Core Payoffs Research Articles

The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics

In large cooperative games core payoffs can be decomposed as a linear function on players' attributes which we call a ‘hedonic payoff’, provided that the worth of each coalition depends only on the sum of its members' attributes and payoffs are superadditive in attributes. If two large finite games weight a particular attribute differently, then the hedonic payoff to that attribute is larger (no smaller) in the game that gives it less weight. The hedonic payoff can be interpreted as a competitive price function e.g. an anonymous wage function in coalition production economies and an anonymous system of admissions prices in club economies.

Concurrence et biens publics

I discuss the extent to which the theory of local public goods and clubs is an extension of competitive theory. To do this I reinterpret efficiency results in the literature as arising from optimization against a complete price system. For clubs I give a framework to unify club economies with anonymous and nonanonymous crowding. Competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the equal-treatment core, and core payoffs satisfy a monotonicity property: An increase in the number of one type of player will reduce their core payoff. When the partition of the population is constrained by fixed geographic boundaries, efficiency is second-best. A complete price system can be used to describe capitalization, and optimization relative to this price system leads to second-best efficiency. For both branches of the literature I offer criticisms of the price systems and equilibrium concepts.