Counterinsurgency Approach Research Articles

A Paradigm Shift in Policy-making: The Evolution of Thailand's Anti-Communism Strategy through Prime Minister's Office Order No. 66/2523

Background and Objectives: This article studies the historical and political significance of the Prime Minister's Office Order No. 66/2523, a landmark directive that transformed Thailand's approach to communist insurgency. This study analyzes how international geopolitical shifts, particularly in Sino-American relations and regional dynamics, combined with domestic factors to catalyze a fundamental change in Thailand's counter-insurgency strategy. The order marked a crucial transition from military suppression to a more nuanced "politics leading military" approach that recognized communist sympathizers not merely as security threats but as citizens influenced by political ideologies and state-induced grievances. Methods: Utilizing historical research methodology and drawing on both primary and secondary documents, this article traces the evolution of Thai anti-communist policies from the 1960s to the early 1980s. The research particularly focuses on how external factors - including the U.S. strategic realignment in Asia, China's pragmatic turn under Deng Xiaoping, and Vietnam's regional ambitions - interacted with domestic political developments to create both the necessity and opportunity for making the unprecedented policy in anti-communism. Results: Key findings demonstrate that Order 66/2523 represented more than a tactical shift in counter-insurgency; it reflected Thailand's growing diplomatic maturity in leveraging changing international dynamics to address domestic challenges. While the order facilitated the reintegration of former insurgents and their sympathizers, it also served broader strategic purposes in Thailand's regional positioning. This analysis contributes to understanding how domestic policy innovation can emerge from the intersection of international pressures and local imperatives, offering lessons for contemporary approaches to political reconciliation and security challenges. Application of this study: This analysis provides insights into the development of Thai military doctrine and civil-military relations. It demonstrates how external and internal factors combine to drive policy evolution, with implications for understanding modern counter-insurgency approaches. Conclusions: While Order 66/2523 marked an important shift in official policy, its success built on pre-existing conditions. The study challenges the superficial perspective about the order's impact while acknowledging its significance in Thai military concepts about political solutions to the security challenge problem. This analysis not only contributes to a deeper understanding of Thailand's political maneuvers during the critical Cold War juncture but also underscores the complex interplay between domestic policies and international relations. The study demonstrates how a successful and creative policy often emerges from a combination of international opportunities with domestic imperatives, offering the thoughts that can be adapted to contemporary challenges in political reconciliation and security policy.

Mosaic; counter-insurgency approaches and the war against the Islamic state in Mozambique

ABSTRACT Following the defeat in Afghanistan there have been several discussions over the failure of western and western allied counter-insurgency strategies. These discussions often assume that winning a counter-insurgency is dependent on choosing the right strategy to win, and ideal type strategies are often sketched up to provide possible alternatives. However, in practice, counter-insurgency often becomes a process of arranging and organizing various goals, capacities, and organizational legacies. This article analyzes the counter insurgency in Mozambique and finds that it was formed by economic interests and organizational legacies, though it was not an entirely rational activity to win a war. On the ground practices have been the result of several approaches creating a dynamic counter-insurgency assemblage that transcends ideal type counter-insurgency strategies. The article suggests that this might be the cases for many counter insurgency campaigns.

De-Radicalization, Rehabilitation and Re-integration of Juvenile Militants in Pakistan: A Case Study of Sabaoon

In the wake of a protracted militancy in the Malakand region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the post-2007 military operations in the Swat valley culminated in the soft counter-insurgency approach under the De-Radicalization and Emancipation Programs (DREP). In doing so, Sabaoon was established in 2009 as the first de-radicalization initiative in Pakistan and the only program in the world to de-radicalize juvenile militants associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Furthermore, Saboon focused on reintegrating the juvenile into their communities as productive and valuable citizens. By drawing on primary and secondary data sources, this paper attempts to highlight the push and pull factors that led the children towards militancy, their rehabilitation methods and techniques used at Sabaoon, and the impacts of the rehabilitation program on reintegration into society. The paper argues that the Sabaoon program aimed to promote religious harmony and tolerance by addressing the ideological and social problems that drove the children towards militancy. The study further argues that most reintegrated children are now running their own small businesses, such as auto-mechanic workshops, carpentry, electronic appliances repair, etc., while some serve in government and non-government institutions. However, the data also suggests a higher recidivism ratio among these juveniles.

Weaponizing people in environmental conflicts: Capturing ‘hearts’, ‘minds’, and manufacturing ‘volunteers’ for extractive development

Local support is instrumental to natural resource extraction. Examining militarization beyond the battlefield, this article discusses the organization of volunteers in three controversial resource extraction projects. Drawing on the political ecology of counter-insurgency and 4 years of research that examined wind energy development in Mexico, coal mining in Germany, and copper mining in Peru, this article examines the weaponization of volunteers in environmental conflicts. It is argued that political acquiescence to natural resource extraction is manufactured by various means of coercion and reward, meanwhile volunteerism – or the appearance thereof – seeks to manipulate people’s ambitions and desires. The manufacturing of volunteerism expresses a ‘local’ counterinsurgency approach, designed to counter-resistance groups by articulating a form of counter-organizing to defend extractive development projects (and transnational capital). The fact remains, however, that these groups often qualify for welfare programs, are paid, or are recipients of ‘donations’ to ensure a supportive presence in the target areas. Volunteerism, in the conventional sense, is ‘hybridized’ with paid work posturing as unpaid to organize legitimacy. Discussing counter-organizations and their relationship to armed and unarmed volunteerism, the article details how communities are divided to support natural resource extraction in times of widespread ecological and climate crises.

Indian And Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaigns: A Comparative Analysis

The South Asian region has been marred by various insurgencies, internal conflicts, and civil wars. Multiple conflicts are mainly discussed and deliberated in piecemeal and standalone case studies. This paper will carry out a comparative study of Indian and Sri Lankan insurgencies while facing protracted insurgencies with different natures, magnitudes, and cultural propensities. Some conflicts were bloody and ultra-violent, and some resistance movements and insurgencies (Indian) have spanned more than five decades. Though Sri Lanka had defeated the insurgents, it is imperative to analyze the causes and factors that led to its success. Both India and Sri Lanka adopted a response pattern in the form of Counterinsurgency, which brought forth distinct consequences. Counterinsurgency is complex irregular warfare involving various logical operations lines such as political, economic, information, psychological, and military operations. But the chief consideration is non-kinetic. The non-kinetic procedures are administered under the ‘Population centric Counterinsurgency approach, in which the counterinsurgent is more inclined toward securing and protecting the population. This paper will ascertain whether India and Sri Lanka have launched the ‘population-centric Counterinsurgency’ or ‘enemy-centric Counterinsurgency.’ Moreover, it will also draw the parallels and variations followed in the respective theaters of insurgencies by both countries and discover how successful they are in suppressing their separate insurgencies. Lastly, this paper will provide the intellectual foundation for understanding the counterinsurgency paradigm for the whole of South Asia.

US Counter-terrorism: Moving Beyond Global Counter-insurgency to Strongpoint Defence

What should the future of US counter-terrorism policy be? This article reviews American strategic successes and mistakes of the past 20 years, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drifting objectives, public intolerance of risk and a misguided counter-insurgency approach to counter-terrorism all yielded an undifferentiated global campaign of attrition that the United States could never win. As the years passed, tactics eclipsed strategic thinking altogether. Meanwhile, the impact of digital technology, a resurgent right-wing threat and rising major powers such as Russia and China altered the global context and required new thinking. The only way the United States can respond effectively, especially after the calamitous and credibility-sapping withdrawal from Afghanistan, is to build stronger links with capable allies and partners, and to reframe its approach. The future of US counter-terrorism demands moving beyond a symmetrical US global counter-insurgency approach and adopting a selective, asymmetrical strategy of strongpoint defence.

Understanding the Cozy Relationship between Pakistan ISI and Lashkar-e-Taiba

This article evaluates to what degree the relationship between Pakistan and militant groups, primarily Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operating within its border, has influenced Islamabad’s counterinsurgency approach. The article succinctly describes the process that led to the formation of Pakistan and its ongoing fight with India since then over Jammu and Kashmir. It further discusses India’s overall strategic recourses in the Disputed Territory that have driven it to interpose in the internal affairs of its neighbors, principally Pakistan and Afghanistan. The interventionist behavior of India in the region generates strong anti-India sentiment among Pakistanis and Afghans. And in turn, the Pakistan militant groups cunningly use this anti sentiment as red meat to feed and reinforce the mindset of their followers and Kashmir nationals. Also, it addresses the developmental impact these militant groups have on Pakistan’s strategy to counter India’s dominance over the Disputed Territory of Kashmir. Additionally, this research highlights that while LeT has been previously a vibrant element of Pakistan’s regional stratagem, the group capability has morphed beyond Pakistan’s ISI’s control. It operates independently of the political development, and its organizational structure has extended beyond Jammu and Kashmir. The seeming threat poses by Indians over the Disputed Territory of Kashmir indeed creates a security quandary for the Pakistani army and security establishments. For over seven decades, India and Pakistan have clashed over the Kashmir-Occupied Territory, critical to both countries’ economies and prosperity. Islamabad has used LeT as its proxy primarily to keep India entangled in the economic drain in the Kashmir area while Pakistan continues to influence Afghanistan. This study is interested in understanding past events in an attempt to interpret the facts and explain the cause of occurrences, and their impact on the present events; thus, it is historical research. Both primary and secondary sources have been consulted to conduct this inquiry. Grasping the changing regional aspects of terrorism may be significantly advantageous in policymaking and intervention strategy. The research results highlight the significance of the entrenched geopolitical conflict and interests of the two nations and the order in comprehending terrorism. And the religious hatred of the Indian Hindus is not the principal driving force of militant groups of Pakistan attacks against India; instead, it is used as a vehicle by jihadists to make a point. The driving factor behind their attacks toward New Delhi is against its hegemonic desires of territorial control. Psychologically, the issue has been the building and making of the separate and unique identity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The research contributes to a clear understanding of the past and provides some possible ways forward. The study concludes that Islamabad and New Delhi need new strategies to mend their relationship and develop a plan to restore their security and stability. Lastly, it suggests some pragmatic recommendation steps India and Pakistan might take to overcome their differences and co-exist peacefully as neighbors.

Joining Militia; Understanding the Drivers of Militia Participation in Counterinsurgency Operation in Yobe State, Nigeria

The Nigeria government has been fighting a protracted insurgency by Boko Haram since 2009. Despite the concerted multifaceted counterinsurgency approach, the insurgent sustained its violence with impunity. However, the participation of militia to support the government significantly suppressed the insurgent hostilities, reduced both attack frequencies and fatalities. Even though the militias succeed in the operation, but what motivates them to engage in the militia is not address. This article, therefore, drawing data from interviews and field observations, this study investigated the drivers of the militias in Yobe State. The case study is at Geidam involving 15 participants from three groups that include the militia participants, government officials, and community leaders. The find revealed poverty and unemployment are the key drivers of militias' participation in the operation. However, the study recommends that Nigeria and Yobe State governments should regulate the militia activities to avoid excessiveness. Nigeria's government should re-strategize its counterinsurgency campaign toward the people-centered operation. Others are the recruitment of more state counterinsurgent forces by the government.

Militia Counterinsurgency: Perspective on the Motivations of Civilian Joint Task Force Militia Participation in Northern Nigeria

Since the year 2013, Nigeria’s northeastern region epicenter of the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency waging war for the establishment of an Islamic State has witnessed mass participation of people in a civil militia group. The militia group colloquially describing itself Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was formed to combat the Boko Haram rebellion. Perhaps, the participation of the CJTF in the combating activities was reportedly influential in reducing the Boko Haram hostilities in most communities. Prior to the CJTF, the counterinsurgency approaches of the Nigerian governments’ Special Joint Task Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Member States of Lake Chad Basin Commission was faced with lackadaisical performances. Whereas the CJTF was reportedly successful, however, the interrupted participation of the people despite the attendant human and material cost has risen suspicion among the population and the critical literature about the groups’ true motivation. This article, therefore, investigated the motivations of the CJTF in northeastern Nigeria. The study was conducted through a qualitative approach designed in a case study. The data was collected from thirteen informants from three groups - CJTF, Community Leaders and State/Local Government authorities. The technique of data collection is in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The finding revealed personal incentive factors of monetary/material gains, and the futuristic interest of employability drives peoples’ participation. To address the economic interests of the CJTF and as a panacea to prevent the manifestation of the security threats associated with the CJTF group, the study recommends for the establishment of charity centers to receive contributions from well to do citizens to ameliorate the economic needs of the participants. The government should also propound strong legal mechanisms to regulate the activities of the CJTF militia.

STRATEGY OF CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE MILITIA IN COMBATING BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.

Callous Cruelty and Counterinsurgency: Civilian Victimization and Compensation in U.S.-Occupied Iraq

Randall Collins coined the term callous cruelty to refer to the bureaucratic development and application of violence, which frequently results in widespread civilian impacts even when unintended. The U.S. military itself identified such outcomes as a major obstacle to success in counterinsurgency warfare during its occupation of Iraq, and consequently sought to more carefully target insurgents in ways that avoid or minimize civilian harm by further rationalizing its violence. When violence resulted in harm regardless, U.S. officials in Iraq sought to ameliorate it by providing monetary payments to war victims. This article presents an analysis of U.S. Army documents from this compensation program. The files studied here depict the routine nature of civilian harm in Iraq even under the counterinsurgency approach. The files further reveal the most common ways by which U.S. military action killed civilians. Finally, the documents show that the compensation program was administered in a way that frequently re-inscribed, rather than diminished, the callous cruelty of counterinsurgency war.

‘Agro sí, mina NO!’ the Tía Maria copper mine, state terrorism and social war by every means in the Tambo Valley, Peru

The Tía Maria copper mine situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley, southwest Peru, has sparked nearly ten years of protracted conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet Southern Copper Peru or Southern, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, has faced ardent resistance. This article explores the ‘political reactions from above’, examining how Southern and the Peruvian government have negotiated the popular rejection of the mine. Residents have organized a popular consultation, large-scale demonstrations, road blockades and general strikes, which has been met with violent repression. Reviewing the political ecology of counterinsurgency, which studies the socio-ecological warfare techniques employed to control human and natural resources, and relating it to social war discourse, this section lays the theoretical foundations to discuss the coercion and ‘social war component’ present in natural resource extraction. This leads to an overview of the relationship between Peruvian security forces and extraction industries, followed by a brief chronology of the Tía Maria conflict. The subsequent two sections offer a political ecology analysis of various ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ counterinsurgency techniques employed by the Peruvian state and Southern in an attempt to pacify social unrest and socially engineer acceptance of the project. The concluding section discusses the ‘whole-of-government’ counterinsurgency approach employed, recognizing how the present institutional arrangements and business imperatives are designed to override popular socio-ecological concerns. Supporting social war discourse, the article contends that the state apparatus and politics itself serve as an instrument of social pacification and ecological exploitation regardless of widespread ecological and climatic concerns.

Organized Criminal-Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: How Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Approaches Ignore the Roots of the Problem

Organized Criminal-Terrorist Groups in the Sahel: How Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Approaches Ignore the Roots of the Problem

Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: The Conduit for Ending Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’s North

This concept paper analyzed the existing counterinsurgency approaches of Nigeria government in combating an Islamist insurgent Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram violent armed uprising for the Islamization of Nigeria state in 2009 have cooled bloodily murdered thousands of people and displaced millions of others from their settlements. This has resulted in serious humanitarian situations. To combat the insurgency Nigeria government in collaboration and support of foreign government have adopted numerous counterinsurgency measures. However, despite the consistent counterinsurgency measures, prevailing evidence suggests that the insurgency is far away from being defeated. In contrast, the group sustained its violence attacks unabatedly. Therefore, this paper explored that the sustenance of Boko Haram insurgency in spite of the successive counterinsurgency measures eventuated from the adoption of enemy-centric approach in the combating activities. The paper revealed the repressive military action coupled with draconian laws and policies by the state created public dissension toward the counterinsurgency campaign, therefore, undermine the successes of the campaign. In conclusion, the paper recommends that to effectively tackle the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria government need to deviate from the enemy-centric approach and to the population-centric paradigm that should focus on addressing the socioeconomic factors fuelling the insurgent recruitment and support.

Counterinsurgency, knowledge production and the traveling ofcoercive Realpolitikbetween Colombia and Somalia

Counterinsurgency witnessed a powerful revival in our post-9/11 world. With its focus on the control of territory, populations and seemingly less kinetic hearts and minds campaigns—as well as a good dose of liberal humanitarianism—contemporary counterinsurgency has become the dominant form of the Western military interventionism. While most of the associated debates focus on the potentials and pitfalls of Western counterinsurgency approaches, the role of South-South cooperation in the making of ‘Global Counterinsurgency’, and the related emerging geopolitical convergences of interest between Western and non-Western elites in counterinsurgency, has received little attention. In focusing on counterinsurgency-related forms of knowledge production, and by analyzing the role of transnational military knowledge entrepreneurs promoting a form of coercive Realpolitik that supports ‘locally owned’ elite-driven counterinsurgency efforts in the field of South-South military cooperation between Colombia and Somalia, this article addresses this void. We show that conventional North/South divides no longer capture the realities of counterinsurgent warfare going global and call for a de-centering of the study of military interventions that is sensitive to how knowledge production in regards to ‘Global South’ contexts not only makes them legible, and thereby more governable, but also how this knowledge production informs ongoing reconfiguration of interventions themselves.

Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: Countering Comando Vermelho’s Criminal Insurgency

Ten years ago, in 2008, the Brazilian Government adopted a strategy to regain control over the favelas in Rio de Janeiro – the Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In spite of initial favorable results, the main threat, namely the Red Command (CV), fought back and by 2014 the UPP strategy was badly frayed. In order to defeat this threat, it is necessary to reconceptualize CV as a criminal insurgency and to pinpoint and address the social and political factors that sustain it. This allows for a response inspired by the ‘shape-clear-hold-build’ counterinsurgency approach, which while cost-intensive is, in the long term, the most sustainable path to achieving security within the favelas and integrating these neglected areas within the broader city of Rio de Janeiro.

International Reactions and Actions on Militancy and Insurgency in Nigeria Since 1999

This article examines international reactions and actions on militancy and insurgency in Nigeria since 1999. It employs historical method of data collection and adopts descriptive and analytical approaches of analysis. It has utilised various sources, mainly secondary literature which include journal articles, books, newspaper reports, reports of international organisations and agencies. The article reveals the nature, trends and dynamics of insecurity in Nigeria; especially, the emergence and rise of militancy in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east have not only affected the unity, territoriality, sovereignty, economy, political environment, government income and institutions, infrastructure and wanton deaths but also attracted international reactions and concerns from different quarters of the global community, especially Nigeria’s immediate neighbours which have affected her external image and international relations. The article concludes that, while her image has improved, Nigeria should continue to embrace progressive dialogue and improve on the multilateral collaborative counter-insurgency approach (i.e., The Joint Multinational Tasks Force involving Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria and Benin Republic) which has proved very efficient and effective since the advent of this present administration in May 2015.

The ‘green militarisation’ of development aid: the European Commission and the Virunga National Park, DR Congo

To ‘save’ the Virunga National Park, located in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Commission (EC) allocates development aid to the paramilitary training of the park guards, their salaries, and mixed patrols of the guards together with the Congolese army. Moreover, the ‘development’ projects the EC supports around the park have militarising effects as they are based on a soft counter-insurgency approach to conservation and to address dynamics of violent conflict. This amounts to the ‘green militarisation’ of development aid. This article describes how a personalised network of policymakers within the EC renders militarised conservation-related violence and controversy around the Virunga park invisible, by framing contestations and violence in and around the park as solely caused by economic factors and motivations. Moreover, by ‘hiding’ the fact that the EC aid is used to fund armed conservation practices, policymakers circumvent political debate about the use of development funds for (para)military expenditures. While the existing literature focuses on the importance of securitised discourses to explain the militarisation of conservation, this article indicates that in addition, it is important to focus on these more mundane practices of securitisation within international organisations that ultimately fund the militarisation of conservation.

Counterinsurgency Challenge in Post-2001 Afghanistan

Although the Taliban insurgency was internally divided and unable to coordinate its activities in 2014–2015, the Afghan security forces were not able to contain it and steadily lost ground throughout 2015. Until 2015, there had been little effort to develop an indigenous Afghan counterinsurgency strategy, but a sense of urgency emerged after a string of Taliban victories. At the beginning of 2016, it was still not clear if and when the National Unity Government would be able to produce a counterinsurgency strategy and, in any case, the need for a coherent counterinsurgency approach became questionable as the Taliban appeared to be transitioning towards conventional warfare.

Inside Papua: The Police Force as Counterinsurgents in Post-Reformasi Indonesia

Following Indonesia’s democratic transition in 1998, the nation’s counterinsurgency strategy shifted from enemy-centric operations led by the military to population-centric operations led by police forces. This was an important move-by the Indonesian government to signal that it intended to include democratic principles in its fight to maintain its sovereignty against the threat of insurgency. In West Papua, the Indonesian police have been empowered to lead the counterinsurgency operation against the Free Papuan Movement (OPM). Nonetheless, the Indonesian police’s deficiencies in battling OPM requires that the police maintain a strong partnership with the Indonesian military. This study examines the complex interplay between the Indonesian military and police in post- Reformasi Indonesia with regard to their counterinsurgency approaches. The article explores the contemporary dynamics between the Indonesian military and police, both tension and cooperation, when conducting operations. It does so by examining a single case study of Indonesia’s counterinsurgency operation in one of the high-risk regions in Indonesia-the Aman Matoa operation against the OPM in West Papua region-which emphasizes law enforcement and building support among local inhabitants. The essay provides a detailed description of the police-military’s joint collaboration in responding to insurgents in West Papua region. (Despite the competition between military and police, the two have been able to work together in West Papua region, especially to extract information about insurgents and to sever the links between guerrillas and their support base.) Further, this study provides a description of the contemporary anatomy of the Free Papua Movement with its current strategy of both violent and nonviolent tactics, from the point of view of counterinsurgency agencies. This empirical study deploys qualitative analyses with data collected through interviews and discussions with relevant stakeholders in West Papua.