Cooperative Conflict Research Articles

Rights and responsibilities of dissent: Cooperative conflict

Cooperative conflict research supports the value of the right to dissent and self-expression as contributing significantly to organizational effectiveness. Through conflict, problems are identified, and solutions created and accepted, and a sense of justice and fairness established. Research also proposes a corresponding responsibility that employees and employers should establish a strong cooperative context for managing conflict. Structuring a conflict-positive organization is a powerful way to capture the benefits of conflict and support the right of dissent.

Thoughts on the Cooperative Conflict Model of the Household in Relation to Economic Method

Summary Mainstream economic theory has traditionally been content to treat the family or household as a single unit. Theory has often spilled over into practice so that researchers and planners also regard the household as a unit. The paper follows Amartya Sen in saying that this is not good enough, A ‘cooperative conflict’ model is needed to replace the undifferentiated unit. Some of the practical problems of researching intra-household distribution of resources are illustrated by a case study from North London. The results of this study are used to show that even in developed countries a recognition that households do not share resources ‘fairly’, let alone equally, has very important methodological implications. Resumé Réflexions sur le Modèle de conflit coopératif dans les ménages relativement à la méthode économique Traditionnellement, la théorie économique (ou du moins son courant dominant) s'est contentée de traiter la famille ou le ménage en tant qu'unité simple. La théorie a débordé dans la pratique, de sorte que les chercheurs et planificateurs considèrent que le ménage est lui aussi unitaire. Le présent article suit l'opinion d'Amartya Sen en déclarant cette analyse insuffisante. Un modèle de ‘conflit coopératif’ est nécessaire afin de remplacer cette unité insuffisamment différenciée. Certaines des difficultés pratiques qui décollement de la recherche sur la distribution des ressources à l'intérieur des ménages sont exemplifiées dans une étude de cas dans le nord de Londres. Les résultats de cette étude serviront à démontrer que même dans les pays développés, une fois que l'on a reconnu que les ménages divisent leurs ressources en parts ni égales, ni encore équitables, les répercussions méthodologiques s'avéreront des plus importantes. Resumen Opiniones Sobre el Modelo de Conflicto Cooperativo de la Familia en Relación al Método Económico La teoría económica clásica viene tratando la familia como unidad. Esta teoría se ha extendido a la práctica y en la actualidad se utiliza con frecuencia en investigación y así los analistas y encargados de planificación siguen tratando a la familia como unidad. Este estudio considera, como tambien hace Amartya Sen, que esto no es suficiente. Se necesita un rnodelo de conflicto cooperativo que sustituya el concepto de unidad. Un estudio del norte de Londres presenta algunos de los problemas prácticos en el análisis de la distribución de recursos dentro de la familía. El autor utiliza los resultados de este análists para mostrar como el reconocimiento de que en las familias los recursos no se distribuyen de forma equitativa, incluso en paises desarrollados, tiene implicaciones metodológicas de gran importancia.

Teaching children to resolve conflicts cooperatively

Managing conflicts with and among children can be stressful and time-consuming for caregivers. Children and parents can learn to resolve differences in a cooperative way that allows each person to feel good about the process and the outcome. This article describes one cooperative conflict resolution process and suggests available resources.

Does Cooperation Inhibit War?

The object of the paper is to explicate two opposing intuitions: the belief that peace and security will benefit from international cooperation, and the belief that this is an illusion. The proposition that sustained cooperation inhibits war is taken to rest on two assumptions, one about images and the other about interests. An unfavorable image of the adversary is presumed to promote conflictive action, and cooperation is presumed to make contenders view each other more favorably. At the same time, cooperation is presumed to create values that would be endangered by war and hence to inhibit war by making it more costly. The first part of the paper is devoted to an elaboration of this view. Then, in the second part, several limitations of this theory about the way in which cooperation relates to conflict are identified, including its narrow scope, its limited testability, and its several theoretical weaknesses. The proposition is plausible only with regard to particular contenders and particular circumstances. There is reason to believe domestic-political factors to be important for the link between international cooperation and international conflict.

Transborder Cooperation, Regional Initiatives, and Sovereignty Conflicts in Western Europe: The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley

Transborder cooperation in Western Europe has made considerable progress. Primarily because of the activities of local groups, such as the Regio Basiliensis, and the support of international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the Upper Rhine Valley and other European border regions have succeeded in voicing their interests in afairly cohesive manner. However, the continued emphasis of national governments on sovereignty and national interests has prevented international border regions from achieving such basic goals as infrastructure integration and harmonization of environmental policy. Present forms of transborder political activity have been insufficient to overcome conflicts between regional needs and national interests. For this and other reasons, European border regions have resorted to new local economic and political initiatives to argue more forcefully for border region demands. In pooling the combined resources of its Swiss, French, and German participants, the Upper Rhine Program of Innovation might well serve as a model for this kind of regional initiative, perhaps setting a precedent for future forms of transborder political activity.

Transborder Cooperation, Regional Initiatives, and Sovereignty Conflicts in Western Europe: The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley

Transborder Cooperation, Regional Initiatives, and Sovereignty Conflicts in Western Europe: The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley

New approaches in research on cooperative conflict resolution by group decisions

In contrast to one-party decisions, conflicts of interest have no unique solution; ‘solution models’ are different answers to the question what an acceptable compromise looks like. Situations used in experimental research on such questions represent the range of possibilities rather poorly. This paper illustrates a possibility for transforming characteristic functions of three-person situations into points of a tetrahedron which is easy to survey and which can be used to introduce ‘regions’ corresponding to types of situations differentiated by aspects relevant for negotiations on conflict resolution. Previous as well as current research shows properties of final agreements which are related to the acceptability of the corresponding proposals. It does not show whether people really consider these properties when proposing, claiming, accepting, or rejecting a compromise, or whether choices and decisions during the bargaining process depend on other aspects and considerations. This paper shows modifications of experimental games which provide better access to what is going on in overt communication as well as in covert considerations and decisions. The analysis of information about covert cognitive processes follows a knowledge-oriented approach, based on the idea that bargaining behavior can be explained — at least to ome extent — as resulting from the application of rules on personal goals and individual knowledge. The ‘knowledge-based acting system’ is a conceptualization of real partners in a conflict of interestas well as a computer system simulating their behavior, or better: of what we think that we know about their behavior.

Group Social Skills Training for Young Children in a Clinical Setting

Peer interaction problems are often difficult to ameliorate in a clinical setting. In this study, four boys, whose many problems included difficulties with peer relationships, were given social skills training in a group over ten sessions. The main aim was to improve cooperative play, effective communication and conflict resolution skills by using a general problem-solving framework combining behavioural and cognitive techniques. The formal measures failed to show change, which may be due in part to inadequacies in the measures. Reports from therapists, teachers and parents suggested that there was considerable change within sessions, some improvement at school but very little at home.

Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict

On the basis of in-depth interviews with Arab and Israeli elites, this study delineates political styles and strategies of conflict on both sides of the Middle East dispute, with the aim of understanding their interaction effects. Three conflict orientations emerged for both Arabs and Israelis. Among Arabs, two are straight-forward: total rejection of Israel and unambiguous acceptance. All the acceptors are peripheral in their Arab identity or unusual in their contact with Israel. Through analysis of latent as well as manifest attitudes, a third, more intriguing orientation of “latent acceptance but manifest rejection” also emerges. Among Israelis, the three orientations consist of annexationism (of the occupied territories), hard bargaining, and conciliation. Although there is potential convergence between the crucial Arab “latents” and the important Israeli “hard bargainers,” their political styles and conflict strategies serve to lock the proponents of these orientations into highly competitive, intractable conflict. Exploration of the psychological needs, cultural processes, and political dynamics which give rise to these positions, together with attitudes on the issues, suggest several policies that might be effective in redirecting the process toward cooperative conflict resolution, about which all parties would feel some sense of gain.

Conflict and cooperation in Andean communities

This paper presents a framework for the analysis of cooperation and conflict based on surveys and anthropological studies of Peruvian rural communities and an examination of the literature on the nature of peasant communities (Redfield, Lewis, Foster, and others). Instead of considering these qualities of human relations as opposite ends of the same continuum, the framework presents two separate continua: high-low cooperation and high-low conflict.

THE RELATIVE EFFICACIES OF ESCALATION AND DEESCALATION FOR COMPLIANCE-GAINING IN TWO-PARTY CONFLICTS

Two independent experiments were conducted to investigate the determinants of target compliance to escalatory and deescalatory influence strategies during a two-person, mixed-motive conflict simulation. Both experiments involved the intermittent transmission of contingent threats of punishment with varying magnitudes from a robot to target subjects. In the first experiment, an escalatory (increasing) pattern of threats and punishments was employed and in the second, a deescalatory (decreasing) pattern was used. Escalation and deescalation were implemented either suddenly and noncontingently by robot, or gradually and contingent on target's response to previous influence exertion. Complementary cells of the two designs were nonparametrically compared to determine the relative compliance-gaining efficacies of escalation vs deescalation. Escalation of punishments was far more effective in eliciting compliance overall than was deescalation (p < 0.0005); these differences persisted within both the sudden (p < 0.0252) and gradual (p < 0.0054) conditions separately. Consistent with a utility analysis, however, sudden deescalation was not significantly less efficient in gaining compliance than gradual deescalation (p > 0.30). These results were discussed as contradictory of simple expected value models of compliance, and deescalation was seen as presenting a significant but limited alternative to escalation for cooperative conflict resolution.