The breakdown of nation states in the Middle East has precipitated a regression to the fundamental tribal identity. The success of al-Qaeda and ISIS later on in mobilizing the tribes for the insurgency in Iraq was due to their ability to reach out to the correct nodes of tribal influence. But their failure was also to a great extent due to their ignoring of tribal mores and sensitivities. Regimes in the region are aware of the risks of this trend, and in some countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the leaderships are trying to strengthen the state at the expense of the tribes. Nevertheless, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya have already devolved totally into “re-tribalised” societies and Jordan and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable. The Sunni-Shiite divide is also superimposed on the tribal factor as it serves to unite tribes against a common enemy. Where borders of the nation state remain intact, they now co-exist with fuzzy areas of tribal influence with minimal governance. This trend will change the map of the region from the static quasi-Westphalian model to a dynamic map of fluctuating areas that will be semi-controlled by tribal powers, tribal alliances and “farming” out of state authority to the tribes. Economic interests will be a key driver of these coalitions. The countries of the region that will maintain their territorial integrity will deepen their dialogue with the tribes along their borders and even far beyond their borders. This trend will affect intelligence collection and analysis. Whereas in the 20th century regional studies relied heavily on country studies that described the workings of government in primarily military modernist regimes, understanding of the region in the first decades of the 21st century will call for “micro-understanding” of the working of tribal affiliations and coalitions and modes of intelligence collection that were typical of the 19th Century and relied on cultural and religious intelligence that can only be gleaned through direct contact and HUMINT.