Cooperative Board Research Articles

Cooperative and Competitive Behavior

The cooperative-competitive behavior of children in Papua New Guinea was assessed by two experimental techniques that have previously been used within other countries to demonstrate ethnic differences. The results of Experiments 1 and 2, in which the Madsen cooperation board was used, indicate significantly more cooperation between children of an intact tribe than between children in a heterogeneous urban setting. In Experiment 3, the marble-pull apparatus was used to assess the cooperative interaction of children from ten sites which varied in tribal intactness, degree of western contact, and urbanization. The results demonstrate the significance of primary group identification as a determinant of cooperative behavior.

The Relationship of Membership Voting Policies to Equity Redemption: Grain Cooperatives in Illinois

Policies on membership and voting, and their relationship to equity redemption in sustaining, limiting, or terminating a member's control and ownership were examined for grain cooperatives in Illinois. The results showed a high probability, for both cooperatives with an equity redemption program and those with no such program, that inactive and past members would not have voting privileges even though they still retained equity capital in the cooperative. A major percentage of no-program cooperatives received no pressure from members for adopting an equity redemption program. Cooperative managers and boards of directors are responsible for developing membership, voting, and equity redemption policies consistent with established principles of cooperation. The Rochdale pioneers, Nourse [211, Fetrow [151, Bakken [2], Schaars [23], and others, developed at least nine different principles to follow in the operation of a cooperative firm. These include member control, member ownership, limited returns on capital, service at cost, etc. [1, p. 521. Member control is the political decision making process, and member ownership is the equity capital invested by members. Ideally, member control and ownership are held by the same individuals. When members have equity capital in a cooperative, they have an interest in having a say about how it should be organized and operated [1, p. 59]. The problem arises when a member ceases patronizing the cooperative or no longer wishes to be a member. An inactive member, one who ceases patronizing, has an interest in retaining voting rights based on any equity in the cooperative. A member seeking to terminate membership needs from the cooperative a procedure to have this equity repaid in cash before giving up voting rights. This should be done with a formal equity redemption program. However, there are cooperatives where member control and ownership are separate,

Cooperation and Competition among Polynesian and European Children

THOMAS, DAvm R. Cooperation and Competition among Polynesian and European Children. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1975, 46, 948-953. The Madsen cooperation board was administered to four samples of children using a different procedure from those reported in previous studies. It was found that Cook Islands children and rural New Zealand Maori children were more cooperative and thus received more rewards than European and urban Maori children. Older children and boys were more cooperative than younger children and girls. It appeared that greater competency in the use of social skills led to the superior performance by the Cook Islands and rural Maori children and that educational programs in some schools may not encourage the development of social skills.

Integration and Acculturation of Cooperative Behavior among Blackfoot Indian and Non-Indian Canadian Children

Teams of boys from an integrated elementary school played a game on the Madsen Cooperation Board which, while permitting either cooperative or competitive behavior, rewarded cooperative behavior. Indian teams, allwhite teams, and integrated teams all showed a similar pattern of behavior on the game. This pattern was markedly different from the behavior patterns which have been demonstrated for either Blackfoot or white children from nonintegrated schools. The behavior of all the groups from the integrated school was midway between that of nonintegrated white and Blackfoot children in terms of the frequency of cooperative responses. The data are discussed in terms of acculturation and the effects of integrated schooling.

A Study of Achievement in Two Types of Public Secondary Schools

In connection with their investigation of the problems of American secondary education, Dr. James B. Conant and the staff of “A Study of the American High School” wanted to obtain objective evidence on the question whether there are comprehensive high schools which do as good a job of teaching as is done by highly reputed college-oriented schools. Final achievement in trigonometry and physics courses in 13 comprehensive schools and four college-oriented schools was measured by appropriate Cooperative and College Board tests. Ability was held constant in the analysis by scores on SCAT. A very large overlap in the range of teaching effectiveness, as reflected by these tests, was found for the two types of school. The same kind of overlap persisted when the data were analyzed separately for students at three different levels of ability.

Union-Management Co-Operation at the Toronto Factory of Lever Brothers Limited

This case study of union-management co-operation at the Toronto factory of Lever Brothers Limited was undertaken for several reasons. It is an example of the union-management co-operation in which increases in productive efficiency were brought about solely by savings in man-power requirements. Further it is a case of the fulfilment of a collective bargaining demand by co-operation. These two facts, in themselves, are highly unusual. Although this case of co-operation took place during the war and was influenced by war-time conditions, it is in no way a part of the general war-time pattern of labour-management co-operation, stimulated in Canada by the Industrial Production Co-operation Board and in the United States by the War Production Drive.Historically, industrial relations can be divided into an area of conflict of interest or collective bargaining and an area of mutuality of interest or co-operation. Employee representation tried to integrate these areas, but without the presence of an independent union, management tended to determine unilaterally the conditions of employment. Union-management co-operation later developed the area of mutuality in parts of the railroad, clothing, steel, and printing industries, but with the exception of the clothing industry, little integration was affected with the area of bargaining. During the recent war labour-management co-operation had a mushroom growth, but little attempt was made to integrate the two areas of industrial relations. In Canada, particularly, the role of the union on the co-operation committees was largely undefined. Co-operation at Lever Brothers is significant because it provides a clearcut case of integration between co-operation on productive efficiency and bargaining on wages and hours. Co-operation arose as a result of a demand by the bargaining agency for increased wages and shorter hours, while their achievement was brought about by the joint action of union and management. This, then, provides an example of union-management relations which may have profound implications for the achievement of industrial peace.