Qatar's much publicized liberalization campaign that began in the mid-1990s was direct result of efforts by the new Amir, Shaykh Hamad, to compensate for his fragile base of support within the ruling Al Thani family by appealing to broader base of Qataris and also to the international community. Historically, the Al Thani family had been one of the only centers of potential opposition to the reigning Amir, with merchant families or the religious establishment having been politically neutralized due to variety of historical and structural reasons. Nevertheless, in relation to both groups the state has pursued nuanced policy of simultaneous co-option and political incapacitation. Meanwhile, steady rises in oil and gas revenues allowed the state to significantly deepen its capacity in relation to society, and, by doing so, to ensure that groups from within civil society did not rise to positions of prominence. Within the Al Thanis, Shaykh Hamad undertook number of significant changes, not the least of which was the creation of new institutions and offices that were staffed by his loyal supporters, including some of his sons and daughters. He also streamlined the line of succession to include only his own descendants. With the traditional political disquiet of the Al Thanis thus silenced, at least for now, all talks of liberalization have been dropped and the Qatari state remains fundamentally autocratic. Since assuming formal power in 1995, the Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, has embarked on an ambitious program of modernizing his country. The Amir's efforts have been greatly facilitated by steadily rising oil prices, and also by concomitant increases in the demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG), of which Qatar has the world's third largest proven deposits.1 By 2005, Qatar was estimated to provide as much as 14.5% of the global share of LNG.2 In 2006, Qatar's total income from oil and gas exports was estimated at $52.8 billion.3 With an approximate population of slightly more than million people (some 75% of whom are expatriates), Qatar's GDP of $98.3 billion (in 2008 current prices) makes the country one of the wealthiest in the world.4 In addition, with an annual per capita income of $95,000 (in 2008 current prices), Qataris have one of the highest standards of living in the world.5 This rapid economic and industrial growth has not occurred in political vacuum. In fact, Shaykh Hamad's assumption of power in 1995 was predicated on the promise of introducing far-reaching political reforms. The dynamic and highly publicized efforts of the Amir and his wife, Shaykha Muza, in introducing wide-ranging economic have made it appear as if Qatar has embarked on its own route to modernity and that it is steadily moving towards democracy.6 Western journalistic reports have been replete with promises of ongoing or impending forward looking political reforms in Qatar,7 where the Amir is leading the drive for popular representation in his country.8 At least initially, there was good reason to believe that the Amir and Shaykha Muza were serious in their efforts to implement meaningful political reforms. Soon after assuming power, the Amir issued series of decrees that seemed to significantly liberalize the country's political system. For the first time, elections to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry were held in April 1998, followed the next year by the first direct municipal council elections. Significantly, along with men, women also were allowed to vote and run for office, though none were elected. The Amir also convened committee to draft new constitution for the country. In much anticipated event, in April 2003, Qataris went to the polls and overwhelmingly approved the constitution, Article 1 of which commits Qatar to being a democratic country.9 For time it appeared as if the Amir was indeed eager to turn Qatar into the first genuine democracy in the region. …