Firm Cooperation Research Articles

Large‐scale Distributed PV Projects in The Netherlands

In The Netherlands, as well as in a large number of other countries around the world, photovoltaics is regarded as one of the most promising options for future power production, although bulk photovoltaic (PV) power now is still more than five times more expensive than grid power. The commercialization of PV will run from small ‘niche’ markets to large-scale power plants integrated into the utility network. This does not mean, however, that PV R,D&D should concentrate on niche market applications only. Tomorrow's introduction of large-scale PV power plants can only be achieved successfully if effort is put into the development and demonstration of large-scale PV technology today. The Nieuw Sloten 250-kWp project (Amsterdam) and the Nieuwland 1-MW project (Amersfoort) in The Netherlands are examples of the commitment on the national and on the European level to take up this R,D&D effort seriously (both projects are supported by Novem and THERMIE). The Netherlands ‘learning programme’ for PV aims at the successful introduction of large-scale, dispersed photovoltaics in the next century. The key issue of the programme, as well as of the aforementioned projects, is to establish a firm cooperation with builders, because future large-scale photovoltaics in The Netherlands will undoubtedly be realized on the roofs of buildings. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Technology and human resources in Europe after Maastricht

The new industrial policy approach of the European Community (EC) stresses that industrial adjustment has to be supported by the creation of a positive environment for inter–firm cooperation, the promotion of conditions for entrepreneurship and innovation, the full development of innovative opportunities, and the development of human capabilities (article 130 of the Treaty of Maastricht). Since the national systems of innovation are still very different throughout Europe, the EC decided in the late 1980s to reverse the convergence process from top–down to bottom–up, by introducing programmes which attempt to stimulate the creation of networks of innovators. This approach was clearly influenced by the debateon industrial districts and by the more general debate on innovation diffusion. It is based on the possibility of favouring aggregations of firms, research institutes, universities, framed in their own national contexts, but forced to cooperate in producing innovation.

Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender Offer Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation during Takeovers

In this paper we explore the following research question: When faced with a tender offer, why do some firms resist and others cooperate? In the past, researchers have suggested that the manner in which firms respond to takeover attempts may be, in part, a function of managers' personal motivations. We contribute to this line of research by questioning whether other factors might be involved. Specifically, we examine whether cooperation may be a function of the friendliness of the bidding company and the social networks shared by executives in the two firms (i.e., bidder and target). We examine how the power and connections of managers affect their responses to tender offers. Our results suggest that these factors do indeed play a role. We found, for example, that target managers are more likely to cooperate under two conditions: (1) if they have less prestigious connections than managers in the bidding firm, and (2) if the target and bidding firms' share numerous ties to the same prestigious networks. In contrast, we found that target managers are more likely to resist a bidder's advances if: (1) the managers in both firms are poorly connected, or (2) the targets' managers hold more prestigious connections relative to the bidders. Together these findings suggest that cooperation and resistance may be a function of the social networks and power relationships that exist between and within firms. We discuss our findings within the framework of numerous organizational theories such as social class and social network theory, agency theory, and resource dependence. Although each of these perspectives suggests somewhat different results, we propose a reconciliation of these various perspectives. Specifically, we suggest that the variables of managerial power and connections may have different effects depending on whether we are observing firms before or after tender offers are made. It may be, for instance, that before a takeover offer is received, the power and prestige of target managers is associated with adoption of anti-takeover defenses (i.e., defenses designed to thwart takeover attempts). In fact, this finding has already been well documented in the literature. On the other hand, our findings suggest that after an offer is received, these same factors of prestige and power appear to be associated with resistance. Finally, our results call into question previous views that corporate takeovers are a mechanism for disciplining or ridding the company of incompetent managers. Instead, our findings suggest that the nature of the takeover process (i.e., cooperative versus resistant) may do little more than perpetuate existing social structures. Powerful and prestigious managers may not suffer the same negative effects of takeovers as their less prestigious and less powerful counterparts.

On labor incentives and work norm in Japanese firms

In this paper, we argue that social/corporate norms play an important role in achieving higher productivity and better economic welfare. We define “social norm” to be a standard of behavior suggested by a social custom, i.e., a customary choice of actions in each social situation. We reinterpret the well-known Nash equilibrium as a “norm equilibrium.” A norm equilibrium is a stable social norm, stable in the sense that there is no incentive to deviate from the behavior suggested by the prevailing social norm. This interpretation requires less information than the traditional interpretation. Moreover, we need not be concerned with the problem of refinement because it is the social norm itself which refines the equilibria. We apply this concept to the labor market. The key assumption is that the level of an individual worker's effort is private information known to workers as a whole; i.e., all workers' efforts are known to their fellow workers as well as to the workers themselves. We show that different work norms may emerge in different corporations at an equilibrium. In “prestigious” firms cooperation is the prevailing work norm, while in “nonprestigious” firms noncooperation is the norm. Thus, the efficiency wage hypothesis holds without the existence of unemployment. Some implications of this interpretation for the Japanese labor markets are discussed.

Semiconductor firm strategies and technological cooperation: A perceived transaction cost approach

Abstract Technological cooperation in the semiconductor industry is increasingly essential to meet global competition. Based on a perceived transaction cost approach, the present study attempts to determine whether a firm's strategy predicts either its level of technological cooperation or its managers' perceptions of the costs entailed in this activity. The primary product/market strategies in this industry, namely, product specialization, vertical integration and innovation, are utilized in correlational and regression analyses of two measures of technological cooperation and six perceived transaction costs. The results indicate that although strategy does predict managers' perceptions of the cost incurred in this activity, it does not explain their actual behavior. Additional factors are suggested for further research along with management implications of the results.

Legal Ethics. Advertising. Law Firm's Cooperation in Preparation of Laudatory Article concerning Its Practice Is Unethical as Indirect Advertising. In the Matter of Connelly (N. Y. App. Div. 1963)

Legal Ethics. Advertising. Law Firm's Cooperation in Preparation of Laudatory Article concerning Its Practice Is Unethical as Indirect Advertising. In the Matter of Connelly (N. Y. App. Div. 1963)

Law Firm's Cooperation in Publication of Self-Laudatory Magazine Article Held Violation of Canon 27 of Canons of Professional Ethics

Law Firm's Cooperation in Publication of Self-Laudatory Magazine Article Held Violation of Canon 27 of Canons of Professional Ethics

Grading of Teak Squares

WITH the hearty co-operation of business firms, the Forest Research Institute at Dehra Dun has published a small pocket monograph entitled “Rules ffv for the Grading of Teak Squares”, prepared by L. N. Seaman, officer in charge, Timber Testing Station, and V. D. Limaye. In a preface, Mr. C. G. Trevor, Inspector General of Forests, states that the work was undertaken at the request of the Chief Conservator of Forests, Burma, and the Indian Railways, and the Burma forest officers were deputed to the saw mills of the five chief teak firms to observe and write down in tabular form all the defects in each teak square passed by the respective firms as belonging to different existing grades. The data so obtained were dispatched to Dehra Dun for analysis, and preliminary draft rules were drawn up by Mr. Seaman and his staff. These rules were discussed at a meeting held in Rangoon between the parties interested, and a trial was made of them. As a result of experience gained, the rules were re-written by Mr. Limaye (Mr. Seaman having left India on retirement) and are now published in the present handy form. The rules express, in so many words, the actual practice that is followed in the trade in the grading of teak squares. The rules have been accepted by the teak lessees of Burma and the timber adviser to the Railway Board and the Army. The rules are equally applicable to mill-sawn squares from Siam and other countries, and it is suggested that in future they will always be used for the buying and selling of teak squares.