Cost Of Revolution Research Articles

Citizenry Accountability in Autocracies

AbstractDo the citizens have a role in constraining policies in autocratic governments? Usually the political and economic literature model autocracy as if the citizens have no role in constraining leader’s behavior, but actually autocratic government are afraid of possible citizens’ revolts. In this paper we focus on contemporary China to analyze how citizens might induce an autocratic government to adopt congruent policies. Although there is no party or electoral competition, the leader fears deposition by coup d’etat of the selectorate and revolutionary threats from citizens. We build a three player political agency model to study the role of both these constraints and we show that the effectiveness of the selectorate and of revolutionary threats are crucial factors in determining the policy outcomes. In particular, we show that the citizens can effectively discipline the leader because of the revolution threat notwithstanding the selectorate size, but this may result in a failed state when the costs of revolting and the selectorate size are small. As the size of the selectorate and the costs of revolution vary dramatically across countries, our result explain why different types of autocracies arise. In particular our model and results provide a useful framework to interpret China policy in the last twenty years.

The Political and the Basic Law'sSozialstaatPrinciple—Perspectives from Constitutional Law and Theory

The welfare state aspect is among the central characteristics of German statehood as established by the constitution. For the Basic Law's drafters, it was so indispensable that they included the mandate of a welfare state in the catalogue of constitutional principles which are to have eternal validity within the constitution and which could only be dispensed with at the cost of breaching the constitution, the cost of revolution (Article 79(3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetzin German; hereinafter “GG”)). Article 79(3) GG codifies the distinction between constitution and constitutional provision made prominent by Carl Schmitt, whose constitutional doctrine of 1928 asserted that, while the constitutional legislature can amend an individual provision in the constitution, the constitution as a whole is not to be changed short of political action transcending the law, that is, a revolution. Article 79(3) GG takes up this idea, insulating certain features of the constitution from amendment. These features—outside all democratic reach and thus quasi depoliticized—include the inviolability of human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the nature of the state as a democracy, a republic, a federal state based on the rule of law, and a “social” state (Article 20(1) GG). On closer scrutiny, the principles underlying the state's structure reveal a significant difference between, on the one hand, the principles of democracy, federalism, the rule of law, and republicanism and, on the other, the principle of the welfare state. The four former features stem from long traditions in constitutional law; modern political philosophy has detailed them precisely and the Basic Law concretizes them in thorough regulations. In contrast, the political history of ideas has failed to produce a “flag-bearing” thinker for the welfare state. The establishment of the welfare state has played no significant role in constitutional history. And, on first glance, even the Basic Law seems to provide hardly any specifics as to what exactly makes up its “social” state or, in particular, what normative consequences follow from this constitutional principle. This raises the question: What actually justifies the principle of the welfare state's illustrious position among those constitutional entities endowed with highest relevance? The following discussion develops the answer: Regardless of its limited historical and theoretical traditions, the principle of theSozialstaatfinds its meaning beyond its doctrinal content in its own distinct, symbolic substance.

Rising oil prices: The cost of revolution and the course of true love

Jérôme E Roos lays out the economic and political ramifications, in the UK and globally, of high, rising and volatile oil prices, and argues for a state‐led drive to establish a stable new relationship with alternative energy technologies.

Inequality, Collective Action, and Democratization

Epic redistributive struggles between the rich and poor lie at the heart of prominent theories of economic development and the emergence of democracy (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The poor pursue democracy to secure credible redistribution away from wealthy elites; elites, fearing redistribution, but also the costs of revolution, decide whether to repress these efforts or to surrender to them. These theories, and the historical examples of working classes exacting redistributive or political concessions from elites, have been interpreted as suggesting that inequality and redistributive struggles should be central features of development and democratization. Where inequality is high, democracy should be unlikely to emerge, or to emerge and be unstable. Because elites in unequal societies are unwilling to adopt institutions that encourage growth and investment (such as institutions that protect non-elites from predation by elites), incomes should be lower as well.

Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment.

Introduction: Objectivity and Paradigms Genesis of the Castro Regime Communism Fidel-Style: Leader and Society 1959-1970 Institutions and Policy 1970-1986 Socialism on a Sugar Island The Foreign Policy of Cuba The Rectified Revolution: Continuing Political Tension Conlusions: The Costs of Revolution