Complete Contracts Research Articles

Comparative Analysis of Collagen and Chitosan-based Dressing for Haemostatic and Wound Healing Application

Collagen and chitosan have haemostatic, tissue fix and wound healing properties but the poor mechanical property limits their application. Therefore, various concentrations of collagen (1-6%) and chitosan (1-2%) were used to develop biopolymer-coated gauzes, with and without glycerol as plasticiser. Glycerol-treated gauzes showed desired mechanical and adhesive property in comparison to polymer-coated gauzes alone. Developed gauzes were characterized using differential scanning calorimetry, thermal gravimetric analysis and Fourier transform infrared spectrophotometry to confirm the biopolymer coating and stability. Scanning electron microscopy showed multilayer coating of the biopolymer and faster clotting in chitosan gauzes in comparison to collagen. Surface plasmon resonance assay confirmed that chitosan exhibited more binding affinity of 65 RU in comparison to collagen, which showed 55 RU with erythrocytes. Decrease in the value of plateletcrit and mean platelet volume confirmed platelet adhesion and aggregation over the surface of polymer-coated dressings. Gamma scintigraphy studies showed 85 ± 2% formulation retention up to 12h at the wound site in comparison to 40 ± 3% retention of the radiopharmaceutical alone. Collagen and chitosan-coated gauze showed 226 ± 15s and 179 ± 12s haemostasis time, respectively, which was significantly less from 506 ± 15s in standard gauze. Chitosan gauze showed faster wound healing in comparison to the collagen-coated gauze. Chitosan and collagen-coated gauzes showed 55 ± 4% wound contraction on day seven in comparison to 25 ± 2% in the control group, while chitosan gauzes showed complete wound contraction on day fourteenth, while the collagen-coated gauze showed 90 ± 3% on the same day.

Change Orders after the Contract Completion Date and Contractual Defects in the “Longest Path” Theory

AbstractA contentious point of discussion between forensic schedule delay analysts and contracts practitioners is the means by which the critical path is determined in a project delay situation aft...

Opportunism and Transaction Costs In Inter-Firm Relationships: Antecedent, Consequence, and Moderator

This study examines the impact of an ex-ante control mechanisms on opportunistic behavior and ex-post transaction costs, as well as how this leads to relationship termination intention. Data gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines is analyzed and used to validate the article's theoretical and empirical contributions. The findings show that contractual completeness has a negative and direct effect on both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism has a positive effect on both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaption costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. Both bargaining and maladaption costs have a positive and direct effect on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on same. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention as well as maladaption costs and relationship termination intention. The implication is that contract completeness can function as an important ex-ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.

Governance of FDI and the East Asian Economic Community

Policy makers in the Asia Economic Community (AEC) engaged in the integration of the countries in the region have so far focused their attention on measures affecting commodity markets. Integration of investment activities should follow in the future. To achieve integration, the policy makers will have to harmonize investment rules. This paper discusses some of the major theoretical and empirical issues of investment governance. The theory is quite clear that, in most cases, cooperation and harmonization of investment rules should be beneficial for countries, a conclusion that is strongly supported by empirical evidence. However, the theory is less clear about specific rules. Though it is still evolving, the theory does provide useful guidance to policy makers in the AEC for negotiating more complete and efficient contracts involving foreign investment.

Bargaining With Charitable Promises: True Preferences and Strategic Behavior

We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges, dishonest proposers can turn the bargaining power to their advantage. Providing ex post information on actual dona-tions while leaving the contract incomplete outperforms a complete contract where proposers cannot renege on their charitable promises. The ex post information allows proposers to improve their (self-)image by voluntarily giving more than pledged and thus proving that the charitable pledge was not used for strategic reasons. We identify proposer competition as another (surprising) mechanism that partly eliminates cheat-ing among accepted offers. We relate our findings to calls for information provision on actual CSR activities within the management literature.

COVID-19 and seafarers' rights to shore leave, repatriation and medical assistance: a pilot study.

The well-being of the world's 1.65 million seafarers is expected to be secured by the rights established under the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), 2006 with active monitoring of its implementation by the flag administrations through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Labour Organisation (ILO). However, the substantial gains achieved since entry into force of MLC in August 2013 appear to have been severely dented by the COVID-19 global pandemic. The aim of the study was to examine, on a pilot basis, the disruptions and challenges to the observance of seafarers' rights to shore leave, repatriation and medical assistance as an immediate consequence of COVID-19. The impact of COVID-19 on seafarers' rights was examined in three dimensions - shore leave, repatriation and medical assistance. Questionnaires were administered online from June to August 2020 to 450 seafarers, top 10 ship-management companies, 35 shipping companies and maritime administrations of top 5 seafarer supplying countries. The paper discusses the results of the survey. The research revealed a previously unknown majority preference for shore leave, that diminished sharply during COVID-19. Impact on work-performance and well-being of seafarers was revealed with only a fifth of the seafarers having willingly agreed to an extension of contract. This study revealed incidence rates at 6 months into the pandemic of several parameters - delayed repatriations (21.44%) that includes crew with contract extensions (12.48%), crew with completed contract awaiting repatriation (8.96%) and crew that had exceeded 12-month continuous service (0.82%). Compensation, if provided, is meagre and was affecting ratings the most. Deprivation of medical assistance was also revealed. The well being of seafarers would likely remain vulnerable to breaches, unless measures are put in place to safeguard the rights assured under MLC in the face of uncertainties caused by a pandemic such as COVID-19.

In Whose Bed Shall I Sleep Tonight? The Impact of Transaction-Specific vs. Partner-Specific Information on Pricing in a Sharing Platform

Sharing platforms such as Airbnb provide rich information on the good or service to be exchanged, as well as elaborate mechanisms to protect against fraud. Thus, one could argue that contracts concluded via such platforms achieve a high level of completeness. According to economic theory, the identity of transaction partners should therefore be more or less irrelevant. Yet, these platforms often also provide an elaborate rating system and reveal considerable information about the transaction partners. These features are often explicitly described as tools to increase trust between the transaction partners, which would not be important in a complete contract setting. In this paper, we empirically analyze whether personal information about hosts provided in Airbnb actually influences prices on that platform using two different data sets. Results indicate that partner-specific information in fact has only a comparatively weak influence on prices, and that the importance of premise-specific vs. partner-specific information varies with the type of premise being rented.

From partners’ learning intent to knowledge leakage: the role of contract and trust

ABSTRACT Alliances are levers to achieve learning and competitiveness, however, with some unintended consequences – knowledge leakage. The present study examines how partner learning intent (PLI), trust, and contract completeness affect knowledge leakage in the Chinese construction industry. Data have been collected from 333 personnel of 22 construction firms of China and analysed through SPSS 23 and PROCESS Macro 3.1. Results show that PLI is positive, whereas trust and contract completeness are negatively related to knowledge leakage. However, the results don’t establish the moderation effect of trust and contract completeness on the relationship between PLI and knowledge leakage. This research study contributes to transaction cost economics theory by acknowledging PLI as a threat and the knowledge leakage as cost of transaction. To knowledge-based view this study reports the direct and negative effects of trust and contract completeness on focal firm’s knowledge leakage ultimately contributing to firms’ Knowledge Management.

Mechanism of Business Contract Drafting in Supporting Economic Activities

The development of business contracts in supporting economic activities, especially in the trade sector, is inseparable from developments in the field of law. Thus, economic actors should understand the contract design method. This article aims to analyze the regulations of business contracts both nationally and internationally, and analize the mechanism of business contract draftingin supporting economic activity. This article is sourced from the results of normative legal research; therefore the method of approach used is the legal approach and conceptual approach. The results of the study indicates that the legal sources which form the basis for regulating business contracts include national law as regulated in Article 1457-1540 of the Civil Code; contract documents; international agreements in the field of contract; court decisions regarding business contracts; and doctrines in the field of contract law. The business contract mechanism includes 3 stages, namely: 1) Pre contractual includes: negotiations on the delivery, delivery and payment of goods; risk of loss if there is a default and procedure for resolving contractual problems; make a Memorandum of Understanding as an initial guideline for the understanding of the parties; Feasibility study concerning the prospects of business contracts made by the parties; 2) Contractual or contractual arrangements include, writing the initial manuscript, revising the manuscript, exchanging draft contracts, revising and writing the final manuscript, and signing of the contract. 3) Contract contractual or contract completion where the parties are responsible for providing guarantees or guarantees that the agreed contract is executed and completed properly. Understanding the mechanism of contract design will facilitate business activities carried out by the parties.

Pioneering Strategy in Supply Chain Relationships: How Coercive Power and Contract Completeness Influence Innovation

Today, firms pursuing a pioneering strategy are often engaged in supply chain relationships to benefit from external resources and to improve their innovation. However, this effort can be impeded by power asymmetries in such relationships and especially by the execution of coercive power by their partner firm. Contracts could potentially reduce this risk of opportunistic behavior. Our survey study on 778 small to medium-sized enterprises in the European packaging and medical equipment industries examines how coercive power of the partner and the contractual arrangement between firms moderate the pioneering strategy's innovation outcomes in the short and long run. Our results confirm the negative effect of coercive power on innovation performance in both the short and long term. However, the compensating effect of rather complete contracts differs temporally. Whereas, contract completeness protects against higher dependence at the beginning of the collaboration, their effect diminishes over time. In contrast, rather incomplete contracts enhance the innovation performance in the long term, possibly complemented with trust.

Recognition of Construction Contract Revenue based on PSAK 34 at PT Tunggal Jaya Raya

All companies have the aim to get profit with maximum. One of the elements related to the acquisition of profit is income. In each type of company certainly have different methods in recognizing its income. In the construction company there are two ways of revenue recognition namely completion percentage and contract completion. This research aims to determine how the revenue recognition of the construction contracts used by PT Tunggal Jaya Raya. This research uses qualitative research methods. The results showed that the company in recognizing its earnings on the basis of cash receipts or cash bases, with a period of 4 months. The company is working on a project with a period of 4 months using the system, but the record is not in accordance with PSAK No. 34. The conclusion of this research is that the company in recognizing the income of contracts if using recognition by the method of settlement percentage preferably with a cost approach so that the value of income and profit value can be recognized more precisely. However, looking at the project time period of 4 months, the company should use the completed contract method.

Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts

Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions triggering payments, giving rise to legal disputes. When complete contract generate Pareto efficient allocations the L&E literature advocates that courts should fill in the missing clauses. This logic does not directly extend to environments with moral hazard, where complete contracts result in constrained efficient allocations. Despite this inefficiency we find that when agency and marginal agency costs are congruent, the legal system can do no better than guide its courts to complete contracts according to the parties’ intentions.

Legal Protection Of Welfare Teacher Assistant Garden Children

The problems that arise in this research are: 1. What is the Realization of Legal Protection for Kindergarten Assistance Teachers' Welfare in Demak Regency, 2. What Barriers Arise in Protecting the Rights of Kindergarten Assistance Teachers in Demak Regency, 3 How is the Kindergarten Assistance Teacher Contract Completion after the employment contract ends.The method used in this research is qualitative descriptive with the research location in Demak Regency. Data sources use primary and secondary data. Respondents in this study were drawn by means of "purposive sampling". Data collection techniques by interview, observation and documentation. Data analysis uses inductive thinking with a flow analysis model which is divided into three main components. To determine the final result, an interactive analysis model is used.The results of the discussion and analysis of this study indicate that the Decree of the Minister of Education No. 034 / U / 2003 Regarding Assisted Teachers, it does not explicitly provide legal protection for the welfare of Kindergarten Assistance Teachers. Barriers that arise in protecting the rights of Assistance Teachers are the absence of the relevance of regulations applicable to Kindergarten Assistance Teachers. The completion of the Assistance Teacher contract agreement after the work contract ends, a Contract Agreement (SPK) is signed once a year until the age of 60 years, if evaluated it still meets the formal requirements. The implementation of legal protection for the welfare of Kindergarten Assistance Teachers has not been as expected.Keywords: Legal Protection, Assistance Teacher Welfare,

An Algorithm Approach to FRAND Contracts

In the context of standards development, the current mechanism of negotiation of FRAND royalties frequently brings to undesirable litigation. This is mainly due to the fact that a relevant part of the information concerning the standard, required to stipulate complete license contracts, is revealed only after the standard itself has spread in the market. In this respect, we propose a litigation-reducing algorithm to determine the FRAND level of the licensing royalty. Unlike the current negotiation mechanism, this algorithm can be defined ex-ante, so to increase contract completeness, because it includes a Bayesian-updating rule, able to address the presence of ex-ante uncertainty. We derive the algorithm from a generic oligopolistic-competition model, so to deliver characteristics of applicability to both price and quantity competition. Simulations in a linear-Cournot framework suggest the algorithm calculates FRAND royalties and may be usefully applied to real-life cases.

The effect of contract completeness on knowledge leakages in collaborative construction projects: a moderated mediation study

PurposeOrganizational networking has been acclaimed as a useful tool for knowledge transfer. However, the demerit associated with knowledge transfer is the leakage of commercially valuable information/knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to empirically establish a useful framework for helping collaborative projects reduce potential knowledge leakages.Design/methodology/approachThe study applies a hybrid methodology to collect data. Postulates are tested through SPSS 23 and Process Macro 3.0 model 7.FindingsThe study finds that knowledge leakage is negatively influenced by contract completeness. Contract completeness has a positive effect on trust and a negative effect on distrust. Partner’s learning intent moderates the relationship of contract completeness with trust and distrust. Trust and distrust negatively mediate the relationship between contract completeness and knowledge leakage.Research limitations/implicationsThe study contributes to the theories of information processing and knowledge management by empirically stating how contract completeness, an organizational structure, supports knowledge management under the influence of partner’s opportunism. The study sees positivism in distrust and explains how practitioners maintain an observatory eye on partner’s opportunism by virtue of distrust ultimately adding value to the distrust literature.Originality/valueThe conceptual framework is novel because this is the first attempt to investigate the moderation effect of partner’s opportunism on the relationship of contract completeness and relational factors; and the mediation effects of trust and distrust between contract completeness and knowledge leakage.

Incomplete Contracts and Employee Opportunism: How Machiavellianism Moderates the Effects of Impacting an Uncompensated Objective

ABSTRACTEmployees could respond to impacting a valued, but uncompensated, organizational objective by behaving more or less opportunistically, depending on whether stewardship or justice theory is at play. Stewardship theory implies employees will be less opportunistic due to feeling more psychological ownership over the firm, whereas justice theory implies more opportunism due to feeling unfairly treated. In an experiment with Mechanical Turk participants, we predict and find lower Machiavellians are less opportunistic (on a subsequent budgeting task) when impacting an uncompensated objective, due to elevated psychological ownership. Also as predicted, higher Machiavellians feel less fairly treated when impacting the objective; however, they do not behave more opportunistically. Instead, they are highly opportunistic both when impacting and not impacting the objective. Collectively, our findings suggest that less complete contracts create stewardship benefits for lower Machiavellian employees that translate to less opportunistic behavior, but create a heightened sense of injustice for higher Machiavellians.

How does contract completeness affect tacit knowledge acquisition?

PurposeThis study aims to empirically investigate the role of contracts in tacit knowledge acquisition in research and development (R&D) alliances. By combining the perspectives of sensemaking and transaction cost economics (TCE), this study proposes a model about the mechanisms through which shared goals and contract completeness jointly affect tacit knowledge acquisition.Design/methodology/approachThis study adopted a quantitative design and used the questionnaire survey method to collect data. The authors finally collected data on 196 R&D alliance samples in China. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.FindingsThere is strong empirical support that contract completeness has a positive effect on shared goals and that shared goals have a positive effect on tacit knowledge acquisition. Meanwhile, contract completeness weakens the positive effect of shared goals on tacit knowledge acquisition. Therefore, this study reveals that contract completeness has an inverted U-shaped effect on tacit knowledge acquisition.Practical implicationsThe findings suggest that managers should consider both the psychological and rational effects of contract governance simultaneously, thus recognizing the importance of a moderate level of contract completeness for tacit knowledge acquisition in R&D alliances.Originality/valueThis study enhances the current understanding of contract governance by integrating the sensemaking and TCE perspectives. The findings provide a possible explanation of how contracts affect tacit knowledge acquisition in R&D alliances. The authors expand the research on contract governance and alliance knowledge acquisition by revealing the inverted U-shaped relationship between contract governance and tacit knowledge acquisition.

The effect of Yashtimadhu ointment on sadyovrana - an experimental study.

Among all this Samhitas of Ayurveda Charaka samhita is a vast treasure of knowledge regarding medicinal plants. Charaka is the first person who could classify the existing plants, into pharmacological categories and given 50 classes which are known as Dashemani. Acharaya Charaka has mentioned Yashtimadhu in the chief 11 Dashemanis which highlights its own importance in Ayurveda. The duration taken for complete wound contraction in Yashtimadhu ointment was much earlier when compare with standard betadine ointment. This was innovative medium of Yashtimadhu ointment preparation for topical application so further clinical study should be conduct. The result of the Yashtimadhu ointment is having potent wound healing activity.

Contracting and Farmers’ Perception of Unfair Trading Practices in the EU Dairy Sector

AbstractIt is commonly asserted that unfair trading practices (UTPs) emerge largely as a result of contract incompleteness. In line with this view it is claimed that making contracts more complete will represent an antidote to UTPs. In this paper we argue that this does not need to be the case. This is because contracts, except for their potential to increase the surplus generated in the transaction, determine how this surplus will be divided. This, in turn, makes it possible for both trading partners to use contractual terms to turn the distributional conflict to their advantage. In the presence of unequal distribution of bargaining power this may lead to a situation in which the stronger party may succeed in tilting the contract in its favour by including UTPs in the contract content. Drawing insights from data collected in 2017 through a field survey among dairy farmers in France, Germany, Poland and Spain, we find support for this argument. Our estimation results show that contract completeness increases the likelihood of farmers reporting that their contracts with processors include the practices that may be considered as UTPs. Further, and also in line with this argument, contract completeness does not seem to affect UTPs during the contract execution or its termination.

Symposium Article: Complete Contracts in Finance

Notwithstanding its significant influence in corporate finance, the theory of incomplete contracts is arguably misunderstood by courts enforcing contracts governing corporate transactions. In resolving such disputes, judges implicitly assume that complete contracts are both achievable and desirable when the parties are financially sophisticated, and they systematically assign blame to one of the parties for leaving the contract incomplete. This, in turn, prompts parties to write ever longer and more complex agreements. Such agreements do not necessarily produce more efficient outcomes, however. In fact, they may yield unexpected outcomes or interpretations, which can be enforced opportunistically by one of the parties or by third parties.