Costs Of Disinflation Research Articles

Disinflation costs and macroprudential policies: real and welfare effects

PurposeThis paper analyzes real and welfare effects of a permanent change in inflation rate, focusing on macroprudential policy’ role and its interaction with monetary policy.Design/methodology/approachWhile investigating disinflation costs, the authors simulate a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, credit frictions and macroprudential authority.FindingsProviding discussions on different policy scenarios in a context where still it is expected high inflation, there are three key contributions. First, when macroprudential authority actively operates to improve financial stability, losses caused by disinflation are limited. Second, a Taylor rule directly responding to financial variables might entail a trade-off between price and financial stability objectives, by increasing disinflation costs. Third, disinflation is welfare improving for savers, while costly for borrowers and banks. Indeed, while savers benefit from policies reducing price stickiness distortion, borrowers are worried about credit frictions, coming from collateral constraint.Practical implicationsThe paper suggests threefold policy implications: the macroprudential authority should actively intervene during a disinflation process to minimize costs and financial instability deriving from it; policymakers should implement a disinflationary policy stabilizing also output; the central bank and the macroprudential regulator should pursue financial and price stability goals, separately.Originality/valueThis paper is the first attempt to study effects of a permanent inflation target reduction in focusing on the macroprudential policy’ role.

Inflation targeting and disinflation costs in Emerging Market economies

Inflation targeting and disinflation costs in Emerging Market economies

Inflation Targeting and Disinflation Costs in Emerging Market Economies

Inflation Targeting and Disinflation Costs in Emerging Market Economies

Inflation Shocks and Disinflation: Stylised Facts from the Past 50 Years

In our study, we examine the circumstances under which major inflation shocks lead to persistently high inflation. For our analysis, we use macroeconomic data from a broad sample of countries for the past fifty years or more. We identify several cases where inflation rises from the single-digit range to above 20 per cent, followed by successful disinflation within two years. Similarly, there are many examples where inflation remains high after an initial shock. The former cases are characterised by more pronounced increases in interest rates during inflation shocks, more disciplined fiscal policy and favourable commodity price developments. Examining the same sample, we also show that the disinflation after a period of persistently high inflation was not typically accompanied by a significant slowdown in the real economy and instead was often followed by higher economic growth. In the disinflationary episodes we identified, the size of the real cost of disinflation is negatively correlated with the central bank independence, suggesting that a disinflationary commitment played a positive role.

How Large is the Output Cost of Disinflation?

This paper examines estimates of, and drivers for, the sacrifice ratio in the United States. Three approaches are employed. The first reviews the literature on what sacrifice ratio might be expected. The second studies a generic disinflation experiment using 40 estimated macro models of the U.S. economy, calculating a distribution of sacrifice ratios. Those sacrifice ratios are high by historical standards and the paper discusses some stories for why this is so. The role of expectations formation and the credibility of policy is emphasized. The third approach gets under the hood of drivers of the output cost of disinflation by carrying out a selection of disinflation experiments using the FRB/US model, varying certain characteristics of the model’s expectations formation mechanism. Pinning down a precise measure for the output cost of disinflation is challenging. But the literature and policy experiments do offer some guidance on how the sacrifice ratio can be reduced.

Die EZB muss die Inflation glaubwürdiger bekämpfen

AbstractInflation rates in the euro area have reached historic highs due in large part to high energy prices. As the euro area is a net importer of energy, one refers to this inflation as imported inflation. There is a danger that these high inflation rates will become entrenched in inflation expectations. This would not only imply that high inflation rates will persist but it could also cause a dangerous upward price spiral. Consequently, the ECB should communicate more clearly and more credibly that it will counteract this danger and act accordingly as the costs of disinflation will remain higher the longer the ECB waits to act.

The Cost of Disinflation in a Small Open Economy Vis-À-Vis a Closed Economy

The Cost of Disinflation in a Small Open Economy Vis-À-Vis a Closed Economy

Disinflation costs in China and monetary policy regimes

This paper investigates the real effects of a disinflationary policy in China, in which we conduct a disinflation experiment in a medium-scale New Keynesian model. We highlight two key features of China's economy: the relevance of money to monetary policy rules and household inequality. For the former, we consider two monetary policy regimes: an expanded Taylor rule with money and a money supply rule. For the latter, we take into account a share of the population that is limited in its ability to participate in assets markets. Our analysis suggests that a disinflation policy is more costly when the central bank controls the money supply than the case in which the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument. Our results are driven by the different impacts of disinflation on nominal and real interest rates under the two regimes.

Inflation-output trade-off: Old measures, new determinants?

This study analyses the determinants of the sacrifice ratio; i.e., the output cost of disinflation. The empirical literature so far has used several model specifications, indicating the degree of model uncertainty. Even for those factors where consensus on their significance has been reached, such as trade openness and central bank independence, considerable uncertainty still surrounds their estimated sign. Motivated by the above, we estimate the most important drivers of the sacrifice ratio based on Bayesian model averaging, for a panel data set of 42 countries. Our findings confirm part of the evidence reported in the prior empirical literature, while it sheds light on the importance of other factors.

What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio? A Bayesian Model Averaging Approach

AbstractExisting empirical studies on the sacrifice ratio (measuring the output cost of disinflation) consider a large number of potential explanatory variables including the length of disinflation, various institutional settings, economic conditions, and the political climate. Some results are robust across different studies, while others are not. We address the presence of model uncertainty by using the Bayesian model averaging method to identify the important determinants of the sacrifice ratio, without relying on ad hoc model selection. Our results show that the length of disinflation is the most important variable. This supports the ‘cold turkey’ argument for faster disinflation.

Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy

A numerical measure of central bank credibility, which can be incorporated into a New Keynesian model under bounded rationality, is proposed and analyzed. This measure arises mainly due to the existence of the drifts in private long-term predictions, which are different from those of the central bank. It is shown that central bank credibility matters for macroeconomic stability. As the credibility increases, macroeconomic variables vary less. This generates endogenous volatility changes. Lastly, the magnitude of response of inflation to monetary policy depends on the level of credibility. This suggests that ignoring credibility changes might leads to overestimate of the cost of disinflation.

The evolving impact of labour markets on monetary policy

Objectives: The aim of this paper is to address the cycle from monetary policy becoming the main instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation to the current unexpected decline in its effectiveness. Research Design and Methods: This article analyses how preventing the risk of wage-price spirals unwinding became the main task of central banks. Such a perception of monetary policy role was a natural consequence of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and the substantial costs of disinflation of the 1980s. Then this paper highlights the causes behind the recent unexpected emergence of persistently low inflation. Among the most important causes of this were structural changes which took place also in labour markets, being the outcome of the twilight of traditional manufacturing and increasing globalisation. Findings: The structural weakening of the bargaining position labour creates situation in which the period when monetary policy was focused on preventing wage-price spirals has ended. If advanced economies are entering a long period of low inflation and low interest rates, it will necessitate a reformulation of the role that central banks play in stabilisation policies. Recommendation: This paper postulates that central banks should acquire a pivotal role in the macroprudential policy. The main argument is that the independence of central banks, which they obtained when fighting inflation, would increase the effectiveness of the macro-prudential policy. Contribution: Usually success in lowering and stabilising inflation is attributed mainly to the changes in the way in which central banks have been conducting their monetary policy since the early 1980s. This article highlights the fact that the role which was played in this process by the substantial weakening of the labour bargaining position is still underappreciated.

Estimating Sectoral Disinflation Cost in India: Some Structural VAR Evidence

This paper attempts a sectoral estimation of sacrifice ratios for India. Two Structural VAR models are estimated using quarterly data for the period 1997–98 Q1 to 2016–17 Q1. The empirical findings suggest that the real cost of disinflation policy is not negligible in India. The estimate of sacrifice ratios in terms of real GDP range from 0.16 to 0.17 depending upon the model employed. The calculation of sectoral sacrifice ratios show that all the three sectors are affected negatively and the largest impact is found in the manufacturing sector followed by the other two sectors, i.e., agriculture sector and service sector. The sacrifice ratio in the manufacturing sector is found to be 1.10 and 0.72 indicating huge negative impact of tight monetary policy. Similarly, for the agriculture sector the sacrifice ratios are 0.40 and the service sector shows sacrifice ratios of 0.36 and 0.37 respectively for different models. Further, from 10-year rolling estimation, we find that sacrifice ratios are time varying. The sacrifice ratio is declining in the last few quarters at the aggregate and sectoral levels indicating that disinflation could be less costly in recent times. However, the high disinflation cost experienced prior to the year 2015 can’t be neglected. So, it is important to take caution while interpreting the results of disinflation cost in India.

Disinflations in a model of imperfectly anchored expectations

We study disinflations under imperfect credibility of the central bank. We propose a framework to model imperfectly credible announcements and use it to study the distribution of the output cost for a given disinflation. Imperfect credibility is modeled as the extent to which agents rely on adaptive learning to form expectations. Lower credibility increases the mean, variance, and skewness of the distribution of the sacrifice ratio. When credibility is low, disinflations become very costly for adverse realizations of the shocks. But, an opportunistic disinflation, a disinflation implemented after a period of below trend inflation, can significantly lower the sacrifice ratio. With simulated data, we reinterpret the reduced form evidence in sacrifice ratio regressions. Coefficient estimates from these regressions can be misleading for policymakers considering the cost of disinflation.

How Costly is the Deliberate Disinflation in India? Estimating the Sacrifice Ratio

Methods followed in earlier studies for estimating the sacrifice ratio or the real cost of deliberate disinflation have focused only on aggregate supply side ignoring aggregate demand. The present study considers the adjustment path obtained as a locus of short run equilibria to arrive at a theoretically acceptable sacrifice ratio. The study uses quarterly data from the period between 1996-97Q1–2013-14Q4 in India and employs both the regression as well as the direct methods to estimate the ratio. The results have revealed a sacrifice ratio ranging from 1.7 to 3.8 depending on the method and the measure of inflation used. Such a magnitude of the real cost of disinflation in India, also relevant in the medium to long run, clearly contradicts the dominant view among policymakers that the trade-off, if any, is negligible. Deliberate disinflation policy needs to consider the real cost of sacrificing output and employment particularly when its magnitude is substantial.

Monetary Policy in a Markov-Switching VECM: Implications for the Cost of Disinflation in Ghana

Monetary policy assessment in Ghana has been conducted using vector auto-regression. This however, presumes stability of long run outcomes and particularly ignores monetary policy regime changes that has characterized the economy overtime. This study thus introduced the possibility of switches in the long run equilibrium in co-integrated vector auto-regression by allowing both the covariance and weighting matrix in the error-correction term to switch. The study did not find any significant difference in monetary response in the different states. However, significant difference was obtained for the cost of disinflation across states. Though, disinflation cost has declined as the Bank of Ghana shifts from monetary targeting to inflation-targeting regime, overall cost is still high. This has implication on disinflation policy given the development agenda pursue by the country.

Monetary Policy and Inclusive Growth: How Costly are Disinflations to Inclusion in Nigeria?

This paper estimates the cost of disinflation to inclusive growth in Nigeria using quarterly data for the period 1960q1 – 2015q2. Two alternative methodologies are used to estimate the size of the cost of disinflation to inclusive growth in Nigeria. The paper also estimates the effect of central bank independence on the size of this cost. It was found that the cost of disinflation to output and unemployment and, hence, to inclusive growth is small during the sample period. In the period following central bank’s independence, however, the cost of disinflation had fallen to zero. The paper, therefore, concludes that the contractionary monetary policy that disinflations necessitate have very small effects on the inclusiveness of growth in Nigeria. In fact, such costs are nearly non-existent in the last few years. One implication of this finding is that the Central Bank of Nigeria may have little to fear in terms of potential costs of disinflation to inclusive growth, especially through its effect on output and unemployment.

An Insight Regarding Economic Growth and Monetary Policy in Romania

Abstract This study introduces some aspects regarding the link between monetary policy and economic growth, through a rule well known in the literature which is named Taylor’s rule and through the concept of sacrifice ratio which encompasses the impact of the cost of disinflation on the economic growth of a country. In this paper, we rely on estimates of the growth of potential GDP of the National Bank of Romania for the period 2003-2006 while for the period 2007-2012 we rely on the estimates reported by the International Monetary Fund. Thus, we carry a deterministic exercise for computing the interest rate on the period 2003-2012 as depicted from the Taylor’s rule and we compare it with the effective monetary policy interest rate used by the National Bank of Romania. In the same time, we calculate the sacrifice ratio for the period 1997-2013 so as to be able to form an opinion regarding the cost of disinflation and its comparison with the typical estimates for larger time spans and for other countries.

Is Deflation Good or Bad? Just Mind the Inflation Gap

We explain why the macroeconomic effects of shocks to inflation of the same size, but opposite sign, are not necessarily symmetric. All in all, the costs of deflation and disinflation tend to exceed those of inflation due to the presence of constraints in the economy, namely the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, downward nominal wage rigidity and borrowing limits. When these constraints are binding, they can prevent monetary policy from closing the inflation gap, labor market from clearing and agents from deleveraging. The impact of a disinflationary shock on the tightness of these constraints depends on the cyclical and structural conditions of the economy. We argue that it would be a mistake to assume that perverse effects can arise only with actual deflation and thus that the classification of deflationary episodes into good (supply-driven) and bad ones (demand-driven) is not only incorrect, but also misleading in terms of policy implications. Empirical evidence for the euro area suggests that the three constraints have become increasingly tight recently.

Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries

This paper measures sacrifice ratios for all countries in the world over an approximately forty year time period, in addition to exploring the determinants of worldwide sacrifice ratios. We test the most commonly-cited determinants: the speed of disinflation, openness, inflation targeting, central bank independence, and political factors for both OECD and non-OECD countries. We find that the speed of disinflation is the most important determinant of OECD sacrifice ratios, but puzzlingly has no effect on non-OECD nations' disinflation costs. Instead we find evidence that greater central bank independence and more openness are associated with lower non-OECD sacrifice ratios. We also find that the ratio of government debt to GDP – a variable that is not important when it comes to OECD countries – is highly significant for non-OECD economies. Specifically, we find that higher indebtedness is associated with lower sacrifice ratios in non-OECD nations, suggesting that greater levels of debt do not lead to higher expectations of inflation. Furthermore we find evidence that the negative impact of debt on non-OECD sacrifice ratios is being driven by middle income economies.