Costs Of Harassment Research Articles

Polymorphic signals of harassed female odonates and the males that learn them support a novel frequency-dependent model

For mate-searching species, the learned mate recognition (LMR) hypothesis assumes that sexual harassment favours signal variation among females, which exploits the receiver ability of males. The model predicts that coevolving males have responded to the female sexual foil by learning to recognize female variants as potential mates. I translate the LMR hypothesis into the language of signal detection theory to explain its novelty as a dynamic, coevolutionary, negative frequency-dependent selection model. Due to gene–environment interactions, males cueing to the morph detected most often should generate positive but often asymmetrical, detection-dependent harassment towards females. Females are expected to sort to an ideal free distribution where harassment costs are equal. At equilibrium, morph fitness, but not necessarily morph frequency, is predicted to be equal. The LMR hypothesis is consistent with recent experimental data and the distribution of colour polymorphisms in the Odonata, predicts general conditions favouring variation in sexual signals, and provides a novel mechanism for speciation via sexual signalling.

Sperm competition

Sperm competition

The frequency and costs of harassment in southern elephant seals

Notwithstanding the important role of male harassment of females for theories of the evolution of mating systems, accurate estimates of its frequency and costs are available for only a few species. In this paper, we quantify the frequency of harassment in southern elephant seals, compare occurrences of harassment inside and outside harems, and estimate the costs of harassment in two populations at Sea Lion Island (Falkland Islands) and Punta Delgada (Valdés Peninsula). Southern elephant seal males are much larger than females, have enlarged canines, and are much more agile on land; hence, females have a small probability of escape from approaching males and may suffer intense molestation. Most males had limited access to females due to the despotic mating system, and their libido was high. Females were approached by males at high frequency, mostly when out of oestrus. The harassment level was negatively related to the ratio of breeding females to breeding males, and females breeding at the peak of the season suffered a lower level of harassment. Females of large harems were harassed less, and their likelihood of interact with secondary males was lower. The activity of harem females was less disrupted, and females in large harems had a higher proportion of resting time. Isolated females suffered more herding episodes, and were approached more frequently by secondary males. The main short-term cost of harassment was disruption of the females' activity schedule; harassment level and total active time were positively related. Suckling bouts were rarely interrupted by male harassment. Mother and pup separations caused by males interaction were rare, short-lasting, and rarely permanent. There was little effect of harassment on weanling weight, physical damage of females was rare, and there was only a slight non-significant negative relationship between harassment level during one season and the likelihood of surviving to the next.

Harassment, corruption and tax policy

This paper introduces ‘harassment’ in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers, with all possible levels of income, participate in such equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment costs as such may not affect tax revenue. However, when the decision to file tax returns is endogenized, harassment cost can affect the filing pattern and, hence, the revenue collection. We study the nature of the equilibrium under imperfect information when different types of taxpayers and auditors are introduced in the system.

Mate choice or harassment avoidance? A question of female control at the lek

Recent studies on the reproductive behavior of fallow deer, Dama dama, propose that harassment from nonterritorial males has a major influence on female movements and mate selection, leading ultimately to the evolution of lek mating in this species. In order to support this statement, one must demonstrate that female movements between lek and isolated territories, and among lek males, lead to a reduction in levels of harassment. We argue that current evidence in favor of this view is inconclusive. A quantification of the total harassment costs experienced by females in lek and isolated territories has never been made. In addition, female movements within the lek may actually lead to higher levels of disruption and harassment: The rate at which females join male territories increases with harem size (the number of females present in the territory), even though harems are disrupted increasingly with size due to a higher frequency of intrusions by nonterritorial males. Females also join male territories at a higher rate while these males are engaged in copulatory sequences, but copulatory sequences are again associated with high levels of disruption and harem instability. In the above studies it is argued that females are nonselective in their mating preferences. This assessment is based on the finding that males that adopt different reproductive strategies do not differ in their mating rates. Here mating rate is measured as the number of copulations received per female-hour. There are a number of reasons, however, why females exhibiting mating preferences might remain longer with preferred males, and so the above preference measure cannot be used to exclude the possibility that females are selective. More research is required to identify the major factors influencing patterns of mate selection and the evolution of leks in this species. We suggest a number of field tests that may help to identify these factors.

Is the Conventional View of Discount Window Borrowing Consistent with the Behavior of Weekly Reporting Banks?

Discount window borrowing by weekly reporting banks disaggregated by Federal Reserve district is used to estimate Marvin Goodfriend's (1983) model of borrowed reserves. Little evidence is found to support the argument that a bank's borrowing decision is determined by the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate and by prior bank borrowing. A weekly reporting bank has only a 2.7 percent chance of visiting the discount window during any given maintenance period. This result is consistent with the presence of considerable harassment costs imposed by the discount window officer. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Household Commodity Production and Social Harassment Costs

In a seminal article, Becker [2] suggested that consumer behavior be viewed as a process in which households produce commodities (meals, plays, and so on) by combining goods or services (food, theatre tickets, and so on) and time. Households are perceived in that model as utility-maximizing producers. In effect, Becker's model demonstrates that money prices of goods or services do not provide sufficient information to explain or predict household choice. More specifically, money prices of goods or services do not reflect the full costs of household-produced commodities because money prices exclude the costs of the household's time spent in the production of such commodities. Mincer [7] showed that, unless the costs of time are considered, the income elasticities of demand for different commodities are biased. Abbott and Ashenfelter [1] have established the theoretical conditions for household utility maximizing expenditures of income and time. Wales and Woodland [9] assumed that households maximize utility functions which include leisure and a Hicksian composite good. The budget constraint is written in terms of wage rates, the price of the composite good, nonlabor income, the total number of hours available, and the full income of the household consistent with the Becker model. Kohlhase [5] constructed simultaneous constraints in which the income and time constraints are reduced to a full income constraint under the assumption that households buy back the leisure time and commuting time of market workers at the market wage rates. And Deacon and Sonstelie [4] analyzed a natural situation in which (for a short time) motorists were faced with a choice between (a) waiting in line for gasoline or (b) not waiting and purchasing gasoline of a similar quality at a higher price. By surveying customers at one low-priced station and at two nearby high-priced stations, they were able to estimate the costs of time for people in both groups. They found that, in general, estimates of the costs of time were similar to the after-tax wages of respondents, thereby providing additional evidence that the money price does not always convey sufficient information to predict household choice.