Counterfactual Analysis Of Causation Research Articles

DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST

AbstractThis article explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A ‘relevantised’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent fails to be accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. The connective thus defined violates almost all of the traditional principles of conditional logic, but it obeys an interesting logic of its own. The article also gives the logic of an alternative version, the ‘Dependent Ramsey Test,’ according to which a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent is rejected (e.g., its negation is accepted) if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. This conditional is closely related to David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation.

Causing Global Warming

Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead adopt Lewis’s (2000) analysis of causation, it turns out that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming (etc.) when I go for a single drive. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. When we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming (etc.). This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) and Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming.

Overdetermination, Counterfactuals, and Mental Causation

The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation and shows why this idea, though initially appealing, does not address the real problem. As the essay shows, the idea derives its spurious plausibility from the fact that the dependency conception cannot even make sense of our pretheoretic idea of causal redundancy. The essay concludes by briefly discussing a possible picture of mental causation that suggests itself in light of these results. The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. The problem is that a nonreductive physicalist view of mind seems to make every case of mental causation a case of overdetermination. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. In this essay, I take up the question whether counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and examine how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, I'll be discussing whether, or to what extent, the overdetermination problem turns on particular conceptions of causation. The essay falls into two parts. In the first half (sections 1–2), after briefly presenting the overdetermination problem in section 1, I address the question whether counterfactuals can capture the notion of overdetermination and argue in section 2 for a negative answer. First, I consider David Lewis's (1986) and Jonathan Schaffer's (2003) definitions of overdetermination, and possible revisions to them, and show that the conditions they specify are neither necessary nor sufficient for overdetermination. I then argue that counterfactual analyses of overdetermination face the same kinds of problems as counterfactual analyses of causation and show that the source of these problems is that counterfactual analyses of overdetermination—just as those of causation—cannot accommodate the intuitive idea that causation is an intrinsic relation between events. The second half (sections 3–4) explores the implications of these observations for the mental causation problem. In section 3, I first argue that the attempt of Karen Bennett (2003, 2008) and similar attempts to resolve the overdetermination problem by invoking counterfactuals rest on a false premise, and then respond to the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation (e.g., Burge 1993; Loewer 2002, 2007). I show why this idea, though initially appealing, does not address the real problem. As we will see, the idea derives its spurious plausibility from the fact that the dependency conception cannot make sense of our pretheoretic idea of causal redundancy. This means that the overdetermination problem cannot even be coherently stated on the dependency approach, revealing that counterfactual talk about causation is expressively impoverished. I conclude in section 4 by briefly discussing a possible picture of mental causation that suggests itself in light of these results.

What Trans-World Causation Could and Could Not Be

Abstract Eduardo García-Ramírez has offered a reductio of the counterfactual analysis of causation. The argument purportedly shows that, given a natural generalization of Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals, statements expressing the existence of causal dependence across worlds are satisfiable. The aim of the present paper is twofold. In the first part, I show that the purported reductio is flawed, as it relies on an overly strong construal of the semantics for counterfactuals. In particular, it is assumed that we can assign a degree of similarity to any given pair of possible worlds. As it turns out, that assumption reduces to the thesis that the relations of comparative similarity featured in the standard semantics for counterfactuals define an interval scale of measurement on the set of all possible worlds. It will be argued that such a thesis is incompatible with a viable understanding of comparative similarity. The second part of the paper is devoted to a new proof of the possibility of trans-world causation. Nevertheless, the new proof does not amount to a reductio of Lewis’ account of causation per se, but rather of the conjunction of several substantive theses (the counterfactual analysis of causation, modal plenitude, the existence of mereological sums and the best theory account of natural laws).

Relativity, Quantum Entanglement, Counterfactuals, and Causation

We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. While it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis's influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt upon this. We discuss ways in which Lewis's semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations.

Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation

The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting‐point the suggestion that C causes E iff (∼C □→ ∼E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (∼E □→ ∼C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre‐emption. It is found that the ‘reversed’ counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre‐emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.

Causation and Counterfactual Dependence

Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.

A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation

If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate how counterfactual analyses of causation must appeal to them to account for the correct causal judgements we make. I show that the truth-conditions of NP-counterfactuals are specifiable only by irreducible appeal to causation. A dilemma then holds: if counterfactual analyses of causation eschew appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are empirically inadequate, but if they appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are circular and thus conceptually inadequate.

Against the PCA-analysis

Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran (1996) have proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this the PCA-analysis is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis's first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis's later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis.

Against the PCA-analysis

Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran (1996) have proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this the PCA-analysis is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis's first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis's later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis.

A counterfactual analysis of causation

On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis of causation that resolves these problems in one go but which respects Lewis's initial insights. One distinctive feature of my account is that it accommodates indeterministic causation without resorting to probabilities.

Redundant Causation

I propose an amendment of Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation, designed to overcome some difficulties concerning redundant causation.

David Lewis Meets John Bell

The violation of the Bell inequality means that measurement-results in the two wings of the experiment cannot be screened off from one another, in the sense of Reichenbach. But does this mean that there is causation between the results? I argue that it does, according to Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation and his associated views. The reason lies in his doctrine that chances evolve by conditionalization on intervening history. This doctrine collapses the distinction between the conditional probabilities that are used to state screening off, and the counterfactuals with chance consequents that are used to state lack of causation. I briefly discuss ways to evade my argument.

Causal Independence in EPR Arguments

I show that locality, as it occurs in EPR arguments for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, can be construed as causal independence understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. This construal has two benefits. It supplements recent analyses, which have not treated locality in detail. And it clarifies the relation between two EPR arguments that have recently been distinguished. It shows that the simpler of the two is more complex than has been thought; and that the other argument does not need ‘counterfactual definiteness’.I aim to show that in the EPR argument (Einstein et al. 1935) for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM), locality can be taken as causal independence, understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation.Recent analyses of the EPR argument makes this construal of locality timely, for two reasons. First, these analyses typically say little about locality.

Causal asymmetry and causal relata: Reply to Lee

Jig-Chuen Lee in a recent paper, 'Causal Connection, Causal Asym metry, and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation', offers a coun terexample to my account of causal asymmetry.1 In this paper I argue that Lee's example is effective only if a certain background assump tion concerning the nature of causal relata is made, an assumption which I previously held but have since abandoned on independent grounds. After outlining my new view of causal relata, I show that Lee's example can be revised to work under this new assumption. I propose a revision of my account of causal asymmetry to handle this case.

Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation

In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation.

Causal condition, causal asymmetry, and the counterfactual analysis of causation

In a recent paper ‘Causal Asymmetry’, Douglas Ehring has proposed an intriguing solution to the vexing problem of causal asymmetry. The aim of this paper is to show that his theory is not satisfactory. Moreover, the examples that I use in showing the defect of Ehring's theory also indicate that the counterfactual analysis of causation has a problem that cannot be remedied by Marshall Swain's suggested refinement of the counterfactual analysis of causation in ‘Causation and Distinct Events’.

Lewis' counterfactual analysis of causation

David Lewis offers a counterfactual analysis of causation, limiting his analysis to causation between particular events.1 Exactly what Lewis is analyzing is revealed by the point at which he announces his analysis to be complete. He does so immediately after giving neces sary and sufficient conditions for one event's causing another.2 One event is a cause of another if and only if there is a causal chain that leads from the first to the second. The notion of a causal chain is defined by appeal to causal dependence, which is defined in terms of the truth of certain counterfactuals. The truth value of a counter factual is determined by the truth value of its consequent in those possible worlds in which the antecedent is true which are most similar over-all to the actual world.3 Two sorts of criticisms of Lewis' account have been leveled elsewhere. Jaegwon Kim objects to the account's classification of certain kinds of cases as ones of causal dependence. Among these are ones which Kim says exemplify an 'analytical' or 'logical' relation, and others in which one event is a part of another.4 Bernard Berofsky objects to Lewis' contention that the vagueness of counterfactuals infects causation.5 I agree that the cases cited by Kim and the features of Lewis' analysis cited by Berofsky present problems for his account. However, another potentially far more damaging line of criticism will be offered here. I shall argue that the adequate determination of a set of possible worlds as closest or most similar to the actual must depend upon causal relations. Without appeal to causal relations (though not the particular ones Lewis analyzes here), the truth values expected will not be determined for many counterfactuals whose truth values are pre-analytically clear. And if a set of worlds is determined as closest to the actual without appeal to causal relations, the relevance of those worlds to the causal relations between particular events in the actual world is obscure. Let us begin, however, by elaborating Lewis' account.

Counterfactual Analysis of Causation and Kim's Examples

Counterfactual Analysis of Causation and Kim's Examples

Counterfactual analysis of causation and kim's examples

Counterfactual analysis of causation and kim's examples