Corporate Geography Research Articles

Unshackling Corporate Geography

The analysis of corporate spatial behavior appears to benefit from recognizing that the firm is a bundle of many different activities. They may be located together prompting us to explicitly take account of firm-specific internal relationships or separately offering new possibilities for applying traditional location theory. Multinational corporations are especially well-poised to exploit location advantages, also as they vary over time for different activities. Dynamic adjustment as to where and to what extent activities are performed is becoming increasingly practicable. This largely conceptual argument is illustrated by specific examples from the use of data communications.

Unshackling Corporate Geography

Unshackling Corporate Geography

A REQUIEM FOR CORPORATE GEOGRAPHY: New directions in industrial organization, the production of place and the uneven development

The grand claims once made for the geography of enterprise have faded for lack of supporting evidence and clear theoretical separation of the casual powers of large firms from those of capitalist d...

A Requiem for Corporate Geography: New Directions in Industrial Organization, the Production of Place and the Uneven Development

A Requiem for Corporate Geography: New Directions in Industrial Organization, the Production of Place and the Uneven Development

Corporate geography

Corporate geography

State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation

THIS spring the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act' impose a general fiduciary duty on those who control a corporation to act fairly toward minority interests.2 This decision, rejecting attempts to expand federal authority over internal corporate affairs through interpretation and thereby limiting the federal role to preventing fraud in securities transactions, may well increase the demands for major federal regulatory legislation governing the shareholdercorporation relationship. It is almost universally the opinion of academic commentators that state corporation codes do not impose sufficiently stringent controls on corporate management and are lax in protecting shareholders. Only federal intervention, it is said, can correct this sorry situation. This article will test the intellectual underpinnings of the conventional wisdom and of the rather venerable proposals calling for the federal regulation of the governance of corporations3 against an economic theory of corporate function and control. It will conclude both that state corporate legal systems are