Counterpart Theory Research Articles

Quidditism without quiddities

Structuralism and quidditism are competing views of the metaphysics of property individuation: structuralists claim that properties are individuated by their nomological roles; quidditists claim that they are individuated by something else. This paper (1) refutes what many see as the best reason to accept structuralism over quidditism and (2) offers a methodological argument in favor of a quidditism. The standard charge against quidditism is that it commits us to something ontologically otiose: intrinsic aspects of properties, so-called ‘quiddities’. Here I grant that quiddities are ontologically otiose, but deny that quidditism requires them. According to a view I call ‘austere quidditism’, properties are individuated by bare numerical identity. I argue that, as far as ontological parsimony is concerned, austere quidditism and structuralism are on a par. But is austere quidditism a coherent alternative to structuralism? To see that it is, we must get clear on what exactly we mean by ‘property individuation’. What we discover is that structuralism is a counterpart theory for properties, and that austere quidditism is simply the rejection of counterpart theory. I conclude with a methodological argument to the effect that counterpart theory for properties ought to be rejected. This paper begins by situating the debate between structuralists and quidditists within the context of a debate over the epistemic limits of fundamental science. At the center of this debate is David Lewis’s posthumously published ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2008). In the appendix I explain the precise role of austere quidditism in Lewis’s argument.

Rethinking Procreation: Why it Matters Why We Have Children

abstractAttempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases commonly do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such an approach identifies the resulting child as having been, in some sense, culpably harmed by their coming into existence. By contrast, and enlarging on work elsewhere, this paper explores the relevance of procreative motivation, rather than harm, for determining the morality of procreative conduct. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm‐based approach, which arises out of Derek Parfit's analysis of the non‐identity problem and its implications for preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the non‐identity objection adopt either an impersonal harm approach or draw on some version of a metaphysical modal counterpart theory to defend a person‐affecting harm account. But here I develop an alternative view. The proposed account construes the wrongness in the considered cases as ‘evil’ rather than harm, and the type of evil in question as being of a non‐grievance, welfare‐connected, collective kind. Understanding the wrongness in this way offers a basis for the view that it matters morally why we procreate, and not just whether or how we do so.

Robust Optimization Using Computer Experiments

During metamodel-based optimization three types of implicit errors are typically made.The first error is the simulation-model error, which is defined by the difference between reality and the computer model.The second error is the metamodel error, which is defined by the difference between the computer model and the metamodel.The third is the implementation error.This paper presents new ideas on how to cope with these errors during optimization, in such a way that the final solution is robust with respect to these errors.We apply the robust counterpart theory of Ben-Tal and Nemirovsky to the most frequently used metamodels: linear regression and Kriging models.The methods proposed are applied to the design of two parts of the TV tube.The simulationmodel errors receive little attention in the literature, while in practice these errors may have a significant impact due to propagation of such errors.

Counterpart theory v. the multiverse: reply to Watson

Counterpart theory v. the multiverse: reply to Watson

Models for Counterparts

Lewis proposed to test the validity of a modal thesis by checking whether its possible-world translation is a theorem of counterpart theory. However, that criterion fails to validate many standard modal laws, thus raising doubts about the logical adequacy of the Lewisian framework. The present paper considers systems of counterpart theory of increasing strength and shows how each can be motivated by exhibiting a suitable intended model. In particular, perfect counterpart theory validates all the desired modal laws and therefore provides a way out of the logical objection. Finally, a weakening of perfect counterpart theory is put forward as a response to some metaphysical objections.

Counterpart theory and modal realism aren't incompatible

Jim Stone has recently argued that counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible. His argument relies on a particular modal claim about the nature of the Lewisian pluriverse: I argue that the person who believes in counterpart theory and modal realism ought not to accept this claim though. I conclude that Stone has not shown that counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible. Jim Stone (2009: 650–51) presents the following argument against the compatibility of Lewisian modal realism and counterpart theory: Let a situation S be one at any possible world where someone finds a wallet and is free to choose whether or not to return that wallet; and let someone be free to choose to return a wallet iff if they return the wallet they could have not returned it and if they don’t return the wallet they could have returned it. It’s possible that every person in S (no matter what possible world they’re in)1 freely returns the wallet.

Why counterpart theory and modal realism are incompatible

I find a lost wallet containing the owner's address and a lot of cash. Shall I keep it or return it? Suppose I have the ‘liberty of indifference’: whatever I do, I could have done otherwise. Indeed, part of what is meant in saying I act freely is that either way what I do is up to me. And let's allow this liberty requires that my choice is not a logical consequence of the past and natural laws. If I return the wallet, I could have kept it without violating a law of nature or changing the past. Let's call this ‘situation S’ (where the liberty of indifference is part of S). Suppose I return the wallet. Others are also in S: free people find lost wallets every day. Each of us can freely return the wallet we find. It doesn’t follow immediately that we can all return it, however. That each ticket holder can win the lottery doesn’t entail they can all win it. We need the additional premiss that no number of people (short of all those in S) freely returning the wallet prevents the remainder from freely returning it. In short: each of us in S can freely return the wallet. Further, no number of us doing so prevents the remainder from doing so. Therefore it's possible that we all freely do what I do.

Robust optimization using computer experiments

During metamodel-based optimization three types of implicit errors are typically made. The first error is the simulation-model error, which is defined by the difference between reality and the computer model. The second error is the metamodel error, which is defined by the difference between the computer model and the metamodel. The third is the implementation error. This paper presents new ideas on how to cope with these errors during optimization, in such a way that the final solution is robust with respect to these errors. We apply the robust counterpart theory of Ben-Tal and Nemirovsky to the most frequently used metamodels: linear regression and Kriging models. The methods proposed are applied to the design of two parts of the TV tube. The simulation-model errors receive little attention in the literature, while in practice these errors may have a significant impact due to propagation of such errors.

RELATIVE-SAMENESS COUNTERPART THEORY

Just as set theory can be divorced from Ernst Zermelo's original axiomatization of it, counterpart theory can be divorced from the eight postulates that were originally stipulated by David Lewis (1968, p. 114) to constitute it. These were postulates governing some of the properties and relations holding among possible worlds and their inhabitants. In particular, counterpart theory can be divorced from Lewis's postulate P2, the stipulation that individuals are ‘world bound’—that none exists in more than one possible world

Modalny realizm i nazwy własne

The paper discusses modal realism, as expounded by David Lewis, and points out some crucial difficulties of this wide-ranging philosophical position. An essential component of it is the counterpart theory, which has the unfortunate consequence of eliminating trans-world objects from our ontology. And this leads to an enormously anomalous behavior of proper names in modal sentences, seriously undermining the plausibility of modal realism.

The Guided Autobiography Method: A Learning Experience

This article discusses the proposition that learning is an unexplored feature of the guided autobiography method and its developmental exchange. Learning, conceptualized and explored as the embedded and embodied processes, is essential in narrative activities of the guided autobiography method leading to psychosocial development and growth in dynamic, temporary social groups. The article is organized in four sections and summary. The first section provides a brief overview of the guided autobiography method describing the interplay of learning and experiencing in temporary social groups. The second section offers a limited review on learning and experiencing as processes that are essential for development, growth, and change. The third section reviews the small group activities and the emergence of the "developmental exchange" in the guided autobiography method. Two theoretical constructs provide a conceptual foundation for the developmental exchange: a counterpart theory of aging as development and collaborative-situated group learning theory. The summary recaps the main ideas and issues that shape the guided autobiography method as learning and social experience using the theme, "Where to go from here."

Kripkean Counterpart Theory

David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought and in some eyes, unwelcome consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent distinctness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart relation is in a sense stipulated rather than grounded on similarity, and is such that no object has more than one counterpart at a world. This avoids a number of objections Fara and Williamson have recently levelled against counterpart theory generally; their other objections are addressed by enriching the theory with special quantifiers and actuality operators.

Persistence, Ontic Vagueness and Identity: Towards a Substantialist Four–dimensionalism

Four-dimensionalism, the stage theory version in particular, has been defended as the best solution for avoiding vagueness in regards to composition, persistence and identity. Stage theory is highly problematic by itself, and the two views usually packed with it, unrestricted composition and counterpart theory, are a heavy burden. However, dispensing with these two views, four-dimensionalism could avoid vague persistence by issuing a criterion that would establish sharp temporal boundaries for the existence of genuine entities (simples, molecules and living organisms). This would avoid vague existence and vague identity, but in a way that is still compatible with endurantism. Nevertheless, a minimal (substantialist) four-dimensionalism, a worm perdurantist ontology, would fit better with the unique way in which organisms persist: by retaining both identity and intrinsic change.

Counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism: a reply to Eagle

Counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism: a reply to Eagle

Counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism: a reply to Eagle

Counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism: a reply to Eagle

Reply to Stone on counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism

Reply to Stone on counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism

Reply to Stone on counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism

Citation: Eagle, A. (2007). Reply to Stone on counterpart theory and four-dimensionalism. Analysis [Online], 67 (294), 159–162. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com

Ways an actualist might be

I discuss Stalnaker’s views on modality. In particular, his views on actualism, anti-essentialism, counterpart theory, and the Barcan formulas.

How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties ? Penelope Mackie

1. Preliminaries 2. Individual Essences and Bare Identities 3. Origin Properties and Individual Essences 4. Extrinsically Determined Identity and 'Best-candidate' Theories 5. Counterpart Theory and the Puzzles of Transworld Identity 6. The Necessity of Origin 7. Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties I: Substance Sortals and Essential Sortals 8. Sortal Concepts and Essential Propeties II: Sortal Concepts and Principles of Individuation 9. Essential Properties and Remote Contingencies 10. Essentialism, Semantic Theory, and Natural Kinds

Coincidence and modal predicates

Is it coherent to suppose that a statue and a piece of bronze that coincide throughout their existence are identical, while also holding that a statue and a piece of bronze that coincide for the first part of their existence, and then diverge, are distinct entities? Jim Stone (2005a, 2005c) argues that the attempt to defend this combination of views by an appeal to counterpart theory fails, partly on the grounds that the version of coun terpart theory that is required for the defence of the identity judgement in the 'permanent coincidence' case cannot provide a satisfactory account of the modal difference between the entities in the 'temporary coincidence' case.1 Although Stone's target is counterpart theory, the modal problem that he invokes has wider implications. For it appears to threaten any attempt to defend the view that there is identity in the permanent coincidence case but distinctness in the temporary coincidence case by appeal to the theory that modal predicates are what Harold Noonan (1991, 1993) calls 'Abelardian predicates', where an Abelardian predicate is one whose ref erence (the property or concept that it stands for) may be affected by the subject term to which it is attached. And although the version of counter part theory that Stone attacks one that involves 'inconstancy' in de re modal representation (cf. Lewis 1986) implies that modal predicates are Abelardian, one can hold that modal predicates are Abelardian without adopting a counterpart-theoretic account of de re modality (Noonan 1991: 190). In addition, if (as seems plausible) the view that there is identity in the permanent coincidence case can be defended only by treating modal predicates as Abelardian, then Stone's modal objection represents a chal lenge to any attempt to combine the view that there is identity in the case of permanent coincidence with the view that there is distinctness in the case of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I argue that Stone underestimates the resources that are available to an Abelardian theory of modal predication, including the