions as a routine bureaucratic procedure. Procedural cases of cadre decisions concerning members of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, however, allude to frequent distortions and violations that manifested themselves as deviations in the sequence of the adoption of decisions and less frequently in cases where even the decision of the Party or of the state organs was not adopted at all. In summary, there were admittedly disruptions in the implementation of the nomenklatura system, yet the existence of nomenklatura mechanisms nevertheless enabled Party organs to effectively control and direct the placement of cadres in state organs, and the CPSU CC, in turn, to control the placement of leading cadres in the Union republics. Keywords: Soviet government, Council of Ministers, administration of a Union Republic, cadre policy

Does Putin's German Interview Mark Turn to West?

APTEKAR: INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN NEWSPAPER BILD IS FULL OF SELF-JUSTIFICATION, BUT SOME SAY THAT PUTIN IS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A PEACEFUL GESTURE TOWARD THE WEST IN HOPES OF EASING SANCTIONS ... PEACEFUL PUTIN. (By Pavel Aptekar. Vedomosti, Jan. 12, 2016, p. 1. Complete text:) [Russian President] Vladimir Putin is again sending signals to the West about his desire for peace. [In view,] the West should acknowledge that it has pursued an unjust policy against Russia, and should allow Russia keep on behaving the way it is (or at least to stop bringing up past grievances). And [the West should] lift the sanctions [introduced in 2014 - Trans.] - which, of course, were mistake, although they have not affected the Russian economy too much. Putin is proposing to start from scratch, as it were - to forget recent disagreements. After all, everyone is to blame, and Russia less so than others. ... president's interview with the German newspaper Bild (published [sic; recorded] on Jan. 5) was the sixth in the current fall-winter media season. This level of media activity cannot be regarded as out of the ordinary for Putin: From September 2014 to February 2015, he also did six interviews with Russian and foreign journalists. However, Putin has changed target audiences: His signals are being directed more and more toward the foreign public, predominantly Western. Even his traditional Message to the Federal Assembly and annual press conference [see, respectively, Current Digest, Vol.67, No.49, pp.3-8, and No.51-52, pp.6-8] touched more on foreign policy than previous ones: the situation in Syria, the conflict with Turkey, and relations with the West. In addition, the film The World Order, based on a series of interviews with the Russian president, aired on the Rossia 1 channel in December. ... In the Bild interview, Putin offers historical validation for annexing the Crimea [see Current Digest, Vol.66, No.12, pp.3-11] and explains what he considers injustices committed by the West against Russia in recent decades. He backs up his claims with hitherto unknown (we wonder why?) archival documents (he refers to transcript of conversation between [former] head of the CPSU Central Committee's international relations department Valentin Falin and West German politician Egon Bahr in 1990). ... Russian president tries to convince the German journalists it is Kiev that is failing to comply with the Minsk agreements [for ceasefire in the Donetsk Basin; see Current Digest, Vol.66, No.37, pp.3-6 and Vol.67, No.7, pp.3-7- Trans.], not Moscow. Putin claims that the Western sanctions imposed against Russia after the events in the Crimea and the Donetsk Basin are unjust, but they have done little harm to our economy. What has hurt us more is the drop in oil prices - but this is useful, too, because it is making us healthier. ... Those in the top echelons of power have probably realized that the economic situation that has resulted from the ongoing decrease in oil prices is more dire than it had seemed. [Moscow] failed to find support in Asia. Kremlin is trying to negotiate with the West about easing sanctions and establishing principles of cooperation before the economic and social situation in the country becomes critical, says political analyst Nikolai Petrov. Without directly acknowledging his own mistakes (which would contradict his image as bad boy), Putin is offering an olive branch to Western politicians. He is hinting that Russia's appetite is much smaller than that of the USSR under Stalin or Brezhnev, so new Yalta would suit everyone. Perhaps the Kremlin does not understand that foreign policy in the West has become more public and the role of secret diplomacy has diminished, comments political analyst Aleksei Makarkin. ... West will not engage in such deals to divvy up the world, of course. But it will keep talking to Putin. ... GERMAN NEWS COMMENTATORS CRITICAL OF PUTIN'S WORLDVIEW, DISTRUST OF AMERICA; RUSSIAN EXPERTS DISAGREE ON CHOICE OF PUBLICATION: DOES TABLOID REDUCE PUTIN'S CREDIBILITY OR EXPAND AUDIENCE? ... PUTIN DID NOT CONVINCE GERMANS. (By Nina Ilyina. Vedomosti, Jan. 13, 2016, p. 2. Condensed text:) The interview with the Russian president published in the German daily newspaper Bild in two installments (Monday and Tuesday [Jan. 11 12]) sparked great interest among leading German media outlets. But their reaction was mostly cool, if not critical. ... Putin's world is simple and clear: He is right; others are wrong. Therefore, criticism of his policies cannot be justified; it must be the machinations of dark forces.*** This is also how Putin accounts for why he comes off so badly in practically all quality German writes political commentator Reinhard Veser in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, citing words about a very strong foreign influence on the German media, primarily from the other side of the Atlantic.

“Erikaader”: nomenklatuur ja julgeolekuorganid Eesti NSV-s 1940–1953 [Abstract: “Special cadre”: the nomenklatura system and the state security organs in the era of Stalinist rule in the Estonian SSR 1940–1953

As one of the main pillars of support for Stalin’s regime, the Soviet state security organs had a prominent role in both the state authority’s and the Party’s nomenklatura system. The principle of the nomenklatura system – to establish the control of Party organs over the appointment of leading cadres – was introduced in the Estonian SSR immediately after its annexation in 1940. This article considers the development of the nomenklatura of the state security organs at the Union republic level, the implementation of the nomenklatura system, and the role of the state security organs in this on the basis of the example of the Estonian SSR in the years 1940–53. It clearly appears that changes in the composition of the nomenklatura, yet also in the individuals filling posts that belonged to the nomenklatura were as a rule initiated not in Estonia but in Moscow in the CPSU Central Committee and in the headquarters of the state security organs. Here the role of the Estonian SSR Party apparat was formal. For this reason, essentially no rights emerged for the Estonian SSR Party apparat to appoint state security leaders to their posts nor did any patron-client relationships develop. In actuality, the role of the Estonian SSR Party apparat was limited to that of the informer and – if necessary – of the institution that had to answer for any conceivable consequences. The strictness with which Estonian Party authorities followed the nomenklatura system depended primarily on what the attitude and regulations of the CPSU Central Committee were at any given moment in relation to this matter. When the order came from Moscow to follow the nomenklatura system more strictly, that is just what was done. With isolated exceptions, non-Estonian cadre officers sent to Estonia from the Soviet Union formed the personnel subject to nomenklatura in the state security organs of the Estonian SSR. The fact that the state security organs carried out background checks not only on their own nomenklatura officials but also on those of other agencies, including those in the Party apparat, increased the independence of the state security organs even further. Considering the centralization and dictator-like control with which the state security organs were run, this was also most likely the intentional policy of the Kremlin, meaning that patronage relationships between the local Party and the leadership of the state security organs were considered undesirable. Instead, rivalry and denunciations were preferred. It appears that the state security agency also did not welcome or encourage actual intervention by the EC(b)P Central Committee in their cadre work. When the situation became problematic, it was always possible to refer to the covert nature of the state security organs. The fact that the approval of the heads of state security had to come from Moscow also essentially gave them independence in relation to the local administration, including Party authority. Keywords: nomenklatura, Stalinism, Estonia, Soviet state security organs.

Search for new approaches to farming in the Ukrainian SSR in the period of "developed socialism"

National scientists have elaborated the reform's gist, approaches, stages and consequences in the Ukrainian agricultural sector during the XX - XXI centuries. These studies have been conducted by N. Zhulkanych, S. Zhyvora, M. Zyza, M. Lendiel, E. Mazur, O. Malyarchuk, V. Nechytailo and many others. The paper aims to perform the comprehensive study of general trends and peculiar features of the agricultural development of the Ukrainian SSR in 1963-1990 and to define actual advances and drawbacks on the basis of analysis of historical records and scientific literature. The object of research is agriculture as part of socialist economy in the USSR. The subject of research is the implementation features of agricultural policy of the Soviet power in the Ukrainian SSR, using the Western region of the Republic as an example. The economic strategy of the Soviet power involved a long-term industrialization of the agricultural sector. A distinguishing feature of the industrialization process was the use of systems of machinery in all branches of agriculture. The technological chain had to embrace the process from the sporadic application of machinery to the overall mechanization and automation of crop and livestock farming. The industrial background of production predetermined the implementation of the system of machinery with extensive power consumption, i.e. with the new technical bases. The resolutions of the March (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee defined the economic priorities and capacity development of the Republic. Capital investments were the economic basis for the increase of production potential of collective and state farms, solution of social problems in rural regions. The land productivity was increased mainly by means of land reclamation and production chemization, use of organic and mineral fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides, etc. The supply of mineral fertilizers increased, but most of them were of low quality, non-concentrated and unbalanced in nutritional ingredients. In its turn it caused irreparable damage to the environment and polluted agricultural products with chemicals. The chemization undermined the population health and disrupted the ecological balance. Despite ultimate achievements in the rise of the industrial level of agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, it didn't meet the needs of collective and state farms. A great number of labour-intensive processes in animal and crop farming were performed manually. In state farms, contrary to collective farms, the stock of tractors was newer, but much smaller. For many years the USSR was in the top ten countries of the world in terms of consumption of energy and proteins, contained in products per capita. However, the patterns were inconsistent with the scientifically grounded norm. Structural imbalance of the ration was the manifestation of the crisis in the USSR. To meet primary needs of Soviet citizens in products the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted the Program of the USSR for the Period until 1990 and Measures of Its Implementation. The main issue of the Food program was to increase grain harvest. Grain production was the basis for and fodder supply of the country. Alongside with a substantial increase in products output in public economy the attention was given to the development of subsidiary individual holdings and fruit-and-vegetable cooperatives. The cooperatives and subsidiary holdings produced a great number of dairy and meat products, vegetables and fruits both for their own needs and for sale in collective farm markets. The state program predetermined the solution of agricultural problems by means of formerly used methods. The major problem of agriculture had to be solved by means of increase in the gross grain harvest. Thus, the implementation of agricultural policy of Soviet power in the Ukrainian SSR lead to great changes in agricultural production. At that time there appeared such new branches of economy specialized in services to agricultural production as waterworks and land reclamation, feed mill industry, farm building, machine engineering for animal farming and fodder production, procurement of agricultural products and agricultural processing. The study of this policy implementation proves that the average annual rates of agricultural production increased but they were inconsistent with high investments. On the one hand, the Food program testified the food crisis in the USSR, demonstrating the lag of the world socialist community from capitalist states. On the other hand, it had to increase the level of self-sufficiency, decrease the procurement of agricultural products from abroad and promote the solution of the world problem in general.

Personnel and Role in the Soviet Political System

The article analyzes the functions of one of the most important groups of the Soviet bureaucracy. It is based on 120 oral interviews and memoirs of former staff members of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. In the first part, a new understanding is put forward about the place the Central Committee apparatus occupied in the functioning of the central governing institutions in the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev period. Various specific and non-obvious functions carried out by the apparatus are also discussed. The second part reviews a collective biography of the Central Committee staff. In particular, the unexpectedly high level of social class and education of the Central Committee staff is noted, as well as their remarkable level of social achievement and fairly young age at the entry level into the CC apparatus. In this part several typical biographical patterns are - analyzed. In the third part, a comparison with the Western bureaucracy is attempted. In particular, a detailed analysis is made of the anti-corruption measures and means of formation of the corporate discipline in the CC apparatus. The most important difference is found in their respective cultural background, which in the Soviet case was formed by the secondary education they received during Stalin’s rule.

The German question from Stalin to Khrushchev: The meaning of new documents

This article discusses the intentions of the Soviet leadership towards Germany during the early 1950s in the light of recently released documents. Whereas Malenkov's comment of 2 June 1953 shows the commitment to a ‘bourgeois’ Germany and the victory of Beria in post-Stalin debates about the German question, Bodnăraş' report on a meeting of the party chairmen and defense ministers of the people's democracies of 9 to 12 January 1951 underlines the real fear of war due to the Western decision to rearm Western Germany, and the minutes of the meetings between Stalin and the SED leadership on 1 and 7 April 1952 demonstrate both the difference of interest between Stalin and Ulbricht and the difference of performance between Stalin and Beria. Minutes of the Presidium of the CPSU's Central Committee show that the final decision for the stabilisation of the GDR was not taken before November 1955.

Academic Religious Institution

Prior to Ukraine's accession to the Ukrainian SSR, there were two research religious institutions - the department (later - the sector) of the philosophical problems of religion and atheism of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine B. Lobovyk, and since 1990 - Doctor of Philosophy A. Kolodnyi) and the Inter-republican Branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee (Professor O. Onishchenko, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine at that time). If the first institution was engaged in the study of the peculiarities of the religious phenomenon in the diversity of its confessional manifestations and multifunctionality, then the second focused its attention on the problems of the survivability of religiosity in the conditions of socialism and defining ways to overcome it. This feature of research efforts is also reflected in the publications of the department and the branch.

Inside the Putin court: A research note

If the soviet system of government centred on the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Russian system has been based on the powerful executive presidency that was established by the...

Lavrent'ev's proposal forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee on July 29, 1950

Lavrent'ev's proposal forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee on July 29, 1950

Predlozhenie O.A. Lavrent'eva, otpravlennoe v TsK VKP(b) 29 iyulya 1950 g.

Predlozhenie O.A. Lavrent'eva, otpravlennoe v TsK VKP(b) 29 iyulya 1950 g.

Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-47

The article utilizes new evidence available from the Russian archives, including the records of the CPSU Central Committee (International Affairs Department and Department on Agitation and Propaganda). It examines the evolution of Soviet foreign propaganda from World War II to the Cold War by analysing its organization, methods and outcome. Emphasis is placed on the internal constraints of the Soviet foreign propaganda machine and its systemic flaws both of which made Soviet foreign propaganda relatively ineffective.

Declassified materials from CPSU Central Committee plenums [Sources, context, highlights

Mark Kramer. Declassified materials from CPSU Central Committee plenums. The recent declassification of transcripts and other materials from CPSU Central Committee plenums has provided a rich new source of information about the whole Soviet period, particularly the post-Stalin period. Under Stalin, the Central Committee almost never met (especially after the 1930s), but in the post-Stalin period it convened more frequently and at times discussed highly controversial issues. Although all key decisions in the post-Stalin era were made by the CPSU Presidium (Politbiuro) and Secretariat, the Central Committee did play an important supplementary role. Moreover, the declassified proceedings of the Central Committee plenums, and the newly released documents prepared for or submitted to the plenums, often shed light on the motives behind the Presidium's and Secretariat's decisions. These materials provide valuable evidence for scholars interested in Soviet domestic politics, leadership struggles, and foreign policy.

Declassified materials from CPSU Central Committee plenums

Les documents déclassifiés des plenums du Comité Central du PCUS. – La récente déclassification des transcriptions et autres documents des plenums du Comité Central du PCUS fournit une source nouvelle et abondante de renseigne­ments sur toute la période soviétique, en particulier la période post-stalinienne. Du vivant de Stalin, les réunions du Comité Central furent très rares (surtout après les années 1930) mais, après sa mort, elles devinrent plus fréquentes et traitèrent parfois de sujets très controversés. Bien que toutes les décisions essentielles de la période post-stalinienne fussent prises par le Présidium du PCUS (Politbjuro) et le Secrétariat, le Comité Central jouait toutefois un rôle complémentaire important. De plus, les comptes rendus des plenums du Comité Central qui sont accessibles ainsi que les documents relatifs à ces séances parus récemment éclairent les motivations qui guidaient les décisions du Présidium et du Secrétariat. Ces documents fournissent des témoignages précieux aux chercheurs qui s’intéressent à la politique intérieure, aux luttes pour le pouvoir, et à la politique extérieure de l’URSS.

The first reorganisation of the CPSU central committee apparat under Perestroika

THE ATTEMPT BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV to reform the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) apparat, particularly its all-powerful Central Committee (CC) apparat, was inextricably tied to the conduct of the economic and political reforms of perestroika and determined many of their successes and failures. Indeed, reform making is policy making, and it must pass through the stages of decision, conception, bargaining and implementation and is subject to the vicissitudes of political conflict. Any assessment of the suitability of a reform's design and strategy and any explanations for its success or failure therefore should examine the constraints on reform making, both structural and 'intentional': the range of choices configured by the demands imposed on the rational calculations of decision makers from different powerful interest or political groups and tendencies within a polity.1 It is insufficient to look exclusively at the political intentions of reform's friends and foes2 or to focus only on the explanatory value of such structural constraints as the multinational and 'partyised' nature of the Soviet state or the hypercentralised structure of its economy.3 The combined power of the conservative opposition to reform (an intentional constraint) and the power of entrenched bureaucracies (a structural constraint) must be taken into account when assessing the reasons for the successes and failures of perestroika. The more conservative and entrenched the bureaucrats, the more difficult it is to implement reform and the less likely it is to produce the outcome the originators of reform seek: a more effective system and maintenance of their power. In the Soviet case, no reform could be implemented without the strong commitment of the party apparatus, if not especially then including the central apparat, the only mobilisational instrument capable of orienting both the state machinery and society toward reform. There were essentially two reorganisations of the CC apparat during Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary. The first was initiated in autumn 1988 and was being executed virtually right up to the XXVIII Congress, after which a second reorganisation was implemented. This article examines the first reorganisation as it was conceived and implemented, in an attempt to understand better the obstacles to successful reform in the USSR better. Both 'intentional' constraints-the conservatives' active opposition and the bureaucratised 'crypto-politics' of the apparat (factional political struggle conducted in the depths of bureaucratic structures through

Matveev's Reform: His time

Two years ago, the constituent congress of the USSR Teacher's Union was held in the Lastochka Pioneer Camp on the Black Sea. Vladimir Matveev was no longer editor-in-chief of Uchitel'skaia gazeta. The CPSU Central Committee had appointed another man to take his place. And it was this other man who was boldly speaking to the delegates who had loved Matveev, who had fought for him but lost. Someone in the audience asked him, How could you agree to take the place of a living man?!

New Directions in Soviet History

Introduction Part I. The Politics Of Soviet History: 1. Gorbachev and history Pierre Broue Part II. Social Change And Cultural Policy: 2. Revolutionary lives: public identities in Pravda during the 1920s Jeffrey Brooks 3. Entertainment or enlightenment?: popular cinema in Soviet society, 1921-1931 Denise Youngblood 4. The centre and the periphery: cultural and social geography in the mass culture of the 1930s James van Gelderen Part III. Politics, Industry and Shopfloor Relations: 5. The crisis of productivity in the New Economic Policy: rationalization drives and shop floor responses in Soviet cotton mills, 1924-1929 Chris Ward 6. The politics of industrial efficiency during NEP: the 1926 rezhim ekonomiki campaign in Moscow John Hatch 7. The Moscow party and the socialist offensive: activists and workers, 1928-1931 Catherine Merridale 8. The demise of the shock brigades, 1931-1936 John Russell 9. Reassessing the history of Soviet workers: opportunities to criticise and participate in decision-making, 1935-1941 Robert W. Thurston Part IV. The Political Elite: From the 1930s to the 1990s: 10. Portrait of a changing elite: CPSU Central Committee members, 1939-1990 Evan Mawdsley Index.