Control Of Major Accident Hazards Research Articles

Protecting your business: from emergency planning to crisis management

The forthcoming UK Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations under the European Community's Seveso II Directive will impose a new formal requirement to test emergency plans. This might be approached as an added burden on industry to demonstrate safe operation, or can be viewed alternatively as an opportunity to improve crisis management systems and thereby decrease the risks to the business. Crisis is by nature an ambiguous and complex environment, demanding endless initiative, inventiveness, communication, co-ordination and learning. Because large-scale crises threatening the entire business are not frequent, learning from experience must be replaced by competence-assurance based on systems thinking, on risk assessment, on wide scenario simulations and on rigorous training. This paper discusses the benefits from various types of testing of emergency plans and from a business approach to continuous improvement in crisis management capability.

Risk assessment—an insurer's perspective

With the current emphasis upon the use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for meeting legislative requirements, and the implementation of the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) directive in the UK, the author will aim to highlight in this article the numerous advantages of using qualitative risk assessment methodologies and the importance of understanding the impact of risk perception in such assessments.

Policy issues on the control of major accident hazards and the new Seveso II directive

No-one wants a major accident to occur! This paper describes the development of EC policies to convert this simple and obvious fact into a coherent prevention strategy which can deliver a high level of protection throughout the European Community. The Seveso II Directive is described in detail, being the relevant Community Instrument which Member States must implement in their national laws. The need to achieve the correct balance between setting general goals and being over prescriptive is discussed, commensurate with the intent to be flexible but yet consistent and effective at the same time. The main changes from Seveso I are discussed, including requirements related to the operator's management systems, the competent authority's systems for inspection, and information and consultation arrangements with the public.

The control of major accident hazards: The land-use planning issue

Land-Use Planning with respect to major accident hazards constitutes one of the new requirements of the `Seveso II Directive'. The paper discusses the rationale and the requirements set by the Directive for the operators of the plants and the planning authorities to take into account the major accident hazards in the land-use planning procedure. Then, the paper focuses on approaches and criteria applied in the European Union, and gives information on procedures in other countries, wherever available. The approaches analysed are grouped into three broad categories, namely, establishing `generic distances', `consequence based', and `risk based'. Finally, two illustrative examples facilitate understanding and comparison of the analysed approaches.

Practical implementation of the Seveso II directive in the UK

This paper describes the arrangements being made in the UK to implement the Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances Directive (Seveso II) (96/82/EEC 1 Reference. 1 ). It starts by describing briefly the arrangements for making the regulations to give legal effect to the Directive. It then goes on to describe the practical arrangements which are being made to ensure that the new regulations will be enforced effectively and that the principles on which enforcement is based (consistency, proportionality, targeting and transparency) will apply. The paper describes major projects dealing with safety report assessment and the development of an inspection strategy. It also describes the liaison arrangements being drawn up between the various enforcing authorities and the internal reorganisation recently carried out by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE): the enforcing authority for the current Seveso Directive. 2 Title and reference. 2

Precursors of dangerous substances formed in the loss of control of chemical systems

Article 2 of Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major accident hazards caused by dangerous substances requires to consider also the hazards due to the dangerous substances “which it is believed may be generated during loss of control of an industrial chemical process”, although no generally accepted guidelines are available for the identification of these substances. In the present study, the accidents involving the unwanted formation of dangerous substances as a consequence of the loss of control of chemical systems were investigated. A specifically developed database was used, containing data on more than 400 of these accidents and on the substances involved. The hazardous substances formed in the accidents and the precursors of these substances were identified. The influence of accident characteristics on the substances formed was investigated. In the context of the application of Directive 96/82/EC, an accident severity index and a hazard rating of the precursors of dangerous substances formed in the accidents were proposed. A lumping approach was used in order to develop schemes for the preliminary identification of substances that may be formed in the loss of control of chemical system. The results of accident analysis were used to test the schemes developed.

EU initiative on the control of major accident hazards arising from pipelines

Abstract The European Council and the Parliament recognised that pipeline accidents had occurred in Europe and worldwide, which clearly indicated the `major accident hazard' potential of pipelines. The present paper presents an overview of the Community Policy on the control of major accident hazards arising from pipelines, summarises the Commission review/assessment of existing legislation on pipelines within the Member States and outlines the principles on which a possible EU initiative should be based. The review has shown that many Member States do not have comprehensive `major accident hazard' legislation in place for pipelines and therefore an EU initiative would complete existing industrial risk management legislation, based on the `precautionary principle'.

An examination of the major-accident record for explosives manufacturing and storage in the UK

This report examines the historical accident record for explosives manufacture and storage in the UK during the period 1950–1997. Details were found of 79 major explosives events, a major event being defined as one which substantially destroys the building in which it occurs and results in projection of debris and/or blast effects at a distance, so posing a hazard to persons elsewhere on the site or indeed beyond the site. Analysis of the accident record allowed major accident rates to be derived for a number of processes undertaken in the explosives industry. It is suggested that the rates derived in this study might be used in quantitative risk assessments (QRA) of explosives manufacturing and storage plants. It is noted that to date, QRA has been used relatively infrequently in the UK within the civil explosives field. However, with the adoption of the European Union Seveso II Directive, to be implemented in the UK as the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations, QRA could now play a more active role in explosives safety in the UK.

Communication in Chemical Emergencies

In the case of chemical emergencies, public information must be given high priority in both planning and management. The public information requirement concerning major accident hazards has been incorporated into Community legislation since 1982 as a relevant component of the control of major accident hazards. During an emergency, communication is to be recognised as the most critical factor that determines the success of the response. However, during an emergency, while the dynamics of events and processes may be partially obscure, people must still be warned of impending danger. The management of ‘in the event’ information is quite diverse from that of ‘prior’ information.

Land use planning, industrial hazards and the ‘COMAH’ Directive

The European Commission has produced a draft proposal for a new ‘Seveso’ Directive on the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) which incorporates for the first time a land use planning element. Drawing on a previous discussion, the proposed land use planning provisions in this Directive are described and evaluated. A number of problem areas are identified and the likely implications for member states of the European Community assessed.

The Development of UK and European Major Hazards Legislation and the Review of the Seveso Directive

Describes the development of major hazard controls, first domestically in the UK and more recently in the European Community. Traces UK developments are traced from the early concerns of the 1960s, the Flixborough disaster and the work of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards on which the current philosophy for controlling major hazards is based. Describes in detail the evolution of European Community legislation from the Seveso Directive to the proposed new Directive for the control of major accident hazards (COMAH). The proposed COMAH Directive will be considered in the CEC′s Environment Working Group and Environment Council over the coming months. If these negotiations are successful in reaching common position by the end of 1994, the new Directive is likely to be adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1995. The UK will have to implement the new Directive within 18 months of its adoption.

Pragmatism, effectiveness and institutional judgement in the british control of major accident hazards

This paper focuses on the regulation of environmental hazards—with a particular emphasos on the British style of policy-making. Following a literature review, the case of major hazard policy and the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards in explored in some detail. The relationship of this case to the BRitish policy style is noted. The stress of the committe on pragmatism is discussed as is the linkate between this regulatory philosophy and the use of technical expertise as a source of legitimation. This claim to legitimation is made despite technical limitations in the selected criteria for hazard control. The paper concludeds with a discussion of pragmatism, effectiveness and the emergence of new demands for a change in the British environmental policy process. In particular, it is argued that whilst the proponents of the current system may place great stress on its pragmatism, critics are likely to be more sceptical of the regulatory process and its consensual assumptions.