Abstract
The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting‐point the suggestion that C causes E iff (∼C □→ ∼E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (∼E □→ ∼C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre‐emption. It is found that the ‘reversed’ counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre‐emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have