This article focuses on agricultural production in lift irrigation schemes along the White Nile in the Sudan. A comparison is drawn between the theoretical forecast and actual practical experience regarding the feasibility of transferring management from government‐run parastatal organizations to private farmer organizations. Although the theoretical model indicates that farmers should be able to cover the cost of managing the river lift irrigation systems, field data show, however, that farmers growing wheat are barely able to break even. Even assuming a doubling of the present wheat yields, the cash surplus earned would only suffice for fuel to operate the pumps. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, contrary to government expectations, the private sector has been unenthusiastic about taking over management of White Nile river lift schemes. The lessons that emerge from this study indicate that unplanned and rapid withdrawal of state management can lead to negative results. The transfer of management responsibility for the river pumps does not appear to influence economic performance considerably, which depends on the wider context of the country's economic, political and institutional environment, within which the agricultural sector functions.