As an important strategic industry in China, the rare earth industry needs to extend its industrial chain to the high-end by carrying out technological innovation. This paper discusses the dynamics of technological innovation in rare earth enterprises and how local governments regulate the behaviors of these enterprises. First, we establish an evolutionary game model between local governments and rare earth enterprises, considering direct and indirect factors of policy regulations regarding the rare earth industry. Second, we analyze the mechanism and evolution process of governance strategy selection and explain the efficiency and evolution path of the local governance system under different policy orientations by finding the stable point of the replication dynamic process. Finally, we use numerical simulation to analyze the impacts of initial willingness and direct and indirect factors on the dynamic evolution process. The results demonstrate that (1) the regulation cost of local governments and subsidies have negative impact on local government decisions and rewards generated by enterprises' technological innovation have positive impact on local government decisions; (2) benefits, direct subsidies from local governments, and indirect performance rewards from the central government have positive impact on enterprises' technological innovation decisions. Based on the empirical results, we recommend that to promote enterprises' participation in technological innovation, central and local governments should create policy for rules and regulations for rare earth enterprises by comprehensively considering the technological risks and spillover effects rather than increasing subsidies. Moreover, based on their characteristics, rare earth enterprises should create an environment for technological innovation and integrate into regional technological innovation platforms.
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