Control Of State-owned Enterprises Research Articles

Research and Analysis of Financial Risk Prevention and Control of State-owned Enterprises ���� Taking Shanghai Electric Co., Ltd. as an Example

Research and Analysis of Financial Risk Prevention and Control of State-owned Enterprises ���� Taking Shanghai Electric Co., Ltd. as an Example

Clearing the fog for an overall view on state-owned enterprises: quality of aggregate holdings reporting by public administrations in 12 countries

In the context of current debates on sustainable public service provision, austerity, debts and cutback management, the governance and management of and in state-owned enterprises is a crucial issue. An aggregate holdings report is an important tool for public administrations to provide accountability and the necessary overall view on the institutional service provision structures of core administration and state-owned enterprises. On the basis of a developed quality index with 175 test criteria, this study analyses the diffusion of aggregate holdings reports in 17 countries and the quality of 12 existing reports at the national level. First, the study provides a conceptual contribution for assessing aggregate holdings reports and future research on the issues of the model categories. Second, for an empirical contribution, the analysis enhances our state of knowledge on aggregate holdings report diffusion and quality patterns. Findings show that, in many cases, public administrations do not meet the requirements from theory and practice. Newer Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union members reach comparably higher quality scores. This comparative study offers new insights that can enhance the sustainable public management and control of state-owned enterprises. Points for practitioners The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, which were published after an intensive consultation process in 2005 and revised in 2015, demand public authorities to develop aggregate holdings reports that cover all SOEs, and make them a key disclosure tool directed to the general public and politicians. This study develops a quality model for assessing the quality of aggregate holdings reports. The model can also answer questions that are often raised in reform debates, such as ‘Which is the best aggregate holdings report?’ or ‘Which aggregate holdings report can I use as a reference to further develop my own aggregate holdings report?’. The model is a conceptual contribution and the empirical results can be used for international bench-learning. They are also useful for international organisations such as the European Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accounting and development aid/cooperation agencies in each country. The results of this study indicate that policymakers at the national and international levels should give more emphasis to the diffusion and quality of aggregate holdings reports and should reflect on establishing and revising legal obligations for aggregate holdings reports because the recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development guidelines, as a soft-law approach, are often not put into practice.

Beteiligungsmanagement und Public Corporate Governance: Grundsachverhalte und Reformperspektiven

ZögU Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen , Seite 131 - 151

A Study of China's Elimination of Private Benefits of Control in State-owned Enterprises

To eliminate control of state-owned enterprise managers of self-interest is a key problem for management of state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government has adopted a separate government functions from enterprise management, clear property rights, the board of directors system, assignment of the board of supervisors system, disciplinary leadership system reform, the mixed ownership and other measures, are difficult to eliminate the soe managers to seize control of self-interest, together with the present situation of China's state-owned enterprises, this paper proposed by the board of supervisors as the center of the corporate governance structure, powers and running of the reform of internal management mechanism, to try to eliminate the control gain, achieving the value of state-owned enterprises.

Stock Returns and Volatility Dynamics in China: Does the Control of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Matter?

This paper examines the nature of equity ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for over 2000 listed firms in China. Notably, the paper examines both the pattern of state ownership and the dynamics of stock returns and volatility. Firms under the control of SOEs dominate the Chinese stock markets and currently account for over three quarters of total Chinese market capitalization. Central SOEs are focused in strategic industries, with firms in Shanghai eight times the size of counterparts in Shenzhen. Local SOEs, on the other hand, concentrate on pillar industries related to consumer goods and services. Furthermore, on average, SOEs have a controlling stake of 40% among listed firms, with much higher shareholding of Central SOEs among firms in strategic industries. We also report an increase in state control among listed firms when compared to earlier reported figures. This is contradictory to expectation that the Chinese government would be obliged to lower state influence following its joining of the World Trade Organization in 2001. In examining the behaviour of stock returns we find evidence of daily and monthly autocorrelations that are larger and of a different sign to that reported for Western markets. We also report evidence of volatility persistence but little evidence of volatility asymmetry, again in contrast to that often reported for other markets. Finally, we find evidence of either no or a negative relationship between returns and volatility (risk) that differs from our usual view of risk aversion. It is hoped, knowledge of these dynamics will increase our understanding of the Chinese equity market, which in turn is important for those engaged in international portfolio management and micro structure modelling.

Liberalization of the Thai energy sector: a consideration of competition law and sectoral regulation

The article explores the policy of liberalization in the Thai energy sector and identifies problems in Thai competition law and sectoral regulation contributing to a lack of competitive development in the Thai energy sector. The article also proposes possible plans for improving both competition law and sectoral regulation to facilitate the move towards competition in the Thai energy sector. In the first part, the article provides an overview of the liberalization and market reform process which has lead to the current uncompetitive structure of the Thai energy sector. In the second part, the article describes the problems of Thai competition law and sectoral regulation, relating to the Thai energy markets. It explores the problems of ineffective competition law and energy regulation which is unable to deal with an uncompetitive structure under the control of state-owned enterprises. In the third part, the article provides suggestions for the development of competition in the Thai energy sector.

Privatisation and Institutions: A Cross Country Analysis

Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.