Cosmopolitan Right Research Articles

Fichte's reappraisal of Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right

I argue that although in the Foundations of Natural Right Fichte adopts a theory of cosmopolitan right that is in a number of important respects formally identical to the one developed by Kant, he later came in The Closed Commercial State to reassess his earlier Kantian cosmopolitanism. This work can in fact be seen to identify a problem with Kant's cosmopolitanism, namely, Kant's failure to recognize the possibility of an indirect form of coercion based on unequal relations of economic dependence. I argue that Kant's failure to acknowledge such a possibility stems from his uncritical acceptance of this type of relation. Whereas Fichte's awareness of the possibility of one-sided forms of economic dependence leads him to offer a solution to the problems it raises: the severing of all commercial relations with other states. This solution is itself highly problematic, however, as I indicate with reference to Fichte's remarks on ‘natural frontiers’.

Human Rights and within Multi-Layered Systems of Constitutional Governance: Rights Cosmopolitanism and Domestic Particularism in Tension

European states are embedded in multiple and overlapping layers of constitutional governance. The same is true for the international and transnational systems of governance, such as the WTO, within which both the EU and its constituent member states are firmly embedded. It is inevitable that these different layers of governance will at times rub against each other, producing inter-layer irritation. This can take different forms, but in general often has the capacity to generate significant change, development and evolution within both national and transnational systems. Inter-layer irritation can have particular significance where the protection of fundamental rights is at issue, where tensions are often generated between and particularist approaches to rights. Cosmopolitan rights standards can be defined as legal norms generated by international or transnational processes of deliberation and embedded in transnational layers of governance. Particularist standards, in contrast, are generated within the specific constitutional order of each state and often interpreted by national courts in a manner that reflects how these rights have emerged and evolved within the particular national context in question. The open architecture of the European human rights system often allows such tensions to be resolved through a process of pluralistic and political interaction. However, there are times when sharp fault lines are uncovered, where the interaction of cosmopolitan and domestic systems generates conflict, generating inter-layer but also at times driving forward the process of legal change and development.

Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender

Cosmopolitan democracy is one of the most debated models of transnational democracy. As a result of his prominence in this field, David Held has attracted much of the criticism and approval of this position. The critique and comment aimed at cosmopolitanism in general, and Held's work in particular, has provoked cosmopolitan advocates to respond, restate and develop their arguments. However, despite its considerable merit, this debate remains largely theoretical, and little has been done in terms of studying the realisation of cosmopolitanism in real-world settings. This article contributes towards the debate concerning the possibility of its actual application by mapping the principles of cosmopolitan democracy in relation to the EU polity and the issue of gender equality. It argues that the EU articulates certain cosmopolitan-comparable principles, and by studying areas where they are clearly exhibited, such as the issue of gender, that this helps us to critically evaluate their practicability and enables a response to criticisms levelled at cosmopolitan democracy. This article addresses two specific criticisms. Firstly, in view of the justiciable qualities of EU law, and its ability to give rise to formal individual rights, it is argued that claims regarding the inherently fictitious nature of cosmopolitan rights are unfounded. Secondly, while acknowledging that civic engagement takes a principally legal mode in relation to the issue of gender, this article rejects the claim that cosmopolitan democracy neglects the political aspects of citizenship. However, cosmopolitan scholars must extend their understanding of the relation between rights and the wider aspects of citizenship engagement, if they hope to realise the vision of an active citizenry that remains central to the cosmopolitan project.

Nuclear fetishism, the fear of the ‘Islamic’ bomb and national identity in Iran

The paper's focus is the concurrence in the Islamic Republic of Iran between the state's enrichment of uranium, internationally feared as a potential Islamic atomic bomb, and the identification of the radio-active material by many Iranians as a national cultural object. In contrast to the Islamic virtues imposed by the state that had created an autarkic image of Iranians in the global context, nuclear technology offered them the opportunity to become cosmopolitan consumers of nuclear energy, a global product that also represented the ‘excellence’ of Iranian scientists’ and engineers’ competence. Instrumental in this re-invention of national identity outside the political space was a reified (fetishised) conception of the nuclear object as a utility – nuclear energy. The enhanced utilitarian use of nuclear material mystified (metamorphosed) both the oppressive relation of Iranian people with their Muslim rulers and their incongruous relation with the rest of the world. The mystifying impact of nuclear production on their national and international relations served Iranians to draw on their role as internationally recognised bourgeois agents (burghers) by subsuming (neutralising) their brutalised relation with the Muslim rulers within the instrumental relation of producers/consumers of the nuclear product. Thus, in their exclusive demand for the right to emulate the non-Iranian producers/consumers of nuclear energy as a global product, Iranians acted in their capacity as burghers. A burgher is defined here, following Hegel, as the agent of civil society whose primary concern is to pursue his/her own interest by using the needs of others as the means to satisfy his/her own. The rationality that governs the action by burghers is ‘the suitability of means to their ends’. By adopting the rationality of a burgher, Iranians abandoned their quest for citizenship. The rights of citizen, in contrast with the cosmopolitan right of burgher to emulate producers/consumers, were geared to the exercise of individual autonomy within the political space, as a domain of contested representations. The paper examines the inadequate mediation of modern institutions that has historically postponed the nationalisation of Iranian society and has delayed the emergence of the Iranian nation as a political community. Looked at from this standpoint, nuclear production offered to Iranians the opportunity to avoid a hazardous route of taking part in a political construction of Iranian identity by acting as citizens and instead draw on their fragmented bourgeois identity to define the nuclear product as ‘national’. This identification matched their Muslim rulers’ interest to represent the enriched uranium internationally as a national, as opposed to Islamic, achievement without having to face the Iranian nation as a political community. The consequence was the Iranians’ failure to deal with nuclear technology and the question of public safety both as a national and international issue which could only be addressed if Iranians had acted in their capacity as citizens.

Embodied Cosmopolitanism and the British Romantic Woman Writer

When can the term “cosmopolitan” legitimately be applied to political theories or literary texts? After surveying recent theoretical discussions of cosmopolitanism in the fields of political science, philosophy and literary studies, this essay argues for a more restrictive definition of cosmopolitanism, one that found expression in the writings of Romantic‐era British women. To explore the theoretical implications of what I am calling an “embodied cosmopolitanism,” I turn to a detailed analysis of Marianna Starke's play, The Widow of Malabar. Together with Elizabeth Inchbald's Such Things Are, Hannah Cowley's A Day in Turkey, and Charlotte Smith's late novels, these texts suggest provocative new ways to give substance to Kant's demand for global “cosmopolitan rights.”

Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism

AbstractIn this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy.

Kant’s Theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel’s Critique

Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right is widely viewed as the philosophical origin of modern cosmopolitan thought. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right, by contrast, is usually viewed as regressive and nationalistic in relation to both Kant and the cosmopolitan tradition. This paper reassesses the political and philosophical character of Hegel’s critique of Kant, Hegel’s own relation to cosmopolitan thinking, and more fleetingly some of the implications of his critique for contemporary social criticism. It is argued that Hegel’s critique was neither regressive nor nationalistic, but rather that he advanced the theory of cosmopolitan right beyond the Kantian framework of formal natural law. The main proposition is that Hegel was not only the first to recognize cosmopolitanism as a definite social form of right, relative to other forms in the modern system of right, but that his ‘scientific and objective’ approach to the issue makes a substantial contribution to restoring the severed connections between the realism of war between nations and the normativism of perpetual peace.

New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of State Sovereignty

Cosmopolitan international relations theorists envisage a process of expanding cosmopolitan democracy and global governance, in which for the first time there is the possibility of global issues being addressed on the basis of new forms of democracy, derived from the universal rights of global citizens. They suggest that, rather than focus attention on the territorially limited rights of the citizen at the level of the nation-state, more emphasis should be placed on extending democracy and human rights to the international sphere. This paper raises problems with extending the concept of rights beyond the bounds of the sovereign state, without a mechanism of making these new rights accountable to their subject. The emerging gap, between holders of cosmopolitan rights and those with duties, tends to create dependency rather than to empower. So while the new rights remain tenuous, there is a danger that the cosmopolitan framework can legitimise the abrogation of the existing rights of democracy and self-government preserved in the UN Charter framework.

Who is the Subject of Human Rights?

What is distinctive about human rights, when compared with the rights claims associated with modern citizenship, animals, or nonbiological units of conscious being (artificial intelligence)? It is suggested that each of these discourses constitutes the subject of rights differently. This article concentrates on both philosophical and psychological means of registering the unique individuality of the subject of human rights. Because human rights is predicated of all human beings, it is a universal discourse and one that Kant called “cosmopolitan right.” The subject of human rights is also the subject in its existential integrity or wholeness. This article explores tensions between the subject of human rights and the jurisdictionally limited and exclusive subject of modern citizenship, tensions that pose new demands on states with respect to international law and standards.