Counterinsurgency Practices Research Articles

Nasty not nice: British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice, 1945–1967

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the British Ministry of Defence prided itself that it was the Western world's leader in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Drawing on the lessons it had learnt during Britain's wars of decolonisation, it believed that it had discovered ways of waging wars among the people that enabled it to use force effectively but with discrimination, distinguishing between the ‘guilty’ few and the ‘innocent’ many. This article will survey these assertions in the light of historical evidence drawn from 10 of those campaigns: Palestine, Malaya, the Suez Canal Zone, Kenya, British Guiana, Cyprus, Oman, Nyasaland, Borneo, and Aden. It will suggest that the real foundation of British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice was not the quest to win ‘hearts and minds’. It was the application of wholesale coercion.

The British counter-insurgency in Cyprus

The Cyprus Emergency is often lumped together with Malaya and Kenya as an example of British counter-insurgency practice in the 1950s. Malaya and Kenya in particular are often used as models of how to succeed. The general perception is that these counter-insurgency campaigns, which are often connected with the strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’, were highly successful,1 and have ‘become synonymous with the conduct of a successful counter-insurgency campaign’,2 in contrast with the methods employed by the French in Indo-China and Algeria, the Dutch in Indonesia, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Americans in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, Cyprus, which tends to be comparatively neglected and less studied, presents a far less rosy and more problematic picture of British counter-insurgency practices in the 1950s. The geography and politics of Malaya and Kenya make them unsuitable as a model for counter-insurgency operations in the very different situation in Cyprus between 1954 and 1959. Rather than the usual comparison with Malaya and Kenya, Cyprus should be seen in parallel not only with Palestine, Aden, and Northern Ireland but also with Portugal and Rhodesia.

British counter-insurgency: a historiographical reflection

The article aims to offer a survey of the historiographical analysis of British counter-insurgency practices and campaigns since the publication of Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency, edited by the author and the late John Pimlott in 1985. It is argued that the volume in question was influential at a time when there was little academic interest in counter-insurgency in Britain. Moreover, the subject generally had been little studied in Britain in the past beyond work by a handful of military writers and theorists. Arguably, the analytical framework followed in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency holds its value even after over a quarter of a century. Since the 1980s, however, it has become apparent that the subject is of increasing academic interest, not least in terms of the ongoing debate on the nature and application of the concept of ‘minimum force’ in British campaigns.

Mission-based policing: rethinking the relationship of police to crime

This paper presents a model of urban policing based on deployment by serious crime. The deployment of line officers transitions from a district-based focus on ‘keeping a lid on crime’ to permanent staging of personnel within hot zones, based on POP intelligence assessment of serious crime characteristics, and carried out inside a model based on command integrity instead of current, highly decentralized (line-level) decision-making. A strategic model for deployment, based on counter-insurgency practices, enables security to be logically tied to long-term areal development and economic reinvestment.

Taming the jungle, saving the Maya Forest: sedimented counterinsurgency practices in contemporary Guatemalan conservation

This paper examines the significance of historically sedimented military practices for conservation in contemporary Guatemala. During a 36-year civil war, the military represented the lowlands as dangerous jungle that had to be tamed to justify its counterinsurgency campaigns, thus positioning the jungle's inhabitants as suspect citizens or potential insurgents. Also during the war, international conservationists coalesced to successfully lobby for a protected areas system that enclosed one-third of Guatemala's territory. This paper argues that this transnational conservation alliance, comprised of international conservation agencies and national elites, evokes the violence of scorched earth counterinsurgency. The use of jungle and forest discourses in successive territorial projects produces a racialized landscape that connects a violent past to a violent present. In recent years, jungle discourses have articulated advocacy for increased militarization to fight the ‘war on drugs’ in protected areas. As such, I argue thatconservation agencies and the military are complicit in reproducing social inequalities, often through violent exclusions. This paper was presented at the 2010 International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, sponsored by the Land Deal Politics Initiative, at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex. A National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant provided research support. Leonardo Luc, Mario López Barrientos and Alberto Alonso Fradejas all offered important insights into Guatemalan land politics. I consulted the CIRMA Archive and the ProPetén library for key project documents. J. Keith Gilless, Octaviano Chavarin, Norman B. Schwartz, Melissa Leach and two anonymous reviewers wrote incisive comments on paper drafts. I am especially grateful to Nancy L. Peluso for encouraging me to develop this paper in consonance with her work. I am responsible for all translations. Any remaining errors are my own.

Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

Aerial bombardment has been an important component of counterinsurgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology in the early twentieth century. Due to the nature of insurgency, bombing frequently occurs in and around settled areas, and consequently it tends to generate many civilian casualties. However, the effectiveness of bombing civilian areas as a military tactic remains disputed. Using data disaggregated to the level of the smallest population unit and measured at multiple points in time, this article examines the effect of aerial bombardment on the pattern of local control in the Vietnam War. A variety of estimation methods, including instrumental variables and genetic matching, show that bombing civilians systematically shifted control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents.

Thompson in Helmand: Comparing Theory to Practice in British Counter-insurgency Operations in Afghanistan

British operations in Helmand province, Afghanistan, have been contextualised within the theory and practice of counter-insurgency. The theories of Sir Robert Thompson are held to represent the basis for successful counter-insurgency campaigning. This analysis takes the simple premise of posing the question as to whether British conduct in Helmand between 2006 and 2008 has represented the effective utilisation of Thompson's principles. Evaluating the evolution of British operations on the ground this analysis suggests that while the influence of Thompson's thinking can be clearly detected, in practice the implementation of his precepts have been undermined and negated by a variety of factors, most notably the weaknesses of the government of Afghanistan. The result has been an ever-greater focus on the prosecution of the military campaign to the exclusion of the multifaceted programme advocated by Thompson. In conclusion, it may be contended the campaign in Helmand does not resemble the ideals outlined by Thompson or, indeed, much of an effective counter-insurgency plan.

The practice and theory of British counterinsurgency: the histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938–1939

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936–9, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorised British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counterinsurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.

Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland

This article challenges traditional dualist thinking concerning the balancing of counter-insurgency tactics against a commitment to human rights. It argues that, far from being forces which weigh against each other, they can be made to pull in the same direction, for the betterment of society as a whole. The article goes on to consider particular counter-insurgency practices used in Northern Ireland and maintains that they did not take proper account of human rights, thereby prolonging rather than shortening the conflict. The courts, even in Strasbourg, were slow to protect human rights in line with developing international standards on accountability.

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.

US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s Perspective

Until very recently, the four and half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than glimmer of hope, detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground. (1) Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and half years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 provides American participants with counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for similar operations well into the second decade of this century. The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons. (2) First, the writing team canvassed and included far wider range of opinion and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving the doctrine wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed. To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions. This article offers an assessment on the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and one view of how it has been applied to operations in the field. The hypothesis is that FM 3-24 conveys an effective military doctrine. Although its utility to the soldier and marine is evident from the reports emanating from Iraq, it is equally clear that FM 3-24 is not the final answer. What David Galula identifies as the 80 percent political action formula is beyond the scope of FM 3-24, but it still needs to be addressed. (3) The article provides brief but necessary reminder of doctrine's function and identifies six criteria for evaluating doctrine to be utilized in examining FM 3-24, testing its theoretical effectiveness. It then offers commentary on counterinsurgency practice in Iraq in the light of the new doctrine before returning to Galula's missing 80 percent. The hypothesis is supported by interviews with authors of the doctrine, service members serving and others who have served in Iraq, post-operational reports, and the ever-growing body of literature. Some careful consideration has also been given to opinion pieces and editorials published in various media. Writing COIN Doctrine Writing counterinsurgency doctrine today faces two major hurdles. First, things have changed markedly since the problem was last considered. John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen, and Steven Metz are three contemporary authors who have pointed out that warning signs related to this change have existed for some time. …

Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control

Abstract : Thirty years after the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and its Army again find themselves confronted with a tenacious insurgency, this time in Iraq. Given our decidedly mixed record in counterinsurgency operations, we tend to look elsewhere for successful models. Many look to the British, especially their exemplary and thorough victory in Malaya, to provide such a model. Commentators cite the British Army's superior organizational flexibility, strategic patience, their use of the minimum force necessary, their ability to integrate civil and military aspects of national power, and the facility with which they adapted their strategies to local circumstances of geography and culture. We would do well to emulate the aforementioned characteristics of British counterinsurgency practice, but there was more to British success in Malaya than a good attitude. The key element of their success was the effective internment of the Chinese squatter population, the segment of Malayan society from which the insurgents almost entirely drew their strength. By interning the squatters in fortified New Villages, the British and their Malayan allies were able to deny the communist insurgents access to recruits, food, and military supplies. This strategy was liable to abuse. In against the contemporary Mau Mau rebellion, the British employed the same strategy as they had in Malaya, in this case interning basically all of the ethnic Kikuyu. The system of detention camps and fortified villages quickly degenerated into Britain's Gulag in Kenya, but it was successful. A strategy of population control was not invariably effective, however. In Vietnam, the Diem regime's British-advised and American-supported attempt to implement the Strategic Hamlet program not only failed to weaken the insurgency, but actually exacerbated popular resistance. The author applies the British model of counterinsurgency and lessons learned from them to Iraq.

Police reform in Northern Ireland

The issue of police reform has become especially salient in Northern Ireland since the announcement of a ceasefire in September 1994. This article examines several major policing problems in this society and the kinds of reforms necessary to normalize policing. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to relax a host of counterinsurgency practices and on changes in the larger political context.

Counterinsurgency in the Third World: theory and practice

The purpose of this essay is to provide a brief overview of the theory and practice of counterinsurgency in the Third World since World War II. Given the obvious limitations of space, descriptions of particular COIN (counterinsurgency) campaigns have been avoided except to illustrate an argument. Furthermore, this essay concentrates primarily on U.S. counterinsurgency doctrines and methods. This is not to underestimate the contributions – both theoretical and practical – made by the former colonial powers in attempting to crush the impulse to national liberation in the Third World. But the European powers – with the recent exception of Portugal – had, by the beginning of the 1960s, neither the capability nor (following a number of humiliating setbacks) much enthusiasm for further military adventures in the Third World. There have, of course, been exceptions – the French in Mali, Britain in Borneo and the Anguilla affair – but these pale into insignificance when compared with the American counterinsurgency effort in the Third World, which began to gather impetus just as the major European colonial powers were abdicating their former role as Third World policemen.1