Countervailing Power Research Articles

Review: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 2007 Center on International Cooperation Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007. 391pp, US$25.00 paper (ISBN 9781588265098)The world is a better place because of the United Nations: because it exists, because of what it does, and because of how it does it. One unexpected but vital component of the organization's overall success story is its history of peacekeeping. That is a story that needs telling by a skilled narrator and then constant retelling with each passing year, lest we forget.A hundred years ago, war was an accepted institution with distinctive rules, etiquette, norms, and stable patterns of practices. In that Hobbesian world, the only protection against aggression was countervailing power that increased both the cost of victory and the risk of failure. Since 1945, the United Nations has spawned a corpus of law to stigmatize aggression and create a robust norm against it. Now there are significant restrictions on the authority of states to use force either domestically or internationally.The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of unilateral resort to force by nation-states has been matched by the movement to broaden the range of international instruments available to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The United Nations incorporated the League proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional-and in theory mandatory-prescription to use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. This is integral to organizing a system of collective security. However, efforts to devise an operational collective security system proved a nonstarter. Instead, the instrument of choice by the United Nations for engaging with the characteristic types of contemporary conflicts is peacekeeping, which evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement.Traditional or classical international peacekeeping forces could never keep world peace, for they lacked both the mandated authority and the operational capability to do so. Yet even while failing to bring about world peace, UN forces successfully stabilized several potentially dangerous situations. The number of UN operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the United Nations was placed centre-stage in efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts.Traditional peacekeeping aimed to contain and stabilize volatile regions and interstate conflicts until such time as negotiations produced lasting peace agreements. By contrast, the newer generation of peacekeeping saw UN missions being mounted as part of package deals of peace agreements-for example in Namibia and Cambodia-that aimed to complete the peace settlement by providing third-party international military reinforcement for the peace process. Reflecting the changing nature of modern armed conflict, UN operations expanded not just in numbers but also in the nature and scope of their missions.The volume under review is the second in a new series that establishes a partnership between the Center on International Cooperation of New York University and the best practices unit of the UN department of peacekeeping operations. The goal presumably is to combine the authoritative presentation of the most reliable and current data held inside the UN secretariat with the analytical capability and editorial independence of a major university. The result is quite a splendid anthology of facts and figures cleverly and attractively presented.The United Nations has long been vulnerable to bias towards American-and especially east coast-universities. There are of course many practical advantages to working with good universities that, because of geographic proximity, are that much more accessible. The series makes a deliberate effort to overcome the tyranny of proximity in two ways. First, its advisory board of distinguished personalities is broad-based. Second, it works in partnership with individuals and institutions elsewhere. …

Industrial epidemics, public health advocacy and the alcohol industry: lessons from other fields

Industrial epidemics, public health advocacy and the alcohol industry: lessons from other fields

Empowerment, Deliberative Development and Local Level Politics in Indonesia: Participatory Projects as a Source of Countervailing Power

The salience of the concept of empowerment has been more often deductively claimed than carefully defined or inductively assessed, by development scholars and practitioners alike. Using evidence from an in-depth, mixed methods examination of the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in rural Indonesia, we define it here as deliberative development interventions that build marginalised groups' capacity to engage local level governing elites using routines of deliberative contestation. Our data show that while KDP induced local level development conflicts, it also provided tools for peacefully resolving them, including associational spaces, incentives for marginalised group participation, and resources for argumentation such as facilitators. Ultimately, marginalised groups used these spaces, incentives, and resources to modestly but consistently shift local level power relations, regardless of the pre-existing institutional context. By contrast, marginalised groups in non-KDP development conflicts from otherwise similar contexts used mobilisational contestation to generate comparatively erratic and inconsistent shifts in power relations that depended greatly on the pre-existing context.

Port co-opetition in concept and practice

The port industry has undergone a rationalization process over the last decade. An increasing proportion of port management and operations is being taken over by global port operating groups. Many port operators who previously ran only their local business now extend their business scope to the regional or global scale; today's port operators can be regarded as multinational corporations. In the era of global economy, a port no longer enjoys a natural monopoly, as was the case in the past. To cope with this changing business environment, a certain form of competition and co-operation among ports is necessary so as to provide services that fit into shipping lines' strategies. It is suggested that ports have to concentrate on new ways for co-operation in an effort to establish a countervailing power. This paper proposes a new strategic option known as co-opetition, the combination of competition and co-operation, for the port industry, and explains a case of co-opetition between the container ports in Hong Kong and South China. The results of this research will provide a useful insight into the port industry, which is currently required to carry out its business in an ever-changing business environment.

Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets

Although much research has been devoted to the impact of seller structure on market outcomes, considerably less is known about the influence of buyer structure. We examine the impact of buyer concentration on the pricing of a monopolist. We design experimental markets in which a monopolist faces either two or four buyers. Markets with two buyers achieve significantly lower prices, sometimes below competitive levels, than those with four buyers. We design an additional pair of treatments to pinpoint the source of this difference. We attribute the lower prices in the two-buyer treatment to the monopolist pricing more cautiously when there are fewer buyers in order to avoid costly losses in sales. Buyer concentration may thus be an effective source of countervailing power.

Grosvenor on Hansen & Heurlin

Reviewed by: The New World Order: Contrasting Theories Peter Grosvenor Birthe Hansen & Bertel Heurlin, The New World Order: Contrasting Theories (Basingstoke: Macmillan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) The end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a so-called New World Order (NWO), have presented the contending paradigms of international relations theory with serious theoretical challenges, all of which relate to polarity — a central concept in international systems analysis. Contributor Ronald Deibert writes that, “the study of world order is... above all the study of the organization of political space — the architecture of political authority — at a world level” (p18). A polar actor is an actor so significant in this architecture that its removal would fundamentally alter the global distribution of power. The Cold War was widely interpreted as a bi-polar system in which two dominant actors imposed stability and peace through a balance of power of both a nuclear and conventional kind. This was, of course, a northern hemispherical perspective because, as Fred Halliday has demonstrated in his Cold War, Third World (Hutchinson Radius, London 1989), the superpowers clashed by proxy in the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Yet the implosion of the Soviet Union as a polar actor spectacularly reconfigured world politics and ushered in an era of comparative uncertainty. This volume of nine essays, edited by two Danish political scientists from the University of Copenhagen, details the responses of contending schools of international relations theory to the post-Cold War world. The term “New World Order” is of political, not academic, coinage. It was used by the Bush administration in the early 1990s to denote a new global situation in which the United States would head multi-lateral efforts to resolve long-standing intra-regional conflicts, to spread liberal democracy, and to liberalize the world economy. The American leadership of a Gulf War coalition comprising such disparate powers as Bangladesh, Denmark, Morocco, Syria, Egypt and France was presented by Bush as an example of the NWO in practice. To the neo-realist school, which treats power asymmetries as the necessary determinants of order and disorder in an anarchical international system, the NWO is simply a uni-polarity in which the power of the United States cannot be effectively challenged by another actor, or group of actors. But uni-polar systems are inherently unstable: in the absence of restraint, the dominant power over-reaches itself, and other powers gradually coalesce to form a countervailing power bloc. In his contribution to this volume K.N. Waltz argues that American uni-polarity is already giving way to a multi-polarity as Russia and China move closer together, and smaller states, stripped of the protection of their Cold War superpower sponsors, seek to build up their own autonomous defense capacities, including in some cases the quest for nuclear credibility. Liberal theoreticians, on the other hand, find encouragement in the NWO for their essentially rationalist project to improve the relations between states through diplomacy, international law, the spread of democracy, and the strengthening of international institutions. The essays collected here are arbitrarily dismissive of the “liberal-convergence” theory elucidated in Francis Fukuyama’s neo-Hegelian The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin, London 1992), but the burgeoning “democratic peace” literature is subjected to rigorous logical and empirical analysis. In contrast to both neo-realist and liberals, Marxists identify important continuities between the Cold War system and the NWO, as Michael Cox shows in his lucid survey of radical international relations theory. Wallerstein’s world systems theory always dealt in an alternative bi-polarity of North-South and substantially ignored the Cold War. Similarly, in his World Orders Old and New (Pluto Press, London 1994), Chomsky sees the end of the Cold War as nothing more than the completion of a world capitalist system under American hegemony. Cox credits Marxism with having tracked the development of international capitalism since The Communist Manifesto and suggests that it will continue to have a role in exposing the contradictions and iniquities of contemporary globalization. At the same time, he concedes that Marxism’s principal theoretical weakness is its inability to formulate practical systemic alternatives to...

Lawyers and Liberal Democracy

Lawyers and Liberal Democracy H. Kwasi Prempeh (bio) If Alexis de Tocqueville was a democrat by conviction, he was quite clearly a liberal democrat. The excesses of the French Revolution had hardened the French aristocrat against unbridled majoritarianism. Sharing the liberal democrat’s fear of the “tyranny of the majority,” Tocqueville believed that “if ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the omnipotence of the majority.” Therefore in examining American democracy, Tocqueville looked, among other things, for those “Causes Which Mitigate the Tyranny of the Majority in the United States.” His reflections on this subject, contained in Chapter 16 of Volume I of Democracy in America, focus in considerable part on the role that lawyers played in American government. In Tocqueville’s view, “the authority which they [Americans] have entrusted to members of the legal profession, and the influence that these individuals exercise in the government, are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy” (I, 272). Perhaps Tocqueville was merely exhibiting professional solidarity, since he himself had studied law and had begun his career as a magistrate at Versailles in the 1820s. But he offers more general arguments in support of his view that lawyers are essential to the workings of democracy: “Men who have made a special study of the laws derive from this occupation certain habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to the revolutionary [End Page 71] spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multitude” (I, 273). Thus, to the degree lawyers assumed a significant and prominent role in government, Tocqueville believed they would act to contain the tendency toward tyranny of the majority. Lawyers, in short, were essential, indeed indispensable, to making democracy liberal. In Tocqueville’s America this role was institutionalized in the form of an unelected federal judiciary that not only was independent of both the legislature and the executive but also had the power (self-asserted, thanks to Chief Justice John Marshall) to strike down laws passed by the legislature as unconstitutional. In effect, lawyers, in their capacity as judges, were capable of frustrating the will of the majority through the exercise of judicial review. Since judicial power is passive, however, it was left to another category of lawyers—those of the private bar—to initiate, on behalf of their clients, appropriate legal challenges to improper exercises of legislative power. In a country where “scarcely any political question arises . . . that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question” (I, 280), this meant that the bar and the bench, acting together, possessed substantial countervailing power. Litigation and adjudication were by no means the only avenues by which lawyers in Tocqueville’s America could intervene to restrain populist passions. Lawyers also participated more directly in democratic politics. “The government of democracy,” Tocqueville wrote, “is favorable to the political power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble and the prince are excluded from the government, the lawyers take possession of it, in their own right, as it were, since they are the only men of information and sagacity, beyond the sphere of the people, who can be the object of the popular choice” (I, 275). Tocqueville argued that lawyers, though inclined by training and taste toward the aristocratic class, “belong to the people by birth and interest” (I, 276) and are therefore less likely to incur their mistrust and suspicion. “As lawyers form the only enlightened class whom the people do not mistrust, they are naturally called upon to occupy most of the public stations. They fill the legislative assemblies and are at the head of the administration; they consequently exercise a powerful influence upon the formation of the law and upon its execution” (I, 279). But Tocqueville also believed that in their role as legislators and officers of the executive, lawyers, rather than serving merely as conduits for translating the people’s passions into law and policy, would mediate, tame, and even divert such passions and thereby block the excesses of majority rule. Whose interests, then, did lawyers seek to protect, if not those...

Quality management of occupational health services: The necessity of a powerful medical profession

Over the past few years there has been a growing interest in quality management in occupational health services. In this article the central role of the medical profession in this area is highlighted from a personal point of view. It is argued that a powerful and active profession is needed as a countervailing power in the field of tension between employees and the company, and for balancing the interests of these two main clients. Therefore, the medical profession should develop a policy on quality and apply quality management on national and local levels to reach a high professional level. In this way the profession can maintain the clinical autonomy that is necessary to be a countervailing power. Elements of such quality management are national guidelines, local peer review and intercolleagual visitation. These activities must be incorporated in the quality management of the occupational health services unit.

A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power

In this article I develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers. The buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which, similar to a boom in demand, forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting. If the buyer’s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough, then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint-profit-maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one. The model is extended to allow for multiple buyers. Large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers. Buyer mergers increase pro~t for all buyers, not just the merging pair, at the expense of the sellers. In contrast, buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers.

Professionalism as a Countervailing Power

Other| June 01 1991 Professionalism as a Countervailing Power Donald W. Light Donald W. Light Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google J Health Polit Policy Law (1991) 16 (3): 499–506. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-16-3-499 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Donald W. Light; Professionalism as a Countervailing Power. J Health Polit Policy Law 1 June 1991; 16 (3): 499–506. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-16-3-499 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsJournal of Health Politics, Policy and Law Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 1991 by Duke University Press1991 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Professionalism as a Countervailing Power

Professionalism as a Countervailing Power

The Organizational Fool: Balancing a Leader's Hubris

This paper explores the role of the sage-fool as means of creating a counter-vailing power against the regressive forces inherent in leadership, in other words, to reinforce the leader's capacity for reality testing. After a brief review of leadership theories, some of the salient characteristics of the role of the sage-fool are reviewed, taking a historical perspective. It is subsequently demonstrated how the fool, in playing the role of mediator between leader and followers, brings to the surface certain conflictual themes and thereby allows both parties to deal with the issues at hand. In this context, the role of humor and joking relationships are examined. Finally, two case examples of the fool in an organizational setting are presented.

Medicaid Drug Formulary Restrictions

Previous articleNext article No AccessMedicaid Drug Formulary RestrictionsDavid DranoveDavid Dranove Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 32, Number 1Apr., 1989 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467172 Views: 5Total views on this site Citations: 29Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1989 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Matthew Grennan, Ashley Swanson Bargaining in Healthcare Markets: Applications of Nash-in-Nash and Extensions, (Apr 2022): 249–270.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_12Giovanni Crea, Matteo M. Galizzi, Ismo Linnosmaa, Marisa Miraldo Physician altruism and moral hazard: (no) Evidence from Finnish national prescriptions data, Journal of Health Economics 65 (May 2019): 153–169.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.03.006W. David Bradford, John L. Turner, Jonathan W. Williams Off‐Label Use Of Pharmaceuticals: A Detection Controlled Estimation Approach, The Journal of Industrial Economics 66, no.44 (Jun 2019): 866–903.https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12189 Bibliografía, (Jan 2014): 133–140.https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-84-9022-593-6.00021-XDavid Bradford, John L. Turner, Jonathan W. Williams Off-Label Use of Pharmaceuticals: Trends and Drivers, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2013).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2230976James D. Dana Buyer groups as strategic commitments, Games and Economic Behavior 74, no.22 (Mar 2012): 470–485.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.014David Dranove Health Care Markets, Regulators, and Certifiers, (Jan 2011): 639–690.https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53592-4.00010-4SARA FISHER ELLISON, CHRISTOPHER M. SNYDER COUNTERVAILING POWER IN WHOLESALE PHARMACEUTICALS, The Journal of Industrial Economics 58, no.11 (Mar 2010): 32–53.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00408.xKosali Simon, Sharon Tennyson, Julie Hudman Do State Cost Control Policies Reduce Medicaid Prescription Drug Spending?, Risk Management and Insurance Review 12, no.11 (Mar 2009): 39–66.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6296.2009.01153.xSHARON TENNYSON, HAE KYUNG YANG State Prescription Drug Policies, Cost Barriers, and the Use of Acute Care Services by Medicaid Beneficiaries, Journal of Consumer Affairs 43, no.11 (Feb 2009): 4–25.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2008.01125.xJames D. Dana Buyer Groups as Strategic Commitments, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1504211Sanjoy Roy, S Suresh Madhavan Making a Case for Employing a??Societal Perspective in the Evaluation??of Medicaid Prescription??Drug Interventions, PharmacoEconomics 26, no.44 (Jan 2008): 281–296.https://doi.org/10.2165/00019053-200826040-00002William J. Moore, Etienne E. Pracht Changes in the Effectiveness of State Medicaid Drug Program Cost-Containment Policies Following OBRA 1990, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 66, no.55 (Dec 2007): 901–924.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2007.00546.xJoan Costa-Font, Panos Kanavos, Joan Rovira Determinants of out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditure and access to drugs in Catalonia, Applied Economics 39, no.55 (Mar 2007): 541–551.https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500438947Haiden A. Huskamp, Richard G. Frank, Kimberly A. McGuigan, Yuting Zhang The Impact of a Three-Tier Formulary on Demand Response for Prescription Drugs, Journal of Economics <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Management Strategy 14, no.33 (Sep 2005): 729–753.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00080.x Prescribing and Prescribing Influence, (Jan 2010): 155–196.https://doi.org/10.1201/9780203010730.ch6Sara Fisher Ellison, Christopher M. Snyder Countervailing Power in Wholesale Pharmaceuticals, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2001).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.277290Douglas Lundin Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior, Journal of Health Economics 19, no.55 (Sep 2000): 639–662.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00033-3F.M. Scherer Chapter 25 The pharmaceutical industry, (Jan 2000): 1297–1336.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80038-4 Pharmaceutical Pricing at the Change of Millennia, Journal of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practice 1, no.11 (Aug 1997): 99–112.https://doi.org/10.1300/J289V01N01_09Brenda R. Motheral, Kathleen A. Fairman The use of claims databases for outcomes research: rationale, challenges, and strategies, Clinical Therapeutics 19, no.22 (Mar 1997): 346–366.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-2918(97)80122-1David A. Sclar, Geneviève C. Tessier, Tracy L. Skaer, Randall F. Legg, Linda M. Robison, Neil L. Nemec Effect of pharmaceutical formulation of diltiazem on the utilization of medicaid and health maintenance organization services, Current Therapeutic Research 55, no.1010 (Oct 1994): 1136–1149.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0011-393X(05)80254-1 William J. Moore , and Robert J. Newman Drug Formulary Restrictions as a Cost-Containment Policy in Medicaid Programs, The Journal of Law and Economics 36, no.1, Part 11, Part 1 (Oct 2015): 71–97.https://doi.org/10.1086/467265Tracy L. Skaer, David A. Sclar, Linda M. Robison, Joanne K.H. Won, Daniel J. Markowski Effect of pharmaceutical formulation on health care expenditures for hypertension: A study of verapamil in a medicaid population, Current Therapeutic Research 53, no.33 (Mar 1993): 256–264.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0011-393X(05)80783-0Jeffrey S. Mccombs, Michael B. Nichol Pharmacy-Enforced Outpatient Drug Treatment Protocols: A Case Study of Medi-Cal Restrictions for Cefaclor, Annals of Pharmacotherapy 27, no.22 (Jun 2016): 155–161.https://doi.org/10.1177/106002809302700203Thomas J. Hoerger Market Failure, Information Imperfections, and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, Drug Information Journal 26, no.44 (Aug 2016): 647–654.https://doi.org/10.1177/009286159202600425David Alexander Sclar, Tracy L. Skaer, Alfred Chin, Mark P. Okamoto, Mark A. Gill Utility of a transdermal delivery system for antihypertensive therapy. Part 1, The American Journal of Medicine 91, no.11 (Jul 1991): S50–S56.https://doi.org/10.1016/0002-9343(91)90063-4John G. Cullis Prescription Charges and Budgets: Towards an Assessment, Social Policy & Administration 24, no.22 (Aug 1990): 136–144.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.1990.tb00332.xG. Edward Miller, John Moeller Outpatient prescription drug prices and insurance coverage: An analysis by therapeutic drug class and user characteristics from the 1996 medical expenditure panel survey, (): 23–57.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0194-3960(01)14003-5

Oligoemporistic Competition and the Countervailing Power Hypothesis

The oligoemporistic competition model developed in this paper describes a market situation where market power is exercised by a subset of traders on both sides of the market. It is shown that countervailing power will merely assure that the price level will coincide with the competitive one, but that the allocation of resources can always be improved upon by decreased concentration on either side of the market. La concurrence oligo-emporistique et l'hypothese du pouvoir compensateur. Le modele de concurrence oligo-emporistique developpe dans ce memoire decrit une situation ofu le pouvoir est exerce sur le marche par un sous-groupe de demandeurs et d'offreurs. On montre que le pouvoir compensateur va simplement faire en sorte que le niveau de prix coincide avec le niveau de prix de concurrence, mais qu'on peut toujours ameliorer l'allocation des ressources en reduisant le degre de concentration du cote de l'offre ou de

Activisme et contre-pouvoirs dans la ville américaine

Countervailing power in US cities. Traditions of localism and reforms of decentralization have given means of action and political experience. Community control has given way to a neighborhood movement, as shown in grass-roots coalitions (NEA, ACORN) which operate in many states and at the national level, or in former militant organizations, now service-oriented or turned into economic development corporations by the State. The Reagan administration has recommended the creation of urban entreprise zones in poor neighborhoods, with little success. In fact, the conservative revolution has been unable to stop the attraction of the grass-roots movement ; on the contrary, it seems to foster it. New registration drives and rainbow coalitions, rooted in poor neighborhoods, attempt to gather all the victims of Reaganomics. Will they succeed ?

American Capitalism. The Concept of Counter-Vailing Power

American Capitalism. The Concept of Counter-Vailing Power

Ecowas: Is it a Countervailing Power for Economic Independence?

Ecowas: Is it a Countervailing Power for Economic Independence?

ECOWAS: Is it a Countervailing Power for Economic Independence?

ECOWAS: Is it a Countervailing Power for Economic Independence?

Channel Domination and Countervailing Power in Distributive Channels

Three hypotheses are discussed: that the power of a channel leader is a result of his control over some power sources, and of dependency of other channel members upon him, and that such power can be offset by the countervailing power available to the channel members. Results of an empirical study which tested and confirmed these hypotheses in a conventional channel framework are presented. Several implications are derived which pertain to channel management decisions and proper selection of channel control mix.

Channel Domination and Countervailing Power in Distributive Channels

Channel Domination and Countervailing Power in Distributive Channels