Core Of Consciousness Research Articles

Psychotic Arousal and the Psychopathology of Acute Schizophrenia: An Exploratory Study of the Experiential Emotional State in Acute Psychosis.

Background: Increasing research data suggest that the dysfunction of emotional brain systems may be an important contributor to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. However, contemporary psychopathology consistently underestimates the role of emotions in the phenomenology of the disease. Psychotic arousal (PA) is a conceptually defined psychopathological construct aiming to portray the experiential emotional state of acute psychosis. The concept provides an explanatory model for the emergence of psychosis, and the formation and maintenance of delusions based on neurobiological models on the formation of core consciousness and subjectivity. This is the first exploratory study of the major assumptions, endorsed in the project summarized as follows: (1) psychotic arousal is a discrete state, eligible for investigation; (2) abnormal experiential feelings are an integral part of this state; and (3) the state is responsive to antipsychotic intervention during the first weeks of treatment. Methods: We developed the Psychotic Arousal Scale (PAS) accordingly, explored its first psychometric properties and tested its relation to other psychopathological measures. Fifty-five acute schizophrenia patients were evaluated with the PAS, the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, the Brown Assessment of Beliefs Scale, the Hamilton Anxiety Scale, and the Calgary Depression Scale. Cronbach α coefficients, t-test analysis, correlations and mixed linear regression models were applied for testing the internal reliability of the scale, associations between parameters and sensitivity to change in three time periods during therapeutic intervention. Results: The results of the study support that (PA) is eligible for investigation as a discrete psychopathological state. Abnormal experiential feelings are an integral part of this state, presenting high affinity with other affective measures; their degree of severity relates to the delusions' conviction and are amenable to antipsychotics early in treatment during the acute psychotic episode. Conclusions: The findings of this exploratory study are connotative of the presence of an emotional arousal permeated by abnormal experiential feelings during acute psychosis, largely overlooked by contemporary psychopathology.

Sports and Social Interaction: Sports Experiences and Attitudes of the Urban Running Community.

Social change and development influence the motivational factors of people's sports participation, exposing the need for socialization and interaction. The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction pattern of the urban running community and the behavior pattern of runners with the help of social interaction theory, and to explore the inner connection between their community movement and social interaction. Ten senior members of marathon urban running societies were selected to conduct two rounds of in-depth interviews which were analyzed using qualitative thematic analysis to understand the sports participation experiences and social interactions of running society members. The study found that the whole interaction process of running groups is accomplished through three aspects: examination of self, adjustment with reference to others, and a sense of group belonging as the core consciousness. On the other hand, the social attributes of running groups can advance the personalization process of runners in society, which is mainly characterized by self-presentation and external constraints, self-requirement and group constraints, intergroup interaction and group identity reorganization. In addition, the unique community culture, standardized group organization and harmonious activity atmosphere will stimulate runners' interest in running, strengthen community communication and establish stable community relations, etc., which in turn will bring about continuous interactive behaviors.

Parsi Consciousness in Rohinton Mistry’s Fiction

Rohinton Mistry is one of the most celebrated new wave fiction writers of Indian writing in English. Mistry is a well-known name for his heritage fiction and Parsi consciousness. As being a Parsi, Mistry seems to be more concerned with his community and its diminishing numbers like their symbol bird vultures. Parsi is one of the most educated communities all around the world and famous for their sense of charities yet with each passing year this one of the oldest religious communities is facing the threat of extinction; and this threat put each and every Parsi writers on their toes to preserve their culture through their writings, and the fiction of Rohinton Mistry is also no exception to this thought. Mistry tried his level best to put Parsi life as it is with their core consciousness and dilemmas on paper.

Will We Ever Have Conscious Machines?

The question of whether artificial beings or machines could become self-aware or conscious has been a philosophical question for centuries. The main problem is that self-awareness cannot be observed from an outside perspective and the distinction of being really self-aware or merely a clever imitation cannot be answered without access to knowledge about the mechanism's inner workings. We investigate common machine learning approaches with respect to their potential ability to become self-aware. We realize that many important algorithmic steps toward machines with a core consciousness have already been taken.

Ghost in the AI Machine

When will artificial intelligence metamorphose into real intelligence? Conceptually this question has been around since the beginning of time. Creating a machine or automaton that replicates human feelings and behaviour in a convincing way is not unique and can be correlated to the primeval and evolutionary process of human transfiguration. Can machines posses a soul? It is said that rationality stems from emotion and emotion stems from bodily senses. Will machines ever be fully capable of exhibiting rational responses? According to Aristotle and Plato only man has faculty of reason and that consciousness is the hylomorphic form (consisting of matter and form) for a viable organism. We are now questioning whether objects created in AI space can indeed have an independent realm of existence from the physical world like Descartes “immortal souls”? AI occupies a metaphysical plane which is scaleable beyond the capacity of human intelligence. AI is a manifestation of cognitive form that has the ability to learn and solve problems. Within this realm, there is a fluidic movement from artificial intelligencia to intelligencia in it’s most archaic form. Only at the point at which the mind is sentient can it exhibit a conscious experience. The very challenge within AI is making or rather allowing machines to reach a plane of consciousness. Raymond Kurzweil prophesied that singularity is near, that computationalism has a non-representational state and that the qualia is a vision of technological omnipotence. AI has the freedom to be everywhere, sharing parallels to God. Our limitless faith in science according to Joel Moses has brought us to this technological point in the intelligibility of mental causation. The study of human perception, actions and thinking draws parallels in the computational and human psyche. We can draw our attention on the neuro-scientific principles through interdependencies of mind and matter as told by Buddha in the now modern day teachings of mindfulness. The mind is indeed a changing stream of perception, volition, consciousness and material form. The creation of a mind stream is the very challenge of AI and we are getting closer to this nirvanistic state. The mind-body relationship as created by Gilbert Ryle and epitomised by Arthur Koestler has become a manifestation within computational artificial intelligence. His very principles of a dualistic inner world is now becoming realised through the use of technology. We are creating a ghost in the machine that lives in harmony with embodiments in a physicality and non-physicality regime. The sensory connections within AI are no longer protozoa. They are a force that is growing at a phenomenal pace to one day touch the very face of man kinds limitations in cognition and traverse far beyond. The error of Descartes is pronounced in this cognitive state, questioning the very existence of a viscera or gut feeling. AI’s synthesis of man and machine lies within the upper echelons of conscious hierarchy according to the teachings of Damasio: the “somatic marker” allows it to detect and record within the protoself. It receives messages from the protoself and becomes aware of feelings from internal and external changes in core consciousness. And then draws upon the use of physical memory and cognitive referencing through the past for extended levels of consciousness. The sentience of AI is the very challenge that faces us all. For robotocists and AI pragmatists this is an encapsulation of being. i.e. mind body = software hardware or where a mind-body interaction between World 1 and World 2, action 1 (in World 1) => action 2 (in World 2). A symbiosis that is truly unique and has a level of interconnectivity that is profound. Our Turing completeness in this Chinese room is John Searle’s greatest agenda: i.e. look inside the computer and find where the mind might be? Will the AI objects that we create eventually ask the question: “who am I?”, exhibit attention to empathy?, turn to solitude as an antidote to loneliness? adapt to their changing needs through the power of belief? and face impermanence in the science of wisdom? Will our AI counterparts be truly happy in a co-existential state with mankind? in the words of Neil Gernshenfeld: “when machines start to think and dream”, we will be entering a new dimension in state metaphysical and abstraction. Machines will no longer be machines, but they will become an emotional creation with a locus of free will, like humans are an apotheosis of emotional creation with a soul and a conscience.

Affective core consciousness and the instroke

Solms and Panksepp have revolutionised concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness. Consciousness is generated by the id, in the brainstem, arises endogenously and is affective. Subjectivity is not corticocentric but located in the upper brainstem. Cortical consciousness is built upon this subjectivity and could not exist without brainstem consciousness. But the reverse is possible. The classical body representation in the cortex is an object representation located in brain areas that create all representations but an internal subjective body exists in the brainstem as the subject of perception. The author reviews 35 years of working with the instroke of the pulsation, which leads to two further developments: the endo self-state and the understanding that the relationship with the self is the most primary relationship. Solms and Panksepp’s work supports both developments grounding these in the functioning of a brainstem subjectivity. In addition, there is encouragement for Reich’s model of the importance of the body, the vegetative system and working with primary emotions.

A conjecture on the nature and evolution of consciousness

The profound importance of consciousness in everyday life suggests that it is a natural and necessary outgrowth of our biological heritage. In this paper we offer a conjecture that consciousness is a deep property of biological life itself. We propose a specific model of how a form of core consciousness could be present in all life forms, and subsequently how each species could create a unique form of consciousness from that common core. We formulate the first consideration as the core consciousness conjecture, and the extension to all animals as the extended core consciousness conjecture.

Dynamical Unstable Processes in the Brain: A Biologically Inspired Communication Mechanism from “Unconscious” to “Conscious” Actors

The specific aim of this article is to illustrate a possible model to explain and better define in future, the emergence of a conscience like ability from the normal brain operations. We consider the normal behavior of the brain to be highly dynamic and use the chaos theory to formalize it. The emergence mechanism is explained in terms of the synchronization and filtering capabilities of the single computational units (from single neurons to specific brain regions). To obtain such results we suggest the use of the filtering operation as a read/write operation that uses the unstable dynamics as a distributed processing and memorization device. The main focus of this article, though, is only on the read operation. These mechanisms provides the basic building block to go from an unconscious, purely biological and physical, behavior to a pre-conscious (“core consciousness”) one in which the single elements of the conscious perception can be altered according to a specific target that can violate the underlying biological/physical laws. In other words, it is possible to define the emergence of the basic building block of the conscious behavior (qualia?): that is the simultaneous presence of the elements from different perceptual systems (vision, tact, smell etc.). These lists of simultaneously present elements, that changes in time according to the interaction with the external world, form the lists of elements to be brought in a Global Workspace Theory based system.

Formal Analysis of Dynamics within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation

Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation model to perform simulations. This specification provides a logical formalisation at the lowest aggregation level of the basic mechanisms underlying a process. In addition, dynamic properties at a higher aggregation level that may emerge from the mechanisms specified by the lower level properties, can be specified. Software tools are available to support specification, and to automatically check such higher level properties against the lower level properties and against generated simulation traces. As an illustration, three case studies are discussed showing successful applications of the approach to formalise and analyse, among others, Clark’s theory on extended mind, Damasio’s theory on core consciousness, and Dennett’s perspective on intertemporal decision making and altruism.

The Rosetta Stone of the Human Mind: Three Languages to Integrate Neurobiology and Psychology

Back to table of contents Previous article BOOK-REVIEWFull AccessThe Rosetta Stone of the Human Mind: Three Languages to Integrate Neurobiology and PsychologyJacob Kean Ph.D.Jacob Kean Ph.D.Search for more papers by this authorPublished Online:1 Jul 2008https://doi.org/10.1176/jnp.2008.20.3.381AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail Dr. Sanguineti writes in his introduction to The Rosetta Stone of the Human Mind: Three Languages to Integrate Neurobiology and Psychology that, “…this book has to be taken for what it really is: an admittedly naive exercise in the integration of the different approaches used to probe the mystery of the mind” (p. xxiii). Put less humbly, the book is a cogent set of working papers that synthesize physics and mathematics, neurobiology and psychology as each relates to understanding the concepts such as consciousness, the unconscious, knowledge representation, and emotion. The book includes thirteen chapters organized into three sections. The first section, “Learning the Languages,” reviews the attempts over the course of humanity to understand the mind and the human subject. It includes a brief primer on three current perspectives on these issues: the works of Alwyn Scott (nonlinear dynamics), Antonio Damasio (neurology), and Gerald Edelman (neurobiology). These three perspectives on the mind are continuing threads through the second section, “Seeking the Understanding,” and the third section, “Applying the Knowledge,” which considers clinical practice and different aspects of culture. Take as an example Chapter 5, “Consciousness,” which compares and contrasts the perspectives of the three “languages” around this phenomenon. Dr. Sanguineti bootstraps from the different perspectives to issues that arise from the synthesis, such as: “…most of the ‘real’ evidence in support of core consciousness and primary consciousness [from Damasio] stems from neuropathology” (p. 52), and “…whether consciousness is an either-or phenomenon that is implied in Edelman and Tononi’s model, a condition that leaves no space for such ambiguous states as dreams” (p. 55). By leveraging the different perspectives, Dr. Sanguineti invites science to approach greater clarity on these complex issues.Among the most powerful demonstrations of this position is a retelling of the myth of Psyche as an illustration, “…which represents the creative expression of inner mental states in ways that are otherwise equaled by modern, rationalistic thinking” (p. 27). Against this backdrop, Dr. Sanguineti demonstrates the inadequacy of objective science in capturing inherently subjective concepts such as ego, self, and consciousness. This call for a redirection of the science to subjective mental phenomena is a provocative suggestion. However, the gold in the book is the honest attempt, evidenced in part by the significant number of footnotes, to synthesize complex and seemingly disparate ideas.Although the writing is clear and definitions are frequent, the inherent complexity of material such as consciousness, the self and ego, and nonlinear dynamics assume a base of knowledge in at least one of the scientific “languages” Dr. Sanguineti discusses. Those with requisite knowledge will find the text as a good starting point to explore issues; others will find it as a way to acquaint themselves with related material in another discipline. The incredible breadth of material covered in the book is akin to a lively graduate seminar and, as such, may be of interest to scholars and clinicians alike. The clinical application of the book is indirect: Dr. Sanguineti’s illustration of the dual value of psychopharmacology (objective) and psychotherapy (subjective) is likely not lost on any good clinician. Nonetheless, Dr. Sanguineti’s adroit synthesis forces reflection on science and therapy of the human psyche in a way that is widely accessible and, for that reason, fills a void that exists in many current discussions of these issues. FiguresReferencesCited byDetailsCited ByNone Volume 20Issue 3 Summer, 2008Pages 381-381 Metrics PDF download History Published online 1 July 2008 Published in print 1 July 2008

Formalisation of Damasio’s theory of emotion, feeling and core consciousness

This paper contributes an analysis and formalisation of Damasio’s theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘feeling a feeling’ (or core consciousness). In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of relevant notions of representation used by Damasio. As part of this analysis, specifications of representation relations have been verified and confirmed against the simulation model.

Moral Physiology, Ethical Prototypes, and the Denaturing of Sense in Shakespearean Tragedy

Shakespearean tragedy explores patterns of feeling and thought that lock characters into asocial consistencies, preventing affective intuitions from modifying self-understanding and judgment in the ways that both early modern moral physiology, as popularized by Erasmus, and current neuroscience suggest ethical sense and practical reasoning require. Blocking "dialogue" between body and discourse, such consistencies induce characters to lapse into what Wilma Bucci describes as "dissociation": either bodily experience disconnects from symbolic representation, or an "emotional schema" activated in "core consciousness," cannot be integrated into "extended consciousness." In Julius Caesar, Brutus's Stoic deprecation of the emotions prevents him from appreciating how embodiment opens memory to affective, prototypic imagery in ways that will guide how the ethical significance of Caesar's body will be grasped' in Hamlet, nature revenges itself upon the dissociation of cognition, and thus identity, from somatic ethical responsiveness that the "rottenness" of the new order of Denmark seeks to effect.

Strengthening Healthy Resistance and Courage in Children: A Gender‐Based Strategy for Preventing Youth Violence

Beginning with the distinction between core consciousness or a core sense of self and a self that is wedded to a story about itself, this paper suggests that we have collectively been wedded to a false story about ourselves, a story that the core self resists. The gender disparity with respect to times in development when children's resilience is at heightened risk highlights the costs of an initiation that occurs for boys in early childhood and for girls at adolescence. Because of this difference in the timing, girls can become informants about a process of psychic splitting and dissociation that impedes the relational capacities of children and opens the way to violence. The articulateness of girls' resistance to losses that are psychologically and socially consequential illuminates a resistance in boys that may otherwise be overlooked. Evidence drawn from studies of girls' development leads to the suggestion that by joining a healthy resistance in children, we can act to prevent youth violence. The paper ends with a case study of a suicidal adolescent girl to illustrate how a relational framework shifts the interpretation of violent behavior and informs a strategy of response.

One brain, two selves

Having a sense of self is an explicit and high-level functional specialization of the human brain. The anatomical localization of self-awareness and the brain mechanisms involved in consciousness were investigated by functional neuroimaging different emotional mental states of core consciousness in patients with Multiple Personality Disorder (i.e., Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)). We demonstrate specific changes in localized brain activity consistent with their ability to generate at least two distinct mental states of self-awareness, each with its own access to autobiographical trauma-related memory. Our findings reveal the existence of different regional cerebral blood flow patterns for different senses of self. We present evidence for the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior associative cortices to have an integral role in conscious experience.

Relationships between olfactory discrimination and head injury severity

The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between brain injury severity and scores on both an olfactory identification test and on many widely used neuropsychological tests in 367 patients with head injuries of varying levels of severity. It was hypothesized that valid olfactory test scores would correlate highly with injury severity because both the olfactory nerves and the primary olfactory cortices are especially vulnerable to damage in closed head injury. After removing data of doubtful validity from cases failing effort tests, olfactory test scores were related to Glasgow Coma Scale scores (GCS), post-traumatic amnesia and radiological abnormalities more strongly than any of the neuropsychological test scores. Based on the assumption that post-traumatic amnesia is caused by a different mechanism than loss of core consciousness, it was also predicted that there would be no cases with a GCS less than 13 and with no post-traumatic amnesia. As predicted, there were no cases in this group. The results support previous studies showing greater olfactory impairment with increased severity of head injury.

Homicides with Partial Limbic Seizures: Is Chemical Seizure Kindling the Culprit?

Recreational intermittent, subthreshold amounts of alcohol and/or drugs might evoke chemical kindling of nonconvulsive, simple partial seizures in the limbic system, with secondary, brief, prefrontal lobe dysfunctioning; preserved core consciousness; and memory for the bizarre, out-of-character, motiveless, unplanned homicidal acts performed during a fleeting psychosis. Such acts persisted for 2 to l0 minutes despite forceful external interruption in three single, white male loners. In contrast, five nonusers, with otherwise similar symptomatology, aborted their homicidal attacks on external interruption, in a previously proposed syndrome with only experiential kindling with memory revival of past hurts in limbic psychotic trigger reaction. Thus, this article hypothesizes that either chemical kindling alone or as a superimposition on experiential kindling might occur in the form of unusual persistence or enhancement of partial seizures.

Consciousness and the brainstem

In the first part of this article we summarize a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses aimed at accounting for consciousness in neurobiological terms. The basic form of consciousness, core consciousness is placed in the context of life regulation; it is seen as yet another level of biological processing aimed at ensuring the homeostatic balance of a living organism; and the representation of the current organism state within somato-sensing structures is seen as critical to its development. Core consciousness is conceived as the imaged relationship of the interaction between an object and the changed organism state it causes. In the second part of the article we discuss the functional neuroanatomy of nuclei in the brainstem reticular formation because they constitute the basic set of somato-sensing structures necessary for core consciousness and its core self to emerge. The close relationship between the mechanisms underlying cortical activation and the bioregulatory mechanisms outlined here is entirely compatible with the classical idea that the reticular formation modulates the electrophysiological activity of the cerebral cortex. However, in the perspective presented here, that modulation is placed in the setting of the organism's homeostatic regulation.

The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Book ReviewFull AccessThe Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of ConsciousnessHoracio Fabrega Jr., M.D.Horacio Fabrega Jr.Search for more papers by this author, M.D.Published Online:1 Dec 2000https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.51.12.1579AboutSectionsView EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail Professor Damasio (1), a distinguished neurologist and author of the highly acclaimed Descartes' Error, has written an additional masterpiece this time focusing on consciousness. The distinctive characteristics of his style are displayed perhaps even more marvelously here. His prose is fresh, exciting, penetrating, and extraordinarily clear. Damasio's engaging and informal way of sharing with the reader how he has come to learn to untangle intricate links between the mind and brain and his presentation of this information in a narrative that flows smoothly and manages always to illuminate, engage, and excite are hallmarks of his literary style, which is displayed here in surpassing brilliance.This book does not focus on psychiatric problems per se. However, it covers a central topic for all professionals engaged in the enterprise of assessing, understanding, and healing problems associated with how persons feel, think, and experience their world. It is the neural basis of consciousness that commands the author's attention: how the brain is able to assemble images of the outside world and, in conjunction with this awareness of the existence of objects and happenings in the world, also to "know" that these images and patterns are being viewed by and are happening to, and indeed belong to, the self. Hence his book offers a compendium of the neural basis of selfhood.In outlining the scope and content of his narrative, Damasio begins by delineating a continuum between, on the one hand, core consciousness and core self, which describe momentary awareness of the world and of a being's participation in it, and on the other hand, an extended consciousness and an autobiographical self that endow human beings with a capacity to place ongoing mental experience in an extended world of memories and knowledge structures that in effect authorize a layered, complex sense of knowing. This division of the cognitive-emotional space of consciousness maps the human evolutionary terrain, from apes to Homo sapiens, and also the clinical terrain created by brain injury and, as a consequence of injury, made available to interested clinicians and observers.In separate chapters Damasio elaborates on the contributions of various brain and mental functions to the drama and puzzle of human awareness and consciousness. He covers in depth the influence of emotions and feelings, language, perception and image formation, aspects of knowing, and the more complex and subtle problems posed by memory. Throughout these chapters, Damasio places in context the key historical concerns of the neurological and cognitive sciences. He presents and discusses clinical cases and explains themes of overriding importance for understanding behavior. Damasio's analyses manage to capture in a direct, unassuming, and very clear way central enigmas of how brain events and processes shape behavior.Readers of Psychiatric Services are used to dealing with persons whose problems of behavior and experience usually do not involve neuroanatomy, the physiology and biology of consciousness, anomalies of knowing and of body awareness (such as agnosias and anosognosia), and factors that interfere with the understanding and production of language. Except for the small proportion of patients with general medical and neurological disease and with head injury who happen to develop secondary psychiatric disorders, the status of the brain and the complexities of its many cognitive "organs" can be taken for granted in clinical psychiatric care. Yet because mental health professionals are interested and involved spectators of the sufferings and impairments of others whom they deal with on a daily basis, they are naturally drawn to seek to understand how brain and biology account for the puzzle of behavior. Furthermore, in the current phase of mental health thinking and practice, which is governed by neurobiological and psychopharmacological reductionism, they cannot but conclude that attention to functions of the brain in relation to their clinical work is important.Almost all staple themes of the neurology of behavior and of the interplay between brain and behavior are addressed in this beautifully written book. The author uses clear prose, lucid diagrams, and an easy-to-grasp presentation of a few cardinal and essential technical terms to describe the intricacies of all facets of human psychology from a neurological standpoint that is accessible to the intelligent and interested general reader.Dr. Fabrega is professor of psychiatry and anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh.by Antonio R. Damasio, M.D.; New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999, 386 pages, $28 hardcover, $15 softcover

Investigating the biology of consciousness

The fact that consciousness is a private, first-person phenomenon makes it more difficult to study than other cognitive phenomena that, although being equally private, also have characteristic behavioural signatures. Nonetheless, by combining cognitive and neurobiological methods, it is possible to approach consciousness, to describe its cognitive nature, its behavioural correlates, its possible evolutionary origin and functional role; last but not least, it is possible to investigate its neuroanatomical and neurophysiological underpinnings. In this brief essay I distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core consciousness corresponds to the transient process that is incessantly generated relative to any object with which an organism interacts, and during which a transient core self and transient sense of knowing are automatically generated. Core consciousness requires neither language nor working memory, and needs only a brief short-term memory. Extended consciousness is a more complex process. It depends on the gradual build-up of an autobiographical self, a set of conceptual memories pertaining to both past and anticipated experiences of an individual, and it requires conventional memory. Extended consciousness is enhanced by language.