Conventional Attacks Research Articles

The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

West European Perceptions of the United States

surveys suggest that America's problem with perceptions among West Europeans is not so much anti-Americanism as opposition to U.S. policies. A largely unappreciated case in point is that the great majority in the countries surveyed oppose a nuclear defense against a conventional attack- the cornerstone of U.S. strategy for West European defense. Communications professionals must be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which international tension reflects misperceptions of U.S. policies. Much of this derives not from misunderstanding but from real conflicts of interest - needing, for their resolution, not better communication but better negotiations.

The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the Early 1970s

For Finland, the last decade has been one of implementation in foreign policy and doctrine formation and material expansion in defence policy. After tracing the fundamentals of Finland's security conception, the article notes that the basic argument and strategy for an active foreign policy line, promoting peace and security, and based on acceptability of the line in the East and West, was established as early as the mid-1960s. Finland's Nordic security policy for confirming the ‘disengaged’ position of the area has been tenacious, whereas in European and global fora Finland's activity has been more dependent on the East–West climate. The three parliamentary defence committees formulated a defence doctrine legitimating the national defence system and ensuing armaments programmes dimensioned to respond to a limited conventional attack. The internal debate resulted in a consensus doctrine on how much Finnish–Soviet military cooperation to include in the defence doctrine that corresponds with the basic philosophy of Finland's foreign policy to trust in political regulation as the best security guarantee even in conflict situations. The military provisions of the Finnish–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance are to be used actively and reliably to maintain the preventive effect of the defence arrangement. With the onset of the 1980s the debate on the increased danger of limited nuclear war is testing the credibility of the defence doctrine based on a restrictive threat conception and questioning the concept of security policy traditionally used.

The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the Early 1970s

For Finland, the last decade has been one of implementation in foreign policy and doctrine formation and material expansion in defence policy. After tracing the fun damentals of Finland's security conception, the article notes that the basic argument and strategy for an active foreign policy line, promoting peace and security, and based on acceptability of the line in the East and West, was established as early as the mid-1960s. Finland's Nordic security policy for confirming the 'disengaged' position of the area has been tenacious, whereas in European and global fora Finland's activity has been more dependent on the East-West climate. The three parliamentary defence committees formulated a defence doctrine legitimating the national defence system and ensuing armaments programmes dimensioned to respond to a limited conventional attack. The internal debate resulted in a consensus doctrine on how much Finnish- Soviet military cooperation to include in the defence doctrine that corresponds with the basic philosophy of Finland's foreign policy to trust in political regulation as the best security guarantee even in conflict situations. The military provisions of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance are to be used actively and reliably to maintain the preventive effect of the defence arrangement. With the onset of the 1980s the debate on the increased danger of limited nuclear war is testing the credibility of the defence doctrine based on a restrictive threat conception and questioning the concept of security policy traditionally used.

The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons

Observers have recently challenged the fundamental tenets of NATO's nuclear doctrine, above all its potentially fateful threat—or bluff—to employ theater nuclear weapons to repel Soviet conventional attacks. One group of these commentators has come to view NATO theater nuclear weapons as an anachronism that is neither necessary for deterrence and defense nor usable under any prudent calculation. Another group envisages new weapons and new doctrines that would make theater nuclear weapons more credible instruments of U.S. and NATO foreign policy. The article explores briefly some of the sources of this radical disagreement.

The Soviet theater threat‐today and tomorrow

Abstract Attempts at assessing military balances are highly subjective affairs. Although numbers can be determined with a fair degree of accuracy, other factors—e.g., quality of weaponry, troop morale, and leadership—are much more difficult to evaluate. Consequently, any assessment of the military balance will be acutely sensitive to the assumptions on which it is based. Although deterrence in Europe probably exists, largely because of the risk that a large conventional attack would escalate to nuclear war, the ability of NATO to defend its territory by conventional means should deterrence fail is problematical. NATO might in that case be compelled to resort to nuclear weapons uncomfortably early, and it is far from clear that we know how to use tactical nuclear weapons for military advantage. The Soviets, on the other hand, might decide to use nuclear weapons first, but in spite of the emphasis on this course in much of their literature, it is doubtful they would want to risk the destruction of their homeland without first trying to win by conventional means. Thus, the task before NATO is to reduce the risk of conventional attack by increasing its conventional might and to enhance deterrence against nuclear attack by modernizing theater nuclear weapons and reducing their vulnerability.

The Conflict in the British Labor Party

The Labor Party has been running six percent ahead of the government in current Gallup polls, and superficially all seems well. The leadership anticipates winning the next general election and, barring unforeseen contingencies, becoming Her Majesty's Government instead of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition. For this reason, among others, it strongly deprecates any tendency to sharpen intra-party controversies or to shift from the conventional and time-honored attacks on the Tories to raising fundamental policy issues. It prefers the easy way to office, even if this way is open only so long as there is relative economic stability and the world situation is not darkened by major crises. But we are living in a period of profound economic instability and of acute international strains, and history does not readily adapt itself to the short-run calculations of professional politicians and party machines.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The Performance of Flat-Plate Solar-Heat Collectors

Abstract The great magnitude of solar-energy flux on the earth has stimulated a number of attempts at its more effective utilization during the last 60 years. Mouchot (1, 2) and Pifre (3, 2) in France, Shuman (4) in Egypt, Ericsson (5), Willsie (6), Shuman (7), and more recently Abbot (8) in America are but a few of the names associated with attempts to prove the economic feasibility of converting solar energy to heat and transferring that heat to the working fluid (steam, air, and sulphur dioxide have been used) of a heat engine. Recently Dr. Godfrey L. Cabot has made possible a continuing research on the problem by establishing an endowment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for studying means of more effective utilization of solar energy. Four projects are under way: three in the fields of photochemistry, photoelectricity, and thermoelectricity. The fourth follows the conventional attack on the problem, namely, the collection of solar energy in the form of heat in a fluid and the utilization of that heat. The present paper is a first quantitative report on progress in the last field.