Principle Of Contradiction Research Articles

Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography (review)

Reviews1 75 orders of society (fishermen, for example) to honor their dead comrades: even if the dedications are fictitious, they prove that it was a known fact that the written commemoration was valued by the lower classes, even ifan intermediary was involved. But none of these reservations detracts from the importance and overall persuasiveness of this magisterial and elegant study. University of Canterbury, New ZealandGraham Zanker Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography, by Gabriella Fiori, translated by Joseph R. Berrigan; ? & 380 pp. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989, $35.00. This book's subtitle, "An Intellectual Biography" (in Italian: "biography of a thought"), perfecdy indicates its content. It is indeed a biography; it does tell a life full of events, but in Simone Weil's case the events that form the web of life are always the expression ofthe development of her thought—events made necessary by the urge either to verify or put the thought to work. She was born in Paris in 1909 ofJewish intellectual parents, stricdy agnostic in matters of religion, but also deeply compassionate human beings, entirely committed to the ideals of equality and justice—as was the master who had a definite impact on her formation: the French philosopher Alain. Her background may explain the passionate awareness of the oppression of the poor with which she lived the experience of factory work— 1934—35—after three years of teaching in small cities where her social commitment shocked the parochial bourgeoisie. It may also explain the drive that made her reach Durruti 's forces in Spain during the revolution. Her participation in any form of "malheur"—her word for a kind of suffering (physical, moral, social) that impairs the humanity of the sufferer—nonetheless, soon acquires religious connotations: this is the new, unpredictable, element which shapes her life, as a work of art, in its unique form. AU through her experiences, to the last days of her life—in London, where she had reached the France Libre group of De Gaulle—she writes thousands of pages of essays and notebooks scrupulously examining historical situations, past and present; exploring the possibilities of structures of society founded on reason and truth, not on convention and superstition, to make life respond to basic human needs; investigating the real extension of those needs, both of body and soul, with the same scientific rigor which she applies to the study of the laws of nature and to her untiring med- 176Philosophy and Literature itation on religion. Thinking and writing must follow the same obligations imposed on manual labor: method and discipline. Any yielding to man's most natural enemy—laziness—takes away from truth. That there is no separation between moral and intellectual search, between thought and action, appears witii crystal clarity from Gabriella Fiori's simultaneous exposition of Simone's life and ideas. This book succeeds, with four hundred pages and limited quotations, in offering the reader a thorough spectrum of Simone Weil's all-encompassing inquiry, spanning a period of almost twenty years—from 1925, papers for Alain, to 1943, Ecrits de Londres. The task is one of extreme challenge because the biographer has to make discernible the balance of growth and consistency that characterizes Simone's work, as well as the richness of a thought that, in its Cartesian clarity, still defies the principle of contradiction and resolves opposites on a higher level. Gabriella Fiori has further developed her effort of interpretation in another book—Simone Weil: Une Femme absolue (1987)—but already in this biography she transmits the essential quality of Simone's voice. Her reading is unbiased; and while it stresses certain aspects—e.g., the sociopolitical aspect, or the relevance of Simone's feminine condition, over, for instance, the impact ofher perception ofbeauty— enough is still said and quoted about the latter, to point the reader in this direction in the mare magnum of Simone Weil's work. Even on a mere factual level Gabriella Fiori has much to offer, both in the text and in the rich supplement of notes, as a result of her indefatigable investigation of any and all recollections of surviving witnesses. The lively style of the Italian original has been masterfully kept...

Om at læse »Danne-Virke« Nogle hermeneutiske overvejelser

How to read Danne-Virke - some hermeneutic ReflectionsBy Kim Arne PedersenIn this paper a new interpretation is put on Grundtvig’s philosophical ideas as represented in the magazine Danne-Virke (D) 1816-1819. Arguments are adduced against the generally accepted understanding of these ideas represented by William Michelsen’s interpretation of Grundtvig’s philosophy as an alternative to Kant’s transcendental idealism and the Absolute Idealism, completely different from these philosophical traditions. According to William Michelsen, Grundtvig stresses the common experience of time as being independent of man and emphasizes the empirical theory of knowledge and the ordinary non-scientific language. Thereby, Grundtvig opposes Kant’s transcendental understanding of time and the ego-orientated speculation of the Absolute Idealism. Grundtvig therefore understands human knowledge as limited by time and space. Grundtvig separates knowledge and faith and claims that the only possible human understanding of God has to be symbolic, because man is created in the image of God. William Michelsen stresses, that Grundtvig never accepts a scientific knowledge of God or proofs of the existence of God.The alternative interpretation in this paper uses a terminological method in reading Grundtvig’s /^-articles, examining the historical roots of his philosophical expressions. Although Grundtvig argues against scientific language, he combines pre-critical Wolffian descriptions of God’s aseite with the Absolute Idealism’s theories of the transcendental ego, founding time and space (cosmos) in God’s self-consciousness and founding the human knowledge in the principle of contradiction, understood as an expression of God’s Trinitarian self-consciousness or ego. Grundtvig is convinced that the limited human consciousness can only be explained by the consciousness of God, and he understands this idea as a variation of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. In this way, Grundtvig gives the human empirical knowledge a speculative foundation in God’s self-consciousness and uses this foundation in his attack on Kant’s transcendental understanding of time. Finally, this paper demonstrates that Grundtvig’s separation of knowledge and faith is not absolute. Faith involves a dimension of knowledge, and this knowledge has to develop from faith.

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite “propositions” are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.

Om Grundtvigs tænkning og den nyere tids filosofi. Introduktion til Danne-Virke II

Om Grundtvigs tænkning og den nyere tids filosofi. Introduktion til Danne-Virke II

Rationality in early Buddhist four fold logic

Although there are many studies in the interpretation of, and significance to be attached to, Buddha's setting aside the famous ten questions, and although there are various studies in the development of Indian logic, there has been comparatively little written on the logic of the early Buddhist four fold logic. Thus, the fundamental nature of the issue as well as the lack of interest in, or avoidance of, the issue on the part of many Indologists and philosophers who have not addressed it make the issue a particularly interesting and challenging one. The fundamental importance of the issue of whether or not Buddhist thinkers violate the principle of contradiction, for instance, has been recognized by some Buddhist scholars, yet has been dealt with in detail commensurate with its importance by few, and very rarely in the context of early Buddhism. J. Fritz Staal (1962) reminds us of the basic importance of this issue as follows:

The Principle of Contradiction in Metaphysics, Gamma

The Principle of Contradiction in Metaphysics, Gamma

The Act of Analysis

THE ACT OF ANALYSIS IT WOULD SEEM FAIR to say that the prevailing view of analysis has been largely shaped by Kant's account of the analytic judgment. In the Critique of Pure Reason that judgment is presented as one in which" the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A." It is a judgment " in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity." Forming it, therefore, involves no " recourse to the testimony of experience," no need to "go outside the sphere of my own conceptions." For example, " I need not go beyond the conception of body to find extension connected with it." I have but to " analyze the conception "-that is, to "become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception." The judgment upon any notion demands only that we " analyze it into its constituent conceptions," thereby bringing into the full light of consciousness those elements "which were already in the subject, although in a confused manner." The product of the analytic act is thus " a proposition that stands firm a priori;" the mind needs" only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time become aware of the necessity of the judgment." 1 The core of the above is also found in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: "Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has already been thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same full consciousness." 2 1 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Meicklejohn, pp. 7-8. (Willey Book Company, New York, 1900). •Prologue to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 14. (The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1950). 45 46 JOHN D. BEACH Important problems attach to Kant's account of analysis and its product, problems rooted in the stated covert, confused or indistinct presence in the subject-concept of the elements that reflective thought brings to the light of day. Granting the product of analysis that initial status, we are led to ask what, if anything, is given overtly and distinctly to thought. Putting this somewhat differently, we must ask in terms of what, if anything , the subject of analysis is initially known or identified. This, in turn, prompts a question concerning the relationship between what is initially known and that which analysis yields. But these are matters more appropriately dealt with in another context. Let us proceed for now on the assumption that the product of analysis, the extracted predicate, is so given as an element of the subject-concept that the act of analysis unfolds exclusively in accordance with the principles of identity and contradiction. The prevailing view of analysis is based upon that very assumption. Its adherents stress that, as initially present to thought, the subject is seen to contain the predicate -i.e., the subject is known as a complex having the predicate as one of its discrete parts. Accordingly, they would note, the analytic proposition is simply the expression of the knowledge that the predicate, the extracted constituent, is such a part of the complex. And this is to say that there is a relation of direct and complete identity between the relevant part of the complex and the extracted predicate, and a relation of direct but partial identity between the extracted element and the initial complex. The favored examples of the latter, partial identity are the relationship between male and bachelor, or unmarried male, and that between sibling and brother, or male sibling. Proponents of this essentially conventional approach toward analysis also emphasize that the necessity involved is based on the laws of identity and contradiction. Contracted to the case in hand, these principles tell us, respectively, that a given cogitated element 0£ a subject-concept must be such an element and that it isimpossible for it not to be such an element. Thus male must be and cannot not be an element of unmarried male. THE ACT OF ANALYSIS 47 Rephrased, an unmarried male must be and cannot not be a male. Whence what is now the standard characterization...

The Role of the Principle of Contradiction in Plato's Euthydemus

The Role of the Principle of Contradiction in Plato's Euthydemus

Grundtvigs erkendelsesteori. Om forholdet mellem tro og fornuft i tidsskriftet »Danne-Virke« (1816-19).

Grundtvigs erkendelsesteori. Om forholdet mellem tro og fornuft i tidsskriftet »Danne-Virke« (1816-19).

Jan Łukasiewicz. On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle. English translation of 1861 by Vernon Wedin. The review of metaphysics, vol. 24 no. 3 (1971), pp. 485–509.

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

Ejvind Larsen: Grundtvig - om noget om Marx

Grundtvig and MarxEjvind Larsen: Grundtvig - og noget om Marx. Studenterkredsen, ÅrhusReviewed by Kaj ThaningEjvind Larsen has put a considerable amount of work into his book. It is obvious that he not only knows his Grundtvig and his Marx, but he has also studied the sociology of Grundtvigianism and is thoroughly conversant with the research work on Grundtvig. But above all, what he writes is based on strong personal commitment, which leads to criticism of both Grundtvig and Marx, but at the same time to a synthesis of both, since, to Ejvind Larsen, between them they indicate solutions to the social problems of today.The starting-point for both of them is a clash with German idealism on the one hand and the materialistic conception of man on the other. To Grundtvig man is a »Divine Experiment« of dust and spirit, to Marx man is the creator of history, while he is also a product of history, of production. Ejvind Larsen asserts emphatically that Marx is no economic determinist. The two great rebels can also be compared in that they oppose the dissociation of manual and spiritual work and are against all elites, hierarchies and bureaucracies. The people must be liberated from all this, but they must liberate themselves.Ejvind Larsen stresses, however, the influence that Grundtvig had on the emancipation of the Danish peasants and in connection with this gives the quotation, »Åndens løsen er bedrifter« (The watchword of the Spirit is deeds). It is in the significance of the spirit and in Grundtvig’s emphasis on dialogue as a basis for any emancipation of the people that he finds the explanation of the fact that the Danish peasantry was made free »despite the economic conditions« and »even though the prevailing tendencies should have reduced it to a powerless pettybourgeoisie and reactionary proletariat.«Ejvind Larsen emphasizes Grundtvig’s dissociation of his work in the Church and his work for the people, and is himself opposed to any mingling of religious and political activity. He rejoices in the fact that Grundtvig does not talk of »original sin« in a historical and political context, as opposed to the Church, which makes use of this concept to stop political progress. But he has not noticed that Grundtvig has, in a sense, secularized original sin, and as a mythologian and a historian talks of the »great calamity«, which »very early on« befell man, making his existence one of conflict and predicament. In Ejvind Larsen’s book there is a discrepancy, in that his reduction of the obvious conflicts of existence to historical calamities (in the plural), which can and should be overcome by mankind (as opposed to the sin that faith alone reveals in man and which can only be overcome through the grace of God), is at variance with his constant emphasis on the »principle of contradiction« and on the fight for man being considered a living person placed between absolute contradictions. Ejvind Larsen will, however, undoubtedly continue his work - and will deal with this inner contradiction in his book, which, despite its lack of clarity on various other points, is an inspiring achievement.

Grundtvig og Søren Kirkegaard

Grundtvig og Søren Kirkegaard

On a principle of contradiction in normative logic and jurisprudence

On a principle of contradiction in normative logic and jurisprudence

A generalized contradiction principle

A generalized contradiction principle

On Foundations of the Three-Valued Logic

At the root of two-valued logic we use there is the assumption, which is usually not formulated explicitly, but is a basic one, and which is called the principle of two-values. This principle in twovalued logic corresponds to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle. However, the principle of the syllogism in the usual (conjunctively transitive) formulation, and the principle of contradiction, of the excluded middle are only "possible" in three-valued logic. From this, three-valued logic are connected with a modal functor such as 'M' to be called "possible" (möglich). Furthermore, some laws of two-valued logic are false in three-valued logic, among others the law (a=a') = 0. From this fact results the absence of antinomies in three-valued logic.Thus any of many-valued logic from three-valued to infinitely many-valued is a proper part or a proper sublogic of two-valued logic, and the latter is a superlogic of the former.

On the Concept "Contradiction" in Dialectic

In the finst place, I tried to make the meaning of the word dialectical "Contradiction" clear. It seems to me there are two usages of that term. The first, the contradiction in existence. The second, the contradiction in logical. It is my principal purpose in this two subject how we can get no contradiction.In my opinion, to find the contradiction in existence consists of Aristotle's principle of contradiction. As to the methodology of the expressional contradiction, for "Real Existence, " I took the cases of ideal dialectic and material dialectic, and analysed the relation between their expressional contradiction.

The Aporias in Plato's Early Dialogues

Although the irony of the Socratic elenchus has long been recognized, little attention has been given to attempting to resolve in detail the aporias in Plato's early dialogues.1 In this paper, I wish to present a few specimen resolutions based on the assumption that the fallacies, omissions, and apparent contradictions producing the aporias are fully intentional on Plato's part.2 The evidence for Plato's deliberateness falls into two main categories: external, or pre-Platonic; and internal, or within Plato's own writings. Into the first category should be placed the fact that before Plato's time deductive techniques and semantic analysis were well developed, intimately related in practice, and repeatedly applied to discussion of philosophical problems. Parmenides' poem presents unprecedented exercise in logical deduction: 3 using geometric reasoning as a model, a metaphysical issue is divided into two cases, and unwanted positions are eliminated by reduction to absurdity. Zeno's paradoxes, which lead to the verge of infinitesimal analysis 4 and reveal an even more thorough mastery of the reductio ad absurdum, suggest also a sophisticated position involving the relativity of movement and the theoretical character of geometric concepts.5 Hippocrates of Chios, who might be called a sophist, though he specialized in the mathematical field, B is probably the inventor of formalized geometric reduction and analysis, both of which as logical techniques are constantly used by Plato's Socrates in the discussion of philosophic issues. Protagoras' dicta and the reports on his work indicate, according to Dupreel's brilliant reconstruction, a pragmatic theory of language, logic, and knowledge.8 Far from denying the principle of contradiction, the great sophist was able to solve the puzzle presented in Parmenides' confusion between a negative predication and a negative existential judgement 9 by an analysis of the relative character

Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study

In the fourth chapter of book  of the Metaphysica Aristotle deals with the principle of contradiction. This law is formulated as follows: ‘it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be’. Let us imagine, says Aristotle, that somebody wished to oppose this view. Our opponent cannot hold a view which contradicts the law of contradiction without assuming the validity of this law itself: for otherwise he is not even denying what we are saying. The only alternative for him, then, will be to say nothing. But this is absurd: of which one line may be quoted here:

The principle of contradiction in recent Soviet philosophy

The principle of contradiction in recent Soviet philosophy

Marxist Dialectics and the Principle of Contradiction

Marxist Dialectics and the Principle of Contradiction