Corinthian War Research Articles

Wastias: the lion of Thebes

AbstractThis article offers the first comprehensive presentation of a monumental funerary lion found approximately 60 years ago in Thebes. Remarkably, the stone lion’s breast is inscribed with the name of the deceased, Ϝαστίας. On numismatic, epigraphic and historical grounds, I identify this Wastias as the homonymous magistrate appearing on staters of the Boiotian koinon in ca. 400 BC, but also as Astias, one of the leading Laconizing Theban politicians on the eve of the Corinthian War (Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 20.1–2). Wastias’ death can be very plausibly placed in 395 BC, the year of the battle of Haliartos. The proposed association is supported by a stylistic analysis of the monument, which thus becomes one of the best-dated sculpted lions of the Classical period. My contextual analysis of the monument reaffirms the notoriously oligarchic orientation of Theban politics. It also prompts a re-examination of other funerary lions, most notably its regional successor in the lion of Chaironeia. It concludes with a reflection on the nature of individual versus collective commemorative practices.

Ritual and Revolution

This article reexamines the vexed issue of the political unification of Corinth and Argos during the Corinthian war. It proposes that the discussion can be advanced by contextualizing the temporary union within both the immediate revolutionary setting at the Corinthian Eukleia festival and the wider background of Argive expansionism. Three principal arguments are made. 1) The revolutionary dynamic of the festival is best viewed as a means of mobilizing the pro-Argive faction and the Corinthian dēmos around the symbolism of the Eukleia cult. 2) Understanding the ideological apparatus of the revolutionary party sheds light on its participants, the chronology, and the nature of the union, which is best classified as a sympoliteia effected shortly after the stasis. 3) This reconstruction is supported by the broader efforts of the Argives to create a regional polity through sympoliteiai, which they furthered by supporting democratic factions and appealing to cultic and ethnic bonds in the greater Argolid.

Die Schule Konons: Karrieren athenischer Feldherren am Beginn des 4. Jahrhunderts


 
 
 
 This paper explores the early careers of both Chabrias and Iphicrates in an attempt to demonstrate some striking similarities in their conduct during the Corinthian War. Taking into account their role in military operations as well as their relationship to Conon and their social origins, it will become apparent that they did not hold any Athenian office over the course of this conflict. Both were mercenary leaders whose military successes subsequently allowed them to advance to the highest echelons of Athenian society.
 
 
 

The funeral oration: a mean of educating the younger generations in the classical city

In this paper, I set out to analyse the use of funeral oration in ancient cities as an educational strategy for dealing with the pain of death. In general, the forms of mourning present in a culture play a key part in the formation of future citizens: they contribute to shaping both collective and individual identity, offering shared meanings about major life events. The epitaphios logos helped both the individual and the community to overcome the fear of death, by “finding in the deeds of the dead a means of educating the living”, as Lysias observed in his Oration for the Fallen in the Corinthian War. I therefore examine literary texts from the classical era that illustrate the educational function of funeral orations, briefly comparing them with another educational tool for addressing bereavement, the tragedy.

‘Why 386 BC?’ Lost Empire, Old Tragedy and Reperformance in the Era of the Corinthian War

Abstract:386 BC is considered to be one of the most important dates in the history of Greek theater: that year

Rhodes during the Corinthian War: from strategic naval base to endemic stasis

The island of Rhodes was a naval base of great strategic interest for the Greek states fighting for hegemony, especially Athens and Sparta in the Classical period. This situation influenced the Rhodian civic community, where there were several episodes of stasis between democrats and oligarchs, supported respectively by Athenians and Spartans. In this paper we focus on one of these episodes, in the framework of the so-called Corinthian War (395-386 B.C.), on the development and implications of which our two main sources (Xenophon and Diodorus of Sicily) disagree.

The Problem with Dexileos: Heroic and Other Nudities in Greek Art

A study of the well-known Dexileos stele, set above a cenotaph or heroon built for a young horseman killed in the Corinthian War in 394/3 B.C.E., leads to an examination of the meaning and function of nudity in archaic and classical Greek art. Dexileos' clothing and his fallen enemy's nakedness defy traditional expectations and so undermine the notion of nudity, a familiar but flawed explanation for the naked state of ideal males in Greek art. Rather than dispense with the concept of heroic nudity completely, we should recognize that it is just one among a number of different nudities in Greek art with a number of different roles, some of them contradictory. These include a nudity of differentiation, a nudity of youth, democratic nudity, a nudity of status or class, and a nudity of vulnerability and defeat (pathetic nudity). As in the art of other ancient cultures, nudity is a costume whose significance is determined by context and subject rather than by abstract principle.

<i>Mάχη κρατειν</i> en la guerra de Corinto: las batallas hoplíticas de Nemea y Coronea (394 A.C.)

In this paper we offer a reconstruction and an analysis of the geopolitical framework, founded in the whole literary sources and not only in the contemporary but biased account of Xenophon’s Hellenica , of two of the most conspicuous pitched battles of the ancient Greek world, namely those of Nemea and Coroneia, both of them were fighted in 394 B. C., during the so-called Corinthian War, and both of them are illustrative and paradigmatic of what a clash between two hoplite phalanxes means.

Cavalry identity and democratic ideology in early fourth-century Athens

In 395 BC, after just under a decade of (nominal) peace between Athens and Sparta, the Corinthian War broke out, and, for the first time since the end of the Peloponnesian War, forces of Athenian cavalry were despatched to fight on behalf of their own city. The surviving historical narratives of the events at Haliartus in that year, and at Corinth and Coronea the next, are often incomplete, inconsistent, or both; the detail of what contribution – if any – was made by the cavalry to the campaign is no exception to that pattern. My aim in what follows, however, is not to attempt to reach the truth of what really happened in those engagements, but rather to look at a small group of material produced by and about members of the cavalry forces involved in the campaign, and to explore some of the ways in which the military exploits of this stereotypically rich and élite section of Athenian society are represented in the city – especially in contexts with particularly democratic associations. In doing so, I want to investigate the idea that Athenian attitudes to the cavalry undergo a significant, and hostile, shift at the end of the Peloponnesian War: the claim, that is, that the cavalry had always been a distinct group in Athens, but, in the 390s, that distinction comes in the form of infamy rather than fame. But I also hope to demonstrate the necessity of adopting a more nuanced approach to the study of the formation of these (positive or negative) attitudes: the image of the cavalry is shaped by the views of those outside that class, but also by the cavalry themselves; moreover, the cavalry are not necessarily simply reactive in their self-presentation, but can be allowed a more proactive role in the shaping of their own self-image.

"Presbeis Autokratores": Andocides' "De Pace"

ANDOCIDES' DE PACE MARKS an interlude of diplomacy towards the end of the first decade of the fourth century, interrupting briefly the course of the Corinthian War. Didymus cites Philochorus for the condemnation of Andocides and the other ambassadors in the archonship of Philocles, that is, the Attic year 392/1 (FGrHist 328 F 149a).1 In the De pace, Andocides urges the Athenian assembly to accept the terms proposed at a peace conference at Sparta, at which he himself had been present as a member of the Athenian embassy.2 We learn from Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 149a), De-

Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy, 387/6 B. C.

AT SARDIS IN AUTUMN 387 TIRIBAZUS, the satrap of Lydia, read to assembled representatives of numerous Greek states edict issued by the Persian king, Artaxerxes II. The terms of the edict were to form the basis of the of 386, a settlement that terminated the Corinthian War on the mainland, asserted a principle of autonomy in Greek interstate relations, and affirmed Persian authority over various Greek states outside mainland Greece. According to the version of the edict preserved by Xenophon, Artaxerxes insisted on the recognition of Persian sovereignty not only over the cities of Asia Minor, but also over the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus (Hell. 5.1.31). The Persian claim to the tiny island of Clazomenae has never been adequately explained, and the coupling of Clazomenae and the great island of Cyprus certainly appears to produce what one scholar has called an oddly assorted pair.' Events following the promulgation of the edict of 387 and the ratification of the King's Peace early in 386 may point to the political and military situation in the eastern Mediterranean in late 387 which gave Clazomenae such apparent importance to Persia and made necessary Artaxerxes' specific claim to Clazomenae in the edict of Sardis.

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War

PREFACEA Spartan admiral dealt the deathblow to Athens and her empirenat the battle of Aegospotami in 405 b .c ., and in the wake of Athens'nsurrender Sparta regulated affairs throughout the Greek world.nBut the era that opened with one Spartan victory and closed withnanother brought more bitterness and enmity than peace or happinessnto victors and vanquished alike. This book is concerned withnthe changes in the political structure of the Greek world, the challengesnand opportunities produced by the fall of Athens, and thenresponses to them, in the early fourth century.During my research on the Corinthian War, I became convincednthat an examination of the years between the battle of Aegospotaminand the Peace of Antalcidas would provide a key to the understandingnof the entire fourth century. Victor Ehrenberg and othernscholars have recently recognized the importance of this period,nbut while particular questions have been discussed in articles andnmonographs, no comprehensive study of the crucial decades fromn405 to 386 exists.1 The focus of this book is on questions of statecraft,nof politics and diplomacy, for these lay at the heart of thenproblems the Greek world faced after the defeat of Athens. Socialnand economic topics are also important in any attempt to understandnpolitical history, as are military events, particularly in thenCorinthian War. These have necessarily claimed much of my attention.nI have followed a narrative format, while analyzing both historicalnand historiographical questions. For the historian of thenearly fourth century, the use of sources raises such difficulties thatnthis book is necessarily an essay in historiography as well as anninvestigation of the period under consideration.It is a pleasant task to convey my gratitude to those who havenhelped me, in one way or another, to write this book. First andnforemost, I owe a larger debt than I can express to Donald Kagan,nwho not only suggested this topic to me and did much to bring it tonfruition but also has been a constant source of inspiration, throughnhis teaching, his scholarship, and his enthusiastic interest in mynwork. To Brian Tierney and Gordon M. Kirkwood, who read annearly draft of the manuscript and gave me much helpful advice,nboth general and specific, I record my thanks. My colleagues at thenUniversity of Chicago, Karl J. Weintraub and Eric Cochrane, tooknan interest in my work and provided valuable advice at an earliernstage of the book, and two graduate students there, Robert J. Bergnand Michael McKillip, not only read the manuscript with care andnattention but also demonstrated the progress of their studies bynoffering valuable insights and calling my attention to matters I hadnoverlooked. I owe a special debt to I. A. F. Bruce, S. Perlman, andnH. D. Westlake, who read the manuscript carefully and criticallynand shared their special knowledge of the subject with me. Theirndetailed comments saved me from many an error or embarrassingnstatement, provided helpful references to literature I had overlooked,nand forced me to clarify my thinking on some points. AlthoughnI may not always have taken their advice, the book is thenbetter for it nonetheless. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their contributions,nboth in their publications and in their comments, to thisnbook. n

(C. D.) Hamilton Sparta's bitter victories: politics and diplomacy in the Corinthian War. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1979. Pp. 346, 2 maps. £12.25.

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Sparta's Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. Charles D. Hamilton

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsSparta's Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. Charles D. Hamilton Lawrence A. TritleLawrence A. Tritle Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Classical Philology Volume 76, Number 3Jul., 1981 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/366645 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1981 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War

Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War

Mystery Site on Mount Lutraki

During the Corinthian War Agesilaos, after capturing the port of Lechaion in 391 B.c., returned to Corinth the following spring. He found the Corinthians and Argives, who had formed a defensive union, on the point of celebrating the Isthmian Games. When the Spartans approached, the celebrants decamped, whereupon Agesilaos bivouacked in the sacred enclosure, sacrificed to Poseidon on his own account, and waited until the pro-Spartan Corinthian exiles had done the same. On the king's departure the Corinthians and Argives returned and celebrated the games all over again.

The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War

The causes and the outbreak of the Corinthian war, as well as the events immediately preceding it, have often been discussed by modern historians. Since the Corinthian war is the first attempt at achieving a new settlement in Greece after the Peloponnesian war and since it brought about new political alliances and the revival of old imperial rivalries, it is not only an episode in the continual warfare among the Greek states, but may also be regarded as a key to the understanding of a part, at least, of the pattern of Greek history in the fourth century B.C.

The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Outbreak of the ‘Corinthian War’

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Heracleia Trachinia

In a past number of this journal Mr. E. Harrison has raised an interesting problem in connexion with the Corinthian War. According to Diodorus, the fortress of Heracleia in Trachis passed out of the hands of Sparta into those of Thebes and her allies in the spring campaign of 394 B.C. Yet in the summer of that year the Spartan king Agesilaus made his way through the adjacent pass of Thermopylae without let or hindrance. Since it is hardly credible that the Thebans should have let Agesilaus through of set purpose, the question arises whether Diodorus can be right in asserting that Heracleia had already been lost to Sparta at the time of Agesilaus' passage.