Courts Of Limited Jurisdiction Research Articles

Understanding the Burden of Legal Financial Obligations on Indigent Washingtonians

In criminal courts across the country, judges assess a variety of fines, fees and other legal financial obligations (LFOs) that many defendants struggle to pay. This paper provides a summary of the authors’ longer empirical article that examines the disproportionate burden that fine and fee assessment and collection practices impose on low-income, system-involved individuals, using administrative court data for criminal cases filed in Washington’s courts of limited jurisdiction between 2015 and 2020. The authors find that the majority of defendants do not or only partially pay their LFOs, but that these observations are more pronounced for indigent defendants. The authors also find that, of defendants who fully pay off their fines and fees, individuals with a public defender satisfy their debt after a greater number of days, as compared to individuals with private counsel. This is all in spite of public defender defendants generally being assessed smaller amounts in fines and fees at the outset. Additionally, the authors uncover that when defendants do pay off all of their fines and fees, they tend to do so on the day of assessment, with the likelihood of satisfying full payment generally decreasing as time goes on. These findings suggest that many people struggle with criminal justice debt, but that this problem disproportionately impacts indigent Washingtonians, subjecting them to a greater possibility of harm through the various methods of collections enforcement.

Understanding the Burden of Legal Financial Obligations on Indigent Washingtonians

In criminal courts across the country, judges assess a variety of fines, fees and other legal financial obligations (LFOs) that many defendants struggle to pay. This paper examines the disproportionate burden that fine and fee assessment and collection practices impose on low-income, system-involved individuals, using administrative court data for criminal cases filed in Washington’s courts of limited jurisdiction between 2015 and 2020. The authors find that the majority of defendants do not or only partially pay their LFOs, but that these observations are more pronounced for indigent defendants. The authors also find that, of defendants who fully pay off their fines and fees, individuals with a public defender satisfy their debt after a greater number of days, as compared to individuals with private counsel. This is all in spite of public defender defendants generally being assessed smaller amounts in fines and fees at the outset. Additionally, the authors uncover that when defendants do pay off all of their fines and fees, they tend to do so on the day of assessment, with the likelihood of satisfying full payment generally decreasing as time goes on. These findings suggest that many people struggle with criminal justice debt, but that this problem disproportionately impacts indigent Washingtonians, subjecting them to a greater possibility of harm through the various methods of collections enforcement.

Punishing on a Curve

Does the punishment of one defendant change because of how she fares in comparison to the other defendants on the judge’s docket? This article demonstrates that the troubling answer is yes. Judges sentence the same case more harshly when their caseloads contain relatively milder offenses, and more leniently when their caseloads contain more serious crimes. I call this problem “punishing on a curve.”Consequently, the article shows how such relative sentencing patterns put into question the prevailing practice of establishing specialized courts or courts of limited jurisdiction. Because judges are punishing on a curve, the court’s jurisdiction systematically shapes sentencing outcomes. Courts of limited jurisdiction usually specialize in relatively less serious crimes (such as misdemeanors, drug offenses, or juvenile cases). They treat the mild offenses on their docket more harshly than generalist courts, that also see severe crimes, would have treated them. This leads to the disturbing effect of increasing punitive outcomes vis-a-vis these offenses, wholly contradictory to the missions of these courts. Such sentencing patterns undermine notions of justice and equitable treatment. They also undermine retributive principles and marginal deterrence across crimes of increasing severity.In light of the profound normative and practical implications, the article offers a remedy to standardize sentences through “statistical curving.” In addition to consulting the sentencing range recommended by the sentencing guidelines for a particular offense, a judge should see the distribution of sentences for the same offense across different courts. The article illustrates the feasibility of the proposal empirically using sentencing data from neighboring judicial districts in Pennsylvania. It also explains how this proposal fits within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence following United States v. Booker, which rendered the sentencing guidelines advisory, and its potential advantage in improving appellate review.

Don't Get Thrown Out On YourDerrière: Common Mistakes In Establishing Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

IN federal court, subject-matter jurisdiction is a magic bullet. Jurisdictional problems are particularly pernicious (to the verdict winner) or useful (to the verdict loser) because they can never be waived, the court must address any potential jurisdictional defect it notices, and an incurable jurisdictional defect requires the judgment to be thrown out. We review some common defects in federal subject-matter jurisdiction and potential ways to fix them. (1) I. Why Defects In Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Destroy Your Victory (Or Save You From Defeat) courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [,] possessing that power authorized by Constitution and statute.... (2) At every stage of litigation, a federal court is required to confirm that it has jurisdiction, and to dismiss the claim if it lacks jurisdiction. (3) court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction. (4) If it appears that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. (5) This rule holds even after final judgment has been entered and an appeal filed. federal appellate court is required to evaluate both its own jurisdiction and that of the district court. If the district court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court must vacate the judgment: [E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. When the lower federal court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit. (6) A litigant generally may raise a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate instance. (7) Even if a jurisdictional defect is first discovered after trial or after judgment has been entered, it requires the case to be dismissed. (8) Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or estoppel, or by 'the parties' litigation conduct.' (9) Even a party that initially brought the case to federal court can attack jurisdiction. (10) Federal district courts and courts of appeals take these requirements seriously. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4) requires appellants to explain why the district court and court of appeals have subject-matter jurisdiction. Many district courts and courts of appeals instruct their staff to confirm the court's subject-matter jurisdiction at the inception of a case. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a district court or court of appeals to issue a sua sponte order requiring the parties to explain why there is subject-matter jurisdiction, even when no one disputes it. Meticulous attention to the jurisdictional requirements is therefore critical. We outline some common pitfalls in pleading and establishing both diversity and federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and describe some ways to fix them. II. Diversity Jurisdiction A. Background Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to, inter alia, controversies citizens of different and a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. (11) Pursuant to this provision, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. [sections] 1332, grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the dispute is between (a) citizens of different states, (b) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign country (excluding lawful permanent residents domiciled in the same state), (c) citizens of different states in which citizens or subjects of foreign countries are additional parties, or (d) a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a state or of different states. …

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW): State Privative Clauses and Jurisdictional Error in Inferior Courts

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 is a very important decision for the Constitutional Law of the Australian States, and for Administrative Law insofar as it is applied to courts of limited jurisdiction in Australia. An indication of its influence may be that, since the High Court’s judgment was handed down in February 2010, it has been cited by Australian courts in no fewer than 200 judgments.The decision in Kirk seems generally to have been welcomed by most commentators. In one sense, that is not surprising. The assimilation of the constitutional position of the Australian States to that of the Commonwealth would be regarded by most as an instinctively satisfying development. And the thought that State courts, and particularly inferior State courts, might make errors of law incapable of correction by higher courts, and ultimately the High Court, is, at first blush, a generally unattractive proposition.In this paper I offer a critique of some aspects of the reasoning in Kirk, and consider some of the possible implications of the decision.

Nonlawyer Judges and the Professionalization of Justice

This article examines the scope of nonlawyer judges in state and local trial courts, with an emphasis on courts of limited jurisdiction. It looks at trends in legal education and the current emphasis on judicial ethics. A review of statewide court reform in Pennsylvania is detailed as representative of many states' experiences. An analysis of criminal defendants' due process rights before nonlawyer judges reviews cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The article concludes with ideas about the future of nonlawyer judges.

Judging Credentials: Nonlawyer Judges and the Politics of Professionalism

Must judges be trained as lawyers in order to be effective in office, or can nonlawyers serve equally well? This question has long provoked controversy among lawyers, judges, legislators, and the public. In her empirical study of the place of the nonlawyer judge in the American legal system, Doris Marie Provine concludes that, despite the opposition of the legal profession to nonlawyer judges, they are as competent as lawyers in carrying out judicial duties in courts of limited jurisdiction. Provine presents a persuasive argument that the case against nonlawyer judges has been weighted in favor of the professional interests of lawyers, not public concerns. Her examination reveals as much about the presuppositions of legal professionals as it does about the competency of nonlawyer judges to old judicial office. To substantiate her claims, Provine has conducted the most comprehensive survey of nonlawyer and lawyer judges yet undertaken, augmenting this material with court observations and extensive interviews of judges. She integrates the results of this survey into the historical context of the lay versus lawyer judge debate, showing how the legally trained judge came to predominate in the American judicial system and analyzing in detail the campaign both in and out of the courts to make legal training a prerequisite for being a judge. Ultimately, Provine suggests, Americans are too committed to the significance of credentials and to the legal profession's vision of the judicial process to respond very favorably to nonlawyer judges, however well they might perform. Judging Credentials will force lawyers, judges, scholars, and the public to reconsider the role nonlawyer judges play in the American judicial system. Provine's provocative views and exhaustive research adds new dimensions to our understanding of the ethics of professionalism and its consequences.

The Evolution of an Urban Judicial System: The Philadelphia Story, 1683 to 1968

The constitutional amendments approved by the voters of Pennsylvania in 1968 significantly changed the structure of the courts in Philadelphia County, a structure which in certain respects had existed virtually unchanged for nearly 250 years. This fact makes a survey of the historical development of the courts during this period eminently appropriate. Although the same courts established either by the Constitution or statute in the other counties of the Commonwealth were likewise established in Philadelphia County, structural differences distinguished the Philadelphia County judiciary. Chief among these structural differences was the fact that the Supreme Court of the State exercised a trial function in the county until 1874. Experiments were made with the judicial structure by establishing courts of limited jurisdiction in order to increase judicial manpower in keeping with an unexpressed principle of relieving the burden of the existing courts by assigning some of their jurisdiction to others. Few records have survived to indicate the successes of these courts or why they were established or abolished. This lack of documentation complicates the task of recounting their history and leaves the historian to gather his materials from statutes and court decisions. For these reasons, the history of the courts in Philadelphia County is both unique and instructional. Courts are essential to the proper functioning of government and provision was made for their establishment even before the settlement of Philadelphia by William Penn.1 Although the Swedes and the Dutch had settled in the Delaware Valley before the English displaced them, none of these settlements was in the area now constituting Philadelphia County, where the Duke of York Laws were applied. These laws provided for the appointment of justices of the peace without, however, specifying their duties. But it can be assumed that the justices were expected to exercise the

Counterclaims in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction

Counterclaims in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction

Administering Justice in Cities

T HERE appears to be no essential principle to support the scheme of court organization common to all our cities. In every city there is at least one court of general trial jurisdiction supplemented by one or more courts of limited jurisdiction. In some of the larger cities there are two or more of both general kinds and also a separation of civil and criminal jurisdiction in independent tribunals. This pattern has evolved during a century or more from a plan of organization adapted to the needs of the typical state at the formative stage of such institutions. The evolution has not been one making for efficiency in administration. Changes have come about by way of temporary adjustments without reference to any inclusive principle, and efforts at improvement have often been thwarted by inability to amend a state constitution.