Court Of Auditors Research Articles

La autonomía presupuestaria de los órganos constitucionales y el presupuesto parlamentario

La Constitución reconoce a las Cortes Generales la facultad de aprobar autónomamente sus presupuestos. Por otro lado, las leyes reguladoras del Tribunal Constitucional, Tribunal de Cuentas, Consejo de Estado y Consejo General del Poder Judicial confieren a estos órganos constitucionales la competencia de elaborar sus respectivos presupuestos. En todos los casos, se trata de secciones presupuestarias que han de integrarse en los Presupuestos Generales del Estado, por lo que conviene observar el alcance de la autonomía presupuestaria y la relación con el deber de presupuestar que corresponde al Gobierno. El trabajo pasa revista a la naturaleza, estructura, contenido y fases del ciclo presupuestario parlamentario.

The Agriculture and the Natural Resources of the European Union - an Object of External Public Audit

The aim of the study is to analyze the results of the audit of EU finances related to agriculture and natural resources. The material used is statistical data published by The European Court of Auditors which was further interpreted. According to this one third of the examined transactions are affected by errors. When about the SAPARD Program in Romania and Bulgaria important deficiencies in the management and control system were detected. As a conclusion, the Court’s auditing highlighted the deficiencies of the aid system including both institutions and farmers and recommended to tight further the rules and imposing a stricter control.

Imitation and supranational politics: some lessons from the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors

Why do certain European Union (EU) institutions look so much like institutions in its member states? The article asserts the reason for this similarity is that these structures have been ‘copied’ from the member states to the EU and provides a historical institutionalist explanation for this process of institutional transfer. The theory of isomorphism provides the analytical foundation for understanding institutional imitation in the EU, while the European ombudsman (EO) and the European Court of Auditors (ECAs) serve as the empirical case studies on which the theory is tested. The article finds that previously existing institutional arrangements matter not only by molding actor preferences in relation to an upcoming institutional transfer, but also by restricting their options and behavior. Specifically, the founding of the EO and the ECAs was the result of pressures exercised by the European Parliament, a supranational body, and the governments of the EU member states. In order to achieve the transfer, those actors had to navigate established institutional practices, primarily the ones associated with the negotiation of new treaties, which are necessary for the addition of new institutions to the EU institutional edifice.

Petróleo, Royalties e Pobreza

A exploração do petróleo se constitui num elemento significativo para a economia sergipana. A contradição existente entre o subsolo rico e a população pobre levanta indagações a respeito da gestão destes recursos e as condições de vida da população. Tais condições, aliadas à entrada de novos atores na exploração do petróleo em Sergipe e à gestão dos recursos advindos da exploração, vêm incutindo relações peculiares à política neoliberal na região e em Sergipe. O estudo foi desenvolvido a partir da análise e cruzamento de informações disponíveis na Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP), Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) e PETROBRAS, dentre outros setores. A carência de políticas sociais que ofereçam às populações condições de inserção nas questões política, econômica e social da região produtora de petróleo tem impedido o desenvolvimento efetivo e mudança no padrão de vida das populações, evidenciando a incoerência entre os altos valores depositados nos cofres públicos municipais decorrentes dos royalties e os elevados índices de pobreza apresentados na região. Tal constatação reforça a ideia de que as políticas públicas devem primar pela redução da desigualdade a partir da gestão responsável dos recursos públicos.
 
 Abstract 
 
 OIL, ROYALTIES AND POVERTY
 
 The exploitation of oil has significant element for the Sergipe´s economy. However, the contradiction between the subsoils rich and poor people raises key questions about the management of these resources and the living conditions of the population. Such conditions, the entry of new actors in the scenery for the exploration of oil in Sergipe and the management of resources of exploration, instilling relations peculiar to neo-liberal policy in the region and in Sergipe. The study was developed from the analysis and crossing of information available in the national agency oil (ANP), the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Court of Auditors (TCU) and Petrobrás, among other public and private sectors. The lack of adequate social policies which offer people conditions to insertion in political, economic and social - producing region oil Sergipe has prevented the development and effective change in the pattern of life, showing the inconsistency between the high values deposited in the public coffers municipal arising from royalties and the high poverty rates presented in the region. This situation reinforces the idea that public policies should be elaborated to reduce of the inequality from the responsible management of public resources.

Errors and weaknesses detected by the European Court of Auditors in the reports on the European Structural Funds 2000–2004

The present paper shows the weaknesses and the errors detected by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in the reports regarding the Structural Funds (the European Social Fund (ESF); the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, ‘Guidance’ section (EAGGF-Guidance), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)), presented by 15 countries of the European Union from the year 2000 to 2004. We have classified the said countries in four groups, regarding the date of their EU incorporation. The main aim of our work is to highlight the errors made by the Member States on the management and control of the structural funds received from the EU, analysing the likely causes and consequences of such errors.

A critical appraisal of the role of UCLAF

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to consider the mission of Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti‐Fraud (UCLAF); how it cooperated with Member States and how it accounted for its actions. The paper seeks to detail examples of its investigations and to consider the criticisms made of UCLAF by the European Court of Auditors and the Committee of Independent Experts which had been established to investigate allegations of fraud, nepotism and mismanagement within the European Commission. It will also seek to draw lessons from the UCLAF experience for the future fight against EU fraud.Design/methodology/approachThe paper used a combination of semi‐structured interviews with EU and national officials in the UK and Ireland as well as a review of secondary materials such as organisational reports and academic sources.FindingsThe paper found that the fight against fraud was fatally undermined by the high degree of fragmentation due to the multiplicity of national and EU agencies involved. There were some self‐inflicted weaknesses on the part of UCLAF such as poor use of intelligence databases and the employment of a high number of staff on temporary contracts which led to high‐staff turnover and disrupted the investigative process.Practical implicationsThe paper reveals how not to fight against transnational fraud. Lessons need to be learned from the UCLAF experience, so that the same mistakes are not made again.Originality/valueThe paper is an addition to a body of work which is not particularly extensive. It strives to offer some lessons for the future fight against fraud.

Isomorphism, institutionalization and legitimacy: operational auditing at the court of auditors

Isomorphism, institutionalization and legitimacy: operational auditing at the court of auditors

The Status of the European Institutions Officials

The European Union increasingly in€uences the member states, their political institutions, business groups, commercial business sector and the citizens. The institutions, politics and legal regulations of the Communities in€uence also countries and human beings from outside the Union. is in€uence means that each member state of the European Union has its own representative in the European Institutions such as European Parliament, European Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors

Isomorphism, institutionalization and legitimacy: operational auditing at the court of auditors

The aim of this paper is to verify the nature of the relationship between the concept of legitimacy and the phenomenon of institutionalization of operational auditing at the Court of Auditors in a context of institutional isomorphism. A documental examination was conducted covering the period of 1987 to 2004 and 18 people involved in the aforementioned activity at the Court of Auditors were interviewed. The results suggest that there is a relationship between isomorphism and legitimacy but only concerning one type of legitimacy. The phenomenon of isomorphism acts in the sense of checking cognitive legitimacy while other factors are at work which are connected to the culture and institutional environment of the country, which interfere in the dimension of moral legitimacy, resulting in institutionalization of the activity at a secondary level in the analyzed organization. It was seen that the process of institutionalization, in this case, has a circular characteristic, in which the phases of innovation, diffusion, partial saturation and partial deinstitutionalization follow one another cyclically, modifying the activity of operational auditing over time at the Court of Auditors.

Die europäische Agrarpolitik vor dem Hintergrund der Osterweiterung

Abstract Reimar von Alvensleben asks in his article whether the “Agrarwende” in Germany could be a model for Europe. He argues that the new agricultural policy (the so-called “Agrarwende”), which has been proclaimed and implemented after the German BSE crisis 2000/2001, adds new problems to the already existing problems of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The strategy of improving international competitiveness of German agriculture by promoting the niche markets for organic food, animal-friendly produced food and regional food is unrealistic and thus neglecting the problem of improving the competitiveness of 85−90% of German agriculture. The criterion of ecological efficiency (How to achieve ecological goals at lowest costs?) is totally neglected in agricultural environmental policy. The strategy of implementing environmental and animal welfare standards by the market mechanism will not lead to reasonable results because of perception distortions of the consumers. As a consequence of distorted perception of food risks by politicians, cost of risk prevention are too high and/or safety and health standards in other less spectaculous areas are too low. For these reasons he concludes that the “Agrarwende” in Germany cannot be regarded as a model for Europe, especially not for Eastern Europe. Bernhard Brümmer and Ulrich Koester write in their paper that the Eastern Enlargement of the EU will have significant implications for governance of the CAP. The evolution of the CAP has led to a permanent increase in the intensity of regulation, although the rate of external protection has declined. Past experience - mainly revealed by the European Court of Auditors - has evidenced many irregularities and even fraud as a by-product of the CAP. Governance problems are due to badly designed policies, which demand control of even individual farms and give the member countries, administrative regions (which are supposed to implement the policies on the local scale) and the individual farms themselves incentives to breach the rules. In their view governance problems will certainly increase in the enlarged EU. The new member countries have a weaker administrative capacity and are subject to more corruption than the present EU countries. Adequate policy reaction should lead to fundamental changes of the CAP. Klaus Frohberg argues that in its Mid Term Review the EU-commission proposes a change in the most important instruments of the CAP. Direct payments and intervention prices belong to this group. In his paper the impact of these changes is discussed. Direct payments shall become decoupled from production and be summarised into a single payment to farmers. In addition, the right of these transfers shall be made tradable independent of a simultaneous exchange of land. With regard to the intervention prices they shall be reduced as to approach world market levels. Assuming that the Member States will confirm the proposals the CAP is expected to improve considerably. Allocation and transfer efficiency will increase, consumer welfare will go slightly up, taxpayers will be little if at all affected and the EU can defend its position in the negotiations of the ongoing WTO round. These advantages accrue to the current as well as to the new Member States. In spite of the improvements the CAP still needs to be enhanced in some areas such as the market organisation of sugar and milk.

Auditing and accountability in the European Union

This article explores the dynamics of financial accountability in the European Union. Financial accountability is a subset of administrative accountability and contributes to parliamentary accountability. Following an analysis of the meaning of financial accountability, the article explores the emergence and evolution of the European Court of Auditors, the "financial conscience' of the Union. It traces the establishment of the Court and the growing salience of financial management in the Union. The work of the Court became entwined in the drama of political accountability in the Union that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in March 1999.

A new partnership between science and politics. European scientists ought to adapt to new research policy paradigms.

A new partnership between science and politics. European scientists ought to adapt to new research policy paradigms.

Court of Auditors uncovers "significant weaknesses" in Socrates and Youth

Court of Auditors uncovers "significant weaknesses" in Socrates and Youth

Fraud: who polices Europe?

Fraud in Europe is complex and well organised: it crosses organisational and geographic boundaries. The policing of fraud, on the other hand, is characterised both at national and transnational levels by fragmentation and divided accountability. This paper considers the issues involved in combating fraud in European institutions and spending programmes. It discusses the roles of those bodies with transnational responsibilities such as UCLAF (now OLAF), the European Fraud Prevention Office and the European Court of Auditors. The paper considers the difficulties associated with the Corpus Juris proposals for a single European legal area to facilitate the fight against fraud related to the European Budget. It concludes that the task of policing Europe is hampered not only by the diversity of national political and jurisprudential systems, but also by the weakness and lack of independence of the transnational institutions.

The European Court of Auditors: Current Legal Issues

The European Court of Auditors: Current Legal Issues

European Court of Auditors and European Investment Bank: An Uneasy Relationship

European Court of Auditors and European Investment Bank: An Uneasy Relationship

Court of Auditors’ Special Report on the Implementation of EU Aid for the Reconstruction of former Yugoslavia

Court of Auditors’ Special Report on the Implementation of EU Aid for the Reconstruction of former Yugoslavia

The evolution of the European union's Tacis programme, 1991–96

Since the beginning of the 1990s the European Union has implemented a programme of technical assistance for the countries of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia ‐Tacis. The programme is designed to facilitate the passage of countries of the former Soviet Union towards market economies, and is coordinated through specific programmes. The Tacis regulations for the period 1996–99 establish a series of priority sectors for Community action, particularly energy and nuclear safety, restructuring in businesses and the reform of the administration. However, despite both the obvious need for such a programme and the clear benefits to date, annual reports of the Court of Auditors have repeatedly identified problems in the implementation of the programme, stressing deficiencies in management, excessive centralization, problems of transparency and the lack of sufficient investments. Nevertheless, this programme puts the European Union into a position from which it could make a major contribution to the reform process in the New Independent States.

EC: The Role of the European Court of Auditors in the Battle against Fraud and Corruption in the European Communities

This article presents and analyses the role of the European Court of Auditors in the attempts to limit fraudulent behaviour and symptoms of officials' corruption within the European Union. First there is an examination of the existing situation regarding these two problems. After a short presentation of the Communities' legislative definition of fraud and corruption the article highlights the current role of the European Court of Auditors in combating them. The analysis is focused on the Court's approach of fraud and corruption as a result of exercising its auditing competences. Finally there are also suggestions regarding a more effective action on behalf of the Court either by granting it judicial authority (long‐term proposal) or by reinforcing its auditing and reporting competences.

Weights and votes in european union: extension and institutional reform

System of European Union institutions consists of the following bodies: Council of Ministers; Commission; European Parliament; European Court of Justice; Other institutions (Court of Auditors, Committee of Regions etc.). We can see, that a distribution of power, based on double-majority principle is closer to relative share of population and GDP than a distribution of power based on the votes only, and at the same time it is not eliminating an influence of small members. More detailed analysis of combination of simple majority voting with double majority principle will require development of software for evaluation of this specific concept of power in committees with more members.