Abstract
To eliminate control of state-owned enterprise managers of self-interest is a key problem for management of state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government has adopted a separate government functions from enterprise management, clear property rights, the board of directors system, assignment of the board of supervisors system, disciplinary leadership system reform, the mixed ownership and other measures, are difficult to eliminate the soe managers to seize control of self-interest, together with the present situation of China's state-owned enterprises, this paper proposed by the board of supervisors as the center of the corporate governance structure, powers and running of the reform of internal management mechanism, to try to eliminate the control gain, achieving the value of state-owned enterprises.
Highlights
Chinese and overseas scholars generally believe that it is very important to eliminate the personal benefits of control ("PBC") by the managers of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs")
To eliminate control of state-owned enterprise managers of self-interest is a key problem for management of state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government has adopted a separate government functions from enterprise management, clear property rights, the board of directors system, assignment of the board of supervisors system, disciplinary leadership system reform, the mixed ownership and other measures, are difficult to eliminate the soe managers to seize control of self-interest, together with the present situation of China's state-owned enterprises, this paper proposed by the board of supervisors as the center of the corporate governance structure, powers and running of the reform of internal management mechanism, to try to eliminate the control gain, achieving the value of state-owned enterprises
They define PBC as monetary gains, on-the-job consumption, non-monetary benefits and the power to decide on the allocation and use of enterprises' resources at managers' own discretion (Demsetz,1985), extravagant working conditions (Jensen, 2004), human capital increment (La porea, 2000), the appointment of incompetent family members or friends (Gebharde & Schmidt, 2006), the transfer of assets through related-party transactions to companies controlled by relatives (Hart, 2001 ), the obtaining of illegal benefits through the disclosure of false information (Hall & Nurphy, 2003; Ei-tan, 2006), or the obtaining of non-monetary benefits such as pleasure, sense of achievement and reputation (Holderness, 2003)
Summary
A Study of China's Elimination of Private Benefits of Control in State-owned Enterprises. Received: September 9, 2015 Accepted: September 26, 2015 Online Published: April 28, 2016 doi:10.5539/par.v5n1p45. Fund Project: phased objectives
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
